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* access: maps made on the way judged by what they holdtv3 days1-0/+84
| | | | | | | | | | | | A write makes the maps on its way where there are none (store::write_path); the rules judged each made map as a write at its own path, so a user whose capability lies below a map not made yet (write on servers/eu, a first PUT at servers/eu/0) had its first write taken by its node and refused by every other. A map made where there was none, in a change writing within it, is now judged by what is written within it. Review finding 3 (parent maps created on the way).
* access: signed values in before the next is judgedtv3 days1-2/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | Under a strict policy the rules read user data: the value at a signed place (prev) and what holds one. A batch judged at its frontier missed a signed write earlier in the same batch, so two successive signed writes at one path received together were refused on some nodes and taken on others. A change at, within or above a signed path now goes in before the next is judged. Review finding 2.
* access: judged by the policy written undertv3 days2-2/+40
| | | | | | | | | | The rules read the policy at the change's dependencies only for strict mode, so history from before the policy was judged by today's rules when a late node caught up, or when REFUSALS had it judged again. A change written while the document had no policy, or one this node doesn't know, is now judged by none. Review finding 6.
* access: a forgotten node cancels its own recordtv3 days1-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | A node forgotten swarm-wide while alive cancels its forget record with a change naming no user; the rules judged _continuum/forgotten by the registry alone, so every node refused the cancellation and everything the node wrote after it. A node may now write its own _continuum/forgotten/<id>, as it may its member entry. Review finding 4.
* access: an epoch's root is never droppedtv3 days4-4/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A REFUSALS naming the swarm's first change made the node receiving it judge that change again in a document that isn't empty, refuse it as "a change without dependencies that isn't the epoch's root", and drop it with everything built on it: its whole document. The first epoch's root is now the first change a document holds, as it comes to an empty one or as it is in one; a change judged again on a peer's word is never refused for having no dependencies; and drop_taken refuses to drop an epoch's root, or anything that would leave nothing kept, logging an error instead. Review finding 1 (critical).
* dashboard: flashes below labelstv3 days1-3/+5
| | | | Flashes are drawn beneath the nodes' labels.
* dashboard: message flashestv3 days1-31/+93
| | | | | messages: off / dots / flash: a message expands at its own speed and leaves an afterglow fading out in the direction it went.
* simtest: members against the rules, and a policy unknowntv3 days1-0/+102
| | | | | | | | A member writing past its API's checks is refused, told, drops its change and is taken again; a node under a policy it doesn't know takes no writes and syncs on. Auth plan M6 (tests).
* dashboard: a token handed over to another member's dashboardtv3 days3-9/+52
| | | | | | | | Opening another member's dashboard passes a token reading only, for five minutes, in the URL's fragment; its login page begins a session with it. Tokens may be asked for with a shorter lifetime. Auth plan M3 (hand-off).
* swarm: changes taken unjudged, dropped (REFUSALS)tv3 days12-34/+444
| | | | | | | | | A node refusing changes a peer brought tells it which broke a rule; the peer judges them itself, and if its rules refuse them too, drops them with all built on them (its document forked without them, a fresh actor), quarantining its own writes among them. Wire version 42. Auth plan M6 (rejoin on taint).
* access: members refused as a wholetv3 days7-3/+146
| | | | | | | | | With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats (sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is taken again or the epoch changes. Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
* auth: the session cookie lets in reads onlytv3 days2-10/+27
| | | | | | | | The cookie lets in GET, HEAD and the session's own requests; anything changing something brings the token itself, which no page of another site or port can make a browser send. The dashboard's writes send it. Auth plan M3 (browsers).
* access: refused oncetv3 days4-16/+199
| | | | | | | | A refused change is remembered by its hash: offered again it is refused without decoding, judging or logging, so is one built on it, and a peer offering nothing else is answered later each time, up to a minute. Auth plan M6 (re-sending).
* auth: a login page and browser sessionstv3 days6-18/+226
| | | | | | | | | GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token (from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser without a user there and renews the session while open. Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
* simtest: sealed valuestv3 days1-1/+81
| | | | | | | A value sealed for its declared readers goes everywhere; one sealed for a stranger too, or plain, gets nothing past the others. Auth plan M8.
* access: values sealed for their readerstv3 days5-1/+484
| | | | | | | | | | cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys, which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt. Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers as users only (nodes hold no keys).
* simtest: a strict swarmtv3 days1-1/+154
| | | | | | | | Signed values everywhere, carried over by a remake and replaced after it; a member writing the registry or a signed path plain gets nothing past the others. Auth plan M7.
* access: --bootstrap-keystv3 days6-20/+89
| | | | | | | The first users' SSH keys, recorded at genesis with their entries, so a swarm can be strict from its start. Auth plan M7.
* auth: logging in by keytv3 days6-7/+310
| | | | | | | | POST /auth/challenge and /auth/login/key: a node-signed challenge, valid five minutes and taken once, signed with one of the user's SSH keys (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-login), for a token. Auth plan M7 (key login, M2b).
* access: signed values judged on receipttv3 days4-16/+313
| | | | | | | | | Inspection gives each operation's kind; under strict every node refuses, at a signed place, anything but an envelope that checks and replaces the one there (deleting first as replacing does), anything within one, and above one anything replacing what holds one. Auth plan M7.
* access: a node registers before it writestv3 days2-37/+114
| | | | | | | | | Under a policy, a change by a node that isn't a member is refused with all built on it: a node's registration is written before any write of its own or through the API, not after (the registration itself exempt). Auth plan M6 (fix).
* api: signed values at the storetv3 days5-19/+317
| | | | | | | | | PUT with application/continuum-signed writes an envelope where values are signed (403/409 saying why); reads open envelopes and name the signer (x-continuum-signed-by), ?raw=true shows them. Under strict, unsigned writes reaching a signed value and the users API are 409. Auth plan M7.
* access: strict policy, signed pathstv3 days6-26/+151
| | | | | | | | | "values": "signed" (strict, requiring signatures too): the registry, _continuum/access, bans and the paths in _continuum/access/userSigned (* for any key) hold values their users signed. Envelopes read as the values they hold where the node reads protocol data. Auth plan M7.
* access: logouts apart from users' entriestv3 days5-23/+30
| | | | | | | | _continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked, written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users' entries can be signed by their managers alone. Auth plan M7.
* access: values signed by their userstv3 days5-2/+289
| | | | | | | | | access::envelope: cv1.<payload>.<signature>, the payload naming the path, value, user, time and the envelope it replaces (prev), signed with one of the user's SSH keys from the registry (keys). Checked against the registry as the writer saw it. Auth plan M7.
* access: SSH signaturestv3 days2-0/+260
| | | | | | | access::sshsig: OpenSSH's SSHSIG, verified and made natively (Ed25519, sha512/sha256), checked against OpenSSH's own test vector. Auth plan M7.
* docs: what is left of write protectiontv3 days1-1/+1
| | | | future-work brought up to date with M6.
* access: banstv3 days5-1/+75
| | | | | | | | _continuum/banned/<node ID>: every node refuses the banned node's changes from then on (judged as the ban stood) and leaves its handshakes unanswered. Auth plan M6.
* simtest: the policy, and a remake under ittv3 days2-0/+165
| | | | | | | | A swarm judging every change: honest writes everywhere, a joining node registers, a forged write stays where it was made; a compaction under the policy refuses nothing honest. Auth plan M6.
* access: signatures requiredtv3 days8-22/+279
| | | | | | | | "signatures": "required": a change counts only once a signature by its committer vouches for it, and waits until then; every node then signs every change it makes. Auth plan M6.
* access: the policy enforcedtv3 days11-9/+288
| | | | | | | | _continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused. Auth plan M6.
* access: screening received changestv3 days5-2/+418
| | | | | | | | | access::screen: a batch of received changes judged change by change, those that change what rules read applied before the next is judged; a refused change stays out with whatever builds on it, kept aside for operators; changes missing dependencies wait. Auth plan M6.
* remake: replays keep their writerstv3 days5-27/+200
| | | | | | | | A remake's replay writes each value as the user who wrote it, splitting where several users wrote under a path, so replays are judged as the original writes. Auth plan M6 (remakes, 2.4).
* remake: forgetting and releasing name their usertv3 days4-6/+52
| | | | | | | Forget records and released quarantines name the user who made them, so they are judged by its capabilities. Auth plan M6.
* access: rules by pathtv3 days4-2/+411
| | | | | | | | | | access::rules::judge: a change judged as its writer saw the document (at its dependencies): committer a member or registering itself; members' entries and votes their own; epochs and swarm ID from roots; a remake's decision by its coordinator; the rest by the registry for the user the change names. Auth plan M6.
* inspect: the paths changes touchtv3 days3-1/+300
| | | | | | | | document::inspect: each change's paths read from its operations before it is applied, the same on every node: an object's place as made, cut at lists and text; unknown objects at the root. Auth plan M6.
* bench: change pathstv3 days2-2/+153
| | | | | | | Finding the paths changes touch, from documents and from raw change bytes, measured before M6 is built. Auth plan M6 (measure first).
* simtest: signed changestv3 days2-1/+115
| | | | | | | Every change vouched for on every node within a second; a forged signature vouches for nothing. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: verified changestv3 days2-11/+16
| | | | | | | GET /admin/changes shows whether a signature by its node vouches for each change. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: on their own (SIGNATURES)tv3 days9-5/+131
| | | | | | | Signatures no sync message took go on their own within a second, to each peer not sent them yet (wire version bumped). Auth plan M5.
* signatures: with sync messagestv3 days8-45/+311
| | | | | | | Sync messages carry, for each actor's writes, the latest signature the sender checked; the receiver checks it once it holds the change. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: kept in the document filetv3 days7-61/+264
| | | | | | | A node's signatures are saved with its document (--document-file) and loaded with it. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: --sign-everytv3 days6-5/+187
| | | | | | | | Changes left unsigned are vouched for by the node's next signature: --sign-every 1s (default) signs the latest within a second, all signs every change, none only those that must be. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: changes signed by their nodetv3 days10-14/+251
| | | | | | | | | | Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519 signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones. Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed, and writes with ?signed=true. Auth plan M5.
* bench: change signaturestv3 days1-0/+229
| | | | | | | Signing and checking change signatures, per change and per actor's latest change, measured before M5 is built (development.md). Auth plan M5 (measure first).
* access: no manages flagtv3 days2-8/+3
| | | | | | | GET /admin/users no longer lists a manages flag per user: whether a user may manage users follows from its capabilities. Auth plan M1 (cleanup).
* dashboard: subscriptions under patchestv3 days1-5/+17
| | | | | | | Subscribed nodes' data merged into the state as the page patches it, not overwritten by the next patch. Auth plan M3 (fix).
* dashboard: without LINKS; LINKS removedtv3 days18-1789/+281
| | | | | | | | | The dashboard reads every member's links from the members themselves; LINKS and LINKS_REPLY, swarm::links and their wire tags go (wire version bumped). Nodes the browser can't reach are drawn from what the reachable ones measure. Auth plan M3.
* dashboard: clocks on the pagetv3 days3-143/+50
| | | | | | | | The page compares the clocks the reports on its map carry: this node's peers', and those of the nodes it subscribes to; the node no longer gathers them from LINKS (api/dashboard/clocks.rs goes). Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).
* dashboard: the writers' trees as this node knows themtv3 days2-46/+16
| | | | | | | | The tree drawn is computed as every node computes its own part of it: from the member list, and whom it and its neighbours reach, as they told it; no longer from the links members report over LINKS. Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).