From bcda4d67483239691b045c5b978047f017f3b9e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: slopulus Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 20:01:42 +0100 Subject: continuum-party: signing through an ssh-agent A key held in hardware is never a file: only an ssh-agent signs with it. Given a public key as `--key` (a `.pub` file, `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), the client asks the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign what SSHSIG signs (a sign request with the key's blob, no flags) and writes the blob around the agent's signature as `ssh-keygen -Y sign` does. An ECDSA signature the agent gives with a high `s` is made low, the other of its two spellings, which the federation takes. What it makes is checked before it is used. A private key file signs as it did. A test starts `ssh-agent`, adds an ECDSA and an Ed25519 key to it and deletes their files, signs through it, and has both continuum and `ssh-keygen -Y verify` check each signature, one of an agent's high-S answers among them. Without OpenSSH it asks nothing. --- src/federation/mod.rs | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'src/federation/mod.rs') diff --git a/src/federation/mod.rs b/src/federation/mod.rs index f7853e7..bb14be3 100644 --- a/src/federation/mod.rs +++ b/src/federation/mod.rs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ // Built stage by stage: parts of it are used by nothing yet, or by tests alone. #![allow(dead_code)] +pub(crate) mod agent; #[cfg(test)] mod attacks; pub(crate) mod client; -- cgit v1.3.1