docs: what is postponed or rejected stays in its own two files

Docs and comments outside future-work.md and review-rejections.md say what the code
does, and point nowhere else for what it doesn't: the architecture page's map, the
transports' forwarders, keys with `/`, a strict swarm's registry, trust.md's "Not yet"
(now saying what isn't protected, in a sentence), the topology bench, and the comments
of the change benchmarks, capabilities' grantor, tokens, dissemination, refusals and
topology.

3 files changed, 5 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/docs/access.md b/docs/access.md
index 7bacd91..1397656 100644
--- a/docs/access.md
+++ b/docs/access.md
@@ -468,8 +468,7 @@ kind, which its proposal and its snapshot's metadata say: a majority of members
 labelling it otherwise (`compact`, its snapshot holding the registry it wants) gets it
 followed, as nodes whose own build differs take the quorum's snapshot. So a strict
 swarm's registry, policy and bans change by its users' signatures against a minority of
-members, not against a majority ([`trust.md`](trust.md); comparing a downloaded snapshot
-with the node's own build is in [`future-work.md`](future-work.md)). Compaction
+members, not against a majority ([`trust.md`](trust.md)). Compaction
 that keeps, at the places values are signed (the registry, `_continuum/access`, the
 bans, the paths listed in `userSigned`), only the values an operator looked over and
 signed, and sets the strict policy. What was written after its base reaches the new
diff --git a/docs/topology.md b/docs/topology.md
index 31abcf5..674eaed 100644
--- a/docs/topology.md
+++ b/docs/topology.md
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ Mycelium's round trips and 267 ms over Tor's: flooding on the member list's grap
 to that (its 12 neighbours give more paths than the bench's figure counts), writers'
 trees take 94 and 324 ms. PlumTree's gap is its tree's depth: along eager links alone
 a member is 5 to 6 hops from another over Mycelium's round trips (writers' trees: 1.9),
-3.4 to 4.3 over Tor's (1.8). `docs/future-work.md` (Swappable topology and
-dissemination) says how it got there and what was tried.
+3.4 to 4.3 over Tor's (1.8).
 
 HyParView's active views settle at 5 neighbours each, nearly all held at both ends (up
 to 3 links of about 125 at one end only, at the end of a run). A member one short asks
diff --git a/docs/trust.md b/docs/trust.md
index 3839958..72a238d 100644
--- a/docs/trust.md
+++ b/docs/trust.md
@@ -159,6 +159,6 @@ Not against a hostile member, but against honest ones getting in each other's wa
 
 ## Not yet
 
-What is left of protecting the swarm against its members, and of keys in browsers, is in
-[`future-work.md`](future-work.md): Write protection by checking changes, Read access
-beyond sealed values, Keys in browsers.
+A member is trusted with what its own node writes as itself: checking changes protects
+protocol data and the paths listed as signed, not data at large; reading is protected
+only for sealed values; and keys stay out of browsers.