| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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We already have osmo_str2lower() and osmo_str2upper(), but these lack:
* proper destination buffer bounds checking,
* ability to call directly as printf() argument.
Deprecate osmo_str2upper() and osmo_str2lower() because of missing bounds
checking.
Introduce osmo_str_tolower_buf(), osmo_str_toupper_buf() to provide
bounds-safe conversion, also able to safely convert a buffer in-place.
Introduce osmo_str_tolower(), osmo_str_toupper() that call the above _buf()
equivalents using a static buffer[128] and returning the resulting string
directly, convenient for direct printing. Possibly truncated but always safe.
Add unit tests to utils_test.c.
Replace all libosmocore uses of now deprecated osmo_str2lower().
Naming: the ctype.h API is called tolower() and toupper(), so just prepend
'osmo_str_' and don't separate 'to_lower'.
Change-Id: Ib0ee1206b9f31d7ba25c31f8008119ac55440797
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In the past, the function ipa_ccm_idtag_parse() was used to parse
the payload of IPA CCM ID RESP packets. However, the function was
based on a possible misunderstanding of the message encoding, and
callers actually counted the first (upper) length nibble as part
of the header and passed a pointer to the second
(lower) length nibble of the first TLV into this function. As such,
it was unfixable, and had to be replaced with a new function called
ipa_ccm_id_resp_parse(). At the same time, we also add
ipa_ccm_id_get_parse() to parse the slightly different format of
the IPA CCM ID GET payload.
We can never be 100% sure what is "correct", as our understanding
of the protocol is entirely based on protocol analysis, without any
official documentation available.
This patch also introduces unit test coverage for both of the new
functions.
Revert "ipa: Add libosmogsm.map entry for ipa_ccm_idtag_parse_off"
This reverts commit 7f31c90b80c08fbfe2d84d70d397402fdb38b94c.
Revert "ipa: Properly parse LV stream of a ID_GET request"
This reverts commit f558ed4bb9c0f00997b8f97c2b251a574c1a64c4.
It introduced a function/behavior that was not originally intended:
The parse of IPA CCM ID GET (8bit length followed by 1 byte tag
and variable-length payload) instead of the IPA CCM ID RESP (16bit
length followed by 1 byte tag and variable-length payload).
Change-Id: I1834d90fbcdbfcb05f5b8cfe39bfe9543737ef8f
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Change-Id: I1ebeba2067549e0dd1541fa84715d44321ff3b43
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This came from osmo-bsc refactoring patch I82e3f918295daa83274a4cf803f046979f284366
https://gerrit.osmocom.org/#/c/osmo-bsc/+/9671/6/src/osmo-bsc/gsm_data.c@1708
Add regression test in utils_test.c.
Change-Id: I1f2918418c38918c5ac70acaa51a47adfca12b5e
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Recent OS#3407 shows that we should verify stderr to catch sanitizer failures.
(They might not always be ignorable like that one.)
Change-Id: Ic9e437a1cc96ae081e0fd6a9b6e3156987e14c0c
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Multiplying the uint16_t x by itself seems to default to be calculated in
int32_t range, while it obviously needs uint32_t. This causes sporadic
sanitizer barfs:
Testing integer square-root
utils_test.c:445:18: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 60369 * 60369 cannot be represented in type 'int'
The final result is still correct, because it is in fact interpreted as uint32_t.
Cast to uint32_t to make sure the sanitizer doesn't complain.
Related: OS#3407
Change-Id: I83c14e38deaa466d977ee43c9420534ed90f090d
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Change-Id: I2b96db6e037e72e92317fec874877e473a1cf909
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Rationale: with osmo_escape_str(), you get the escaped contents of the string,
but not so graceful handling of NULL strings. The caller needs to quote it, and
for NULL strings not quote it.
osmo_quote_str() is like osmo_escape_str() but always quotes a non-NULL string,
and for a NULL string returns a literal NULL, i.e. it should (tm) give the
exact C representation of a string.
That's useful in testing, to show exactly what char* situation we have, without
jumping through hoops like
if (str)
printf("\"%s\"", osmo_escape_str(str, -1));
else
printf("NULL");
Copy the unit test for osmo_escape_str() and adjust. To indicate that the
double quotes are returned by osmo_quote_str(), use single quotes in the test
printf()s.
I considered allowing to pick the quoting characters by further arguments, but
that complicates things: we'd need to escape the quoting characters. Just
hardcode double quotes like C.
Change-Id: I6f1b3709b32c23fc52f70ad9ecc9439c62b02a12
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It seems with default flags in_buf was being memzeroed by the compiler.
When compiling with -O0, that's not the case anymore and printf prints
after first 16 bytes, printing extra garbage which doesn't match the
expected output.
Change-Id: I736c1e4d625f647d3bb794fa717256e9dbf36e87
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To report invalid characters in identifiers, it is desirable to escape any
weird characters. Otherwise we might print stray newlines or control characters
in the log output.
ctrl_test.c already uses a print_escaped() function, which will be replaced by
osmo_escape_str() in a subsequent patch.
control_cmd.c will use osmo_escape_str() to log invalid identifiers.
Change-Id: Ic685eb63dead3967d01aaa4f1e9899e5461ca49a
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Sounds stupid, but we actually didn't support hex nibbles in one of
the two directions of the conversion, so let's make sure we test for
this.
Change-Id: I8445da54cc4f9b1cd64f286c2b238f4f7c87accb
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Will be used by OsmoHLR to validate VTY and CTRL input.
Change-Id: Idf75946eb0a84e145adad13fc7c78bb7a267aa0a
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This is particularly useful for hex dumps containing spaces found in a log
(e.g. osmo-nitb authentication rand token), which can now be passed in quotes
to osmo-auc-gen without having to edit the spaces away.
Change-Id: Ib7af07f674a2d26c8569acdee98835fb3e626c45
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Change-Id: Ic95ab00b57d54905a235109561c00419161cf4bc
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For some reason the structure is closer to be a LV (length
and value). The value is actually a tag but it is counted
inside the length. Introduce an overload of the parse function
to provide an offset for the length. This will be taken from
the returned length.
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In the osmo-bts and libosmo-abis code the hexdump routine is used
for every incoming/outgoing packet (including voice frames) and the
usage of snprintf showed up inside profiles.
There is a semantic change when more than 4096 characters are used.
The code will now truncate at byte boundaries (and not nibbles).
Code:
static const int lengths[] = { 23, 1000, 52 };
char buf[4096];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 30000; ++i)
char *res = osmo_hexdump(buf, lengths[i & 3]);
Results:
before: after:
real 0m3.233s real 0m0.085s
user 0m3.212s user 0m0.084s
sys 0m0.000s sys 0m0.000s
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This code makes a simple dump and tests for the corner case
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