diff options
| author | tv <tv@krebsco.de> | 2026-11-08 14:13:05 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tv <tv@krebsco.de> | 2026-11-08 15:26:03 +0100 |
| commit | 69a08327d24d08ba7a4e879116eeff60ac2a3874 (patch) | |
| tree | ca822e7efe7123c290fd7923034cd5123fe5584a /src/api/dashboard/login.html | |
| parent | 5de2994c6d8f5f266d60b4febdf9252a035488ad (diff) | |
dashboard: hand over a token reading the member list only
Review finding 8, second part: opening another member's dashboard
handed it a token reading everything (READ_ALL). A member writes its
own dashboard URL, so a malicious one received a read-everything token
under the operator's identity: /admin/config, /admin/changes,
/admin/log and the rest, on every node the user reaches.
The token handed over now reads the member list only (READ_MEMBERS, as
sent to subscribed nodes), which is enough to draw the map; the user
logs in at the other dashboard to see more. With 1151 it lasts five
minutes and isn't refreshed past them.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/api/dashboard/login.html')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/api/dashboard/login.html | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/api/dashboard/login.html b/src/api/dashboard/login.html index e09d31c..74c9fd1 100644 --- a/src/api/dashboard/login.html +++ b/src/api/dashboard/login.html @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ document.getElementById("token").addEventListener("submit", async event => { try { await begin(event.target.token.value.trim()); } catch (error) { failed(error); } }); // Opened from another member's dashboard (`handOff`), sent here for want of a session: -// its token, reading only, begins one; the rest goes on to the dashboard. +// its token, reading the member list only, begins one; the rest goes on to the dashboard. (async () => { const HAND_OFF = "#continuum="; if (!location.hash.startsWith(HAND_OFF)) return; |
