| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Where the new epoch holds as high a `seq` at a signed place as the old
one reads, the chain isn't replayed: it was counted as superseded and
left out even with `--superseded-writes quarantine`, unlike every other
write a newer one superseded. Now it goes to the quarantine then too.
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Under a strict policy, the links of the chains to signed values were
ordered across places by their changes' timestamps. How a link is
judged in the new epoch depends on what was replayed before it: a key
added to a user's entry, a capability granted. A write signed with a
key added a moment before, through a node whose clock is behind, went
first, was refused and quarantined, though every node had taken it.
The changes replayed (`between`) now come each after those it builds
on, clocks deciding only between changes neither of which saw the
other, then the lower hash; the links follow that order, and an
envelope takes its time from the first change that wrote it there.
remakes.md says so, and what becomes of a place where a link is
refused. Without a strict policy there are no links, and nothing
changes.
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A rejoin replays in two parts: what was written before it began, then
what was written during it. A chain to a signed value was read to what
the old document reads now, from the envelopes written within the part:
a value written again during the rejoin made the first part's chain
lead to an envelope that part doesn't hold, and the second part's start
from one it doesn't either. Both were quarantined, and the new epoch
kept the base's value.
Each part's chain now leads to what the old document reads where that
part ends.
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A change written under a policy that isn't strict was refused, in a
strict document, unless it was in the history of the change that wrote
the policy value the document read now. So the policy written again by
a node that held a change from before, taken beside the strict policy,
put that change in the new writer's history: that node kept it, every
other node refused it, and the new policy with it, and the node was cut
off.
Now the reference is the change that turned the swarm strict: one that
wrote a strict policy where the policy at its history wasn't, found by
following back the writes of what the policy holds
(`store::writers`). A change written under a policy that isn't strict is
refused where such a change is beside it, neither in its history nor
built on it. A policy written again, strict over strict, names the same
change.
One turning the swarm strict beside it is refused like any other. Of
two at once neither is preferred: any rule choosing one, the lower hash
say, would let a change made later to look as old take the place of the
one every node took, and every node would drop it with all that was
built on it. So two members turning a swarm strict at once split the
nodes that took one from those that took the other; access.md says to
turn it from one.
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Where the policy asks for signed values, a place's value is chosen by
`seq`, but conflict reports still called the choice `newestWins`, and
the code and the architecture still said "newest" of what a read
shows. A report names it `highestSeq`; the rest says "the one a read
shows".
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A swarm turned strict by writing the policy into it kept the time
before open: a change whose history lacks the policy's change is
judged by the policy then, none or one that isn't strict, needs no
signature there, and is taken whenever it comes, from any member. With
values read by `seq`, an envelope planted at that time with the
highest `seq` there is can never be followed: a ban, a user, a
declaration, for good.
Once a document's policy is strict, a change written under one that
isn't is refused, received or held, unless it is in the history of the
change that wrote the policy the document reads (`store::written_by`).
A node that holds one beside that change, taken before it came, is
told so by any peer that refused it (REFUSALS), judges it again, now
refuses it too, and drops it with what builds on it, as for any change
it took unjudged. A swarm strict from its genesis change has no such
time; one whose policy isn't strict judges as before.
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A swarm strict from its start had its policy written by its first user
in a later change. A change is judged by the policy at its history, so
any member could always add a change whose history is from before the
policy: judged by none, needing no signature, taken whenever it comes.
Since signed values are read by `seq`, an envelope planted there with
the highest `seq` there is can never be followed: a ban, a user, a
declaration, for good.
`--bootstrap-policy JSON`, with `--genesis`, records the policy in the
genesis change, with the first users: then no change of the swarm is
from before it. It must be a policy this node knows, and a strict one
needs `--bootstrap-keys`, or nobody could sign what decides who may do
what.
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Under a strict policy, a replay wrote at each path the old document's
merged view: at a place of a value its user signed, the last envelope
alone, whose `prev` names one the new epoch doesn't hold if the value
was written twice since the base. Every node refused it, it went to
the quarantine, and the new epoch kept the base's value: a remake
rolled back every signed value changed twice since its base, and a
rejoining node lost its own the same way. And the replay found what
changed by Automerge's diff, which says nothing of a value that
changed beside Automerge's own choice: where a place held two values
at the base, a write replacing the one read by `seq` wasn't replayed
at all.
Now, under a strict policy, the places of signed values are found from
the changes' operations as well as from the diff, and each is replayed
as the chain that leads to the envelope the old document reads: every
envelope from the one the new document holds there, following `prev`
through the changes since the base, each in a change of its own by its
signer at the time it was made, judged as every node will judge it.
A place is replayed only where the new document holds a lower `seq`
there; where no chain leads from what it holds, it goes to the
quarantine. A path above such places is split into its keys. Without
a strict policy nothing changes.
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Where the policy asks for signed values, a place's value is chosen by
`seq`, but two readers still took Automerge's own choice: an increment
found the counter beside an envelope a read showed (answering the
counter), and `inspect::placed`, which the API's checks go by, walked
through whatever Automerge chose. Both now take the value a read shows
(`store::shown`). A list's items keep Automerge's choice, as before:
no signed value is one, and reading a list whole goes by it.
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The order by `seq` sat in `store::candidates`, which every swarm reads
through: in a swarm that isn't strict, a string shaped like an
envelope, written at the same time as a plain value or a map, was read
first. What a swarm without a strict policy reads must not change for
signed values.
The order now applies only where the policy asks for signed values
(`"values": "signed"`), as any value at the policy's place says, read
as written (`signs_values`), so the policy's own reading doesn't go
round. Elsewhere `candidates` is newest first, as always. It is looked
at only where a place holds several values and one is an envelope.
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`put_signed` added one to the `seq` of the envelope there unchecked:
at `u64::MAX` it panicked where overflow is checked and wrapped where
it isn't. It adds as `envelope::check` does, and nothing follows
`u64::MAX`: `409`, as for any write not numbered after what is there.
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Three parts read an envelope three ways: the store's order took any
string with the prefix whose meta held a `seq`, its reads any whose
value decoded, the checks only one with four parts and a meta of
exactly its fields. A string that the first two took and the checks
refused was read first, read as the registry's or the policy's value,
and treated as nothing by the check of the next write there.
`document::signed` reads an envelope the one way: four parts, the
value JSON, the meta exactly its six fields (one more, or one twice,
and it isn't one), no newline in either, the signature decoding. The
store's order, its plain reads, the checks, the API and the users API
all go by it. What isn't one in every respect is a plain string,
wherever it is read.
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A member could put a user's older signed value back beside a newer
one: a change made with dependencies from before both is judged where
the place was empty, so the older envelope (`prev` empty) is taken;
and of values written at once, the one read was the one with the
highest operation, which whoever writes the change steers. A revoked
capability, a lifted ban or an earlier policy came back that way,
signed by whoever signed it then.
An envelope is now `cv2.<value>.<meta>.<signature>`: the value as its
user wrote it, and apart from it what continuum adds (swarm, path,
user, at, seq, prev), the signature over the value's line and the
meta's. `seq` is one more than that of the envelope it replaces, 0
where it replaces none; every node checks it with `prev`.
Of the values a place holds, written at once, signed ones are read
before any other, the highest `seq` first, of equal ones the lower
digest (`store::candidates`): reads, snapshots and writes all go by
it. An older envelope beside a newer one changes nothing.
`application/continuum-signed` is the value's line, the meta's, then
the signature; `scripts/continuum-signed` writes and checks it so.
The wire version goes up: nodes must agree on what a place's value is.
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`active_views_settle_and_heal` waited 60 s for the views to settle, on
lossy links. A DISCONNECT lost leaves a link at one end until the next
reaffirm round (`REAFFIRM_EVERY`, 60 s): the wait timed out with one
member holding another that no longer held it. It waits twice that, as
the heal after it does.
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A neighbour pulls heads a STATUS listed only if it still lacks them after
a round trip to the sender, as they are usually on their way along a
writer's tree. With no round trip known, or one measured long ago (busy
pairs send no keepalives), it pulled at once; with a short one, a STATUS
sent right after a change can overtake it by more than that round trip,
delays varying per message. Either way the change came twice
(`trees_hold_through_continuous_writes`: c pulled once while every write
reached it along x's tree).
The wait is the round trip, but 50 ms at least (and 1 s at most, as
before).
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`no_mark` typed at 0 to 4 into a text of three characters: splicing at 4
is past its end. It types at 0 to 3.
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Screening asked of every operation naming an element that the element was
inserted as a value or an object, inserting or not. In a document that
took a mark before marks were refused, a transaction typing right after it
inserts after the mark's begin or end, and was refused: every node refused
the change of the node that typed, and all it wrote after.
An element is written at only where a value or an object was put; an
insert may follow any element of that list, as transactions insert.
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Twice, crafting changes by hand missed some that pass screening's checks
and break Automerge; a program generating them found three more kinds.
This test does the same: on documents three honest writers wrote at once
(maps, a list, a text, a counter), changes of one to four operations of
every kind, at random places, naming as replaced nothing, what is there,
or any operation. Each that passes the checks is applied, given back by
its hash, saved and loaded, taken by a peer that lacks it, written after
by an honest node, and saved and loaded again; nothing of that may fail
or panic. The run is seeded, the seed named where it fails, and
CHANGES_GENERATED sets how many documents (60 by default) for a longer
run.
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Screening took marks in a text, checking that a mark's end comes at its
begin or after it, by walking the elements each is inserted after back to
the text's head: up to 22 s for one change of 9 KB. And it took a value
put at a mark's begin or end, replacing it: sound until an honest node
edits that text, then the node panics at its next sync or append, and its
save doesn't load.
Continuum's store writes no marks. A change with a mark's begin or end is
now refused, and the walk is gone. An element written at is one a value
or an object was inserted as.
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Screening took a table for a map. A table made is sound, but Automerge
panics applying a change that puts a value into one, made by that change
or a later one, and applying isn't caught where it panics. Transactions
make a table and can't write into it; continuum's store makes none.
A change making a table is refused, and so is one writing into a table
the document holds.
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Screening took as replaced any operation made at that object and key
without inserting: a deletion, an increment, a mark. A transaction names
only what holds a value there: a counter incremented and put over names
its put alone, a key put again after its deletion names nothing.
Automerge takes a value put again naming its deletion, at a map's key or
a list's element, and then gives back another change under its hash: a
save that doesn't load, a sync that fails. A deletion naming a deletion
panics as it is given back. An increment naming a deletion does the
same as a put.
What an operation names as replaced now put a value or made an object.
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Nothing installs a subscriber in the transport's tests: RUST_LOG gave no
output there, where a transient failure needs it. The first node a test run
makes installs one, writing into the test's output, which is shown where a
test fails.
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Screening asked what an operation isn't: a deletion replacing nothing, a
value put at a list's head without inserting, a mark ended but right after
its begin. Others pass that Automerge's transactions never write, and
Automerge takes them and breaks: an element written over naming as replaced
the element inserted after it (an inserted element's key is the element it
follows, its place is itself), an insert replacing something, a deletion or
an increment inserted, an increment at a list's head, a mark ended ahead of
its begin or at the head, a mark in a list. Giving such a change back
panics or gives another change under its hash, and the save doesn't load.
Each operation is now asked to be one transactions write
(`document::changes::unwritten`): inserted, a value, an object or a mark's
begin or end into a list or a text, replacing nothing; at a list's element,
never its head, without inserting, replacing what is at that element; at a
map's key, never inserted, a deletion or an increment replacing something;
a mark's begin with its end as the next operation, both inserted. A value
replaced at a list's element is the element itself or written at it, not an
element inserted after it. Marks are only in a text, and a mark's end is at
its begin or at an element after the begin's: their places follow from the
elements each is inserted after, back to the text's head, as the change's
history holds them.
The document the tests write now has counters in a list and a map, an
element written over, and marks over a span, the whole text, none of it, and
across what was deleted and inserted since; and each case above is a test.
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`what_transactions_never_write_is_refused` checked changes built on
the insert against a document without the deletion the insert builds
on. Such a change isn't ready, and nothing is asked of it: the honest
insert passed for that reason, and the two crafted from it weren't
refused. Each is checked now against a document that holds what it
builds on.
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Automerge 0.12.0 takes some changes that name nothing wrong, and then
can't give them back: a deletion that replaces nothing, a value put
at a list's head without being inserted, a mark ended where no mark
began right before it. Giving the change back panics, the save
doesn't load, and a sync to a peer that lacks it panics: one member
stops every node it reaches.
Those are refused with the other checks (`changes::Written`).
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Screening checks that a change is one Automerge writes
(`changes::Written`) before it looks for forks and judges the rules,
and the checks recorded what a change made as soon as it passed them.
A fork of a change the document holds has its actor and counters: if
it was checked first in a batch, and refused as forged after, its
record stood in for that change's operations, outside the history of
the next. An honest change writing into what the real one made was
then refused, for good. Anyone could make such a fork, its hash
ground to sort first.
What a change made is recorded once screening takes it
(`Written::taken`), and an operation named is looked for in the batch
and in the document, whichever the change's history holds.
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A node switched to a fresh actor whenever a peer showed it a change of
its own actor that it didn't hold, signed or not. So any peer made a
node start a writer at will, by sending a copy of its last change with
another value: and every writer costs every node memory in proportion
to the document's history.
Copies of a node's data directory hold its key, and sign their
changes with it; a stranger can't. A twin switches the node only where
a signature by the node's own key of it is kept or waiting. Unsigned,
it is refused as forged as before, and nothing switches.
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A change is refused before Automerge sees it unless it is one
Automerge writes (`document::changes::Written`). Three things about
that, each of which let a crafted change through or parted nodes:
* An operation a change names (the object written into, a list's
element, an operation replaced) must be made in the change's own
history, or before in the change itself, not anywhere in the
document. Else a node that holds the operation takes the change and
one that doesn't yet refuses it for good: nodes part by the order
changes reach them.
* And it must be what it is named as: an object of the kind written
into, an element of that list, an operation at the place written.
A change that replaces an operation elsewhere marks an unrelated
value gone, and Automerge then gives back another change under its
hash and saves a document that doesn't load; one that writes into
an operation that made no object makes it panic.
* A change that isn't its actor's first must have the one before it
among its dependencies, as a transaction puts it there. A gap in an
actor's numbers makes Automerge panic.
What the document holds at the changes this one builds on is read
there where it can be (a map's key, an object held by a map's key);
else the operation's own change is decoded and the history walked
back to it, no further than the operation's counter. So operations on
a list's elements cost a walk each.
Decoding a change can panic too (an operation naming an actor its
change doesn't list): caught, and the change refused as one whose
bytes aren't Automerge's.
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Automerge 0.12.0 applies a change that lists an actor none of its
operations names, or whose first operation is numbered below its
dependencies' or near 2^32. It then gives back another change than
the one it was given and saves a document that doesn't load, or
panics at the next write. A member sending one stops the nodes that
take it.
Every change from elsewhere is looked at before Automerge sees it
(`document::changes::Written`, from `access::screen::apply`, with or
without a policy), and refused like one breaking a rule unless:
* encoded again, it has the hash it came with;
* its first operation is numbered one after the highest of its
dependencies, 1 without any, as a transaction at the document's
heads numbers it;
* every operation it names (an object, a list's element, an
operation replaced) is its own, or was made before it, in the
document or by a change of the batch looked at before.
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A node dropping a change taken unjudged swapped in the document
without it, released it, and only then quarantined its own writes
that were dropped with it. In between, a reader found them gone and
not quarantined: `simtest::policy::a_change_taken_unjudged` asserts
right after seeing the change gone, and found the quarantine empty
now and then.
They are quarantined now under the document's lock, with the swap.
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A member one neighbour short asks once per `ONE_SHORT_EVERY` (300 s), and a
member with `k` refused it. When a member most others had as a neighbour
went away, three members ended up each with the other two as neighbours,
one short each; each asked once, was refused by a full member, and waited
five minutes. Changes pass only between neighbours: the three got none of
what was written meanwhile (`active_views_settle_and_heal`, timed out
waiting for the same heads).
NEIGHBOUR says now whether its sender is one short, and a member with `k`
takes such an ask as its `k + 1`th, the most it keeps; one with `k + 1`
still refuses. Asks stay as rare as they were, and one is enough but where
those asked have `k + 1`. Wire version 50.
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The document file's first line names its format; each record's first
byte its kind. A version that doesn't know a kind refuses the file, as
it does a format it doesn't know. With the Closed and Opened records,
the format is continuum-document/3, so a version knowing only 2 refuses
a file it can't read by its first line. Files of 2 are read as of 3:
the same records, Closed and Opened where a version knowing them wrote
them.
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The document file's format names itself in its first line
(continuum-document/2) and each record's kind in its first byte. A
record of a kind the reading version doesn't know makes the file
unusable: the node doesn't start on it unless told to move it aside
(--force badDocumentFile). lifecycle.md says so: a file one version
wrote is read only by versions knowing every kind of record in it. The
format's comment names the Opened record a node appends as it starts on
the file, which undoes the clean stop's mark.
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Ending a session records it in the document until the login's end
(login_exp), so every token of the session, refreshed or handed over, is
refused until none can live any longer. A login may ask a lifetime of
its own (POST /auth/login with lifetime): its session ends with that
token (session_exp), as a refresh never goes past it. Its login_exp is
now that end too, so ending its session records it as long as one of its
tokens can live, not for the node's whole session lifetime. A token
refreshed with a lifetime (one handed to another member's dashboard)
keeps the login's end.
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A node receiving a change of the actor it writes as, one it doesn't
hold, writes on as a fresh actor (another node writes as it, from a copy
of its files). Where the other node made it at a seq this node made a
change at too, the change was taken to Automerge, which refuses the
whole batch (duplicate seq): the message failed, and with it everything
else it carried. Signatures::forks found it forged only where a
signature verified a change of the actor at that seq, and this node
signs its own latest change only as it sends it.
forks now also finds a change forged where its actor is the one the
document writes as and the document's latest change of it
(get_last_local_change) is at its seq or later. apply_bytes switches to
the fresh actor after judging the batch, not before, so the check still
sees the actor; also where judging fails.
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A sync message larger than the threshold for its peer (16 chunks, lower
on a slow link or after a message to it failed whole) goes as a delta:
the peer fetches its changes in chunks, from any node holding them. Its
signatures, each writer's latest with changes in it, went in the
envelope offering it: up to 65536 of them, 6 MiB, in one message, the
size the delta exists to avoid. Nor did an Automerge message count its
signatures (one per writer in a whole document pulled) towards the
threshold.
A delta's signatures are now a blob of their own: the offerer packs and
keeps them (Blobs::keep, the latest 64), and the spec names them by
BLAKE3 hash and size (DeltaSpec::signatures, None where no signature
vouches for its changes). They are served as content (BlobId::Content),
so their hash checks them. The receiver fetches them from the offerer
alone, as another node holding the changes holds signatures of its own,
before the changes, and offers them under the write lock just before
judging the changes, so they wait for them as before. The envelope of a
delta carries none. An Automerge message's signatures count towards its
size: past the threshold, it goes as a delta.
Wire version 49.
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A received signature of a change the document doesn't hold yet waits for
it (Pending), checked once the change comes. A delta's signatures come
before its changes, so they wait for the whole download. Kept one per
change, the last that came, a member could send a signature that
doesn't verify for a change it knows is on its way and put the honest
one aside: the writer then went unvouched for until its changes came
again with their signatures.
Pending now keeps up to three different signatures of a change
(CANDIDATES): the first that came, and the latest others. Ed25519
signatures are deterministic, so every honest copy is the same bytes and
counts once: one sent first stays, one sent after stays unless more
others follow it. Once the change comes, offer and vouch_batch check
them in turn, the first that came first, up to the first valid one,
within the bound on invalid signatures (MAX_INVALID). MAX_PENDING counts
signatures, not changes.
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Received signatures of changes the document doesn't hold yet wait for
them, up to 65536 (MAX_PENDING). Each Signatures::offer, one per
received sync message, looked up every waiting one's change to find
those that came meanwhile.
The pending signatures now remember the document's heads at the last
look (Pending::scanned, Pending::arrived): while they stand, the
document holds nothing more, as it only grows, and offer looks up none.
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A stream opened with a token ends once refused_now refuses it. In a
swarm without a registry, a session ended on this node is kept in memory
(AppState::ended_sessions), and the streams waiting on session_ended are
woken (notify_waiters). credentials_end now makes the Notified it waits
on before each refused_now, the first one included, and not after: a
session ended between a check and the wait is seen at once rather than
at the next change to protocol data.
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A sync message carries up to 65536 signatures (MAX_PER_MESSAGE), and the
receiver checks, under the document's write lock, each one of a held
change that would vouch for more of its actor's changes than the one
before: about 30 µs each. A member sending that many signatures that
don't verify cost the receiver about two seconds of writes per message.
Signatures::offer and vouch_batch now stop checking after 64 found
invalid (MAX_INVALID) and drop the rest unchecked, with a warning. A node
forwards only signatures it verified, so an honest peer sends none.
offer counts those a message brings apart from those that waited for
their changes, which came from any peer. Signatures::vouch says which it
found (Vouched): more vouched for, nothing more, or invalid.
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With --keep-actor, a node on a document file that ends with a clean stop
writes on as the actor the file names. Two nodes started on copies of
one file (a copied data directory, a restored disk image while the
original runs) both do, and both make that actor's next change number:
peers holding one refuse the other as forged, and everything built on
it.
screen::apply_bytes, the way every received change comes in, now looks
for a change of the actor the node writes as that the node doesn't hold:
only another node can have made it. The node then writes on as a fresh
actor at once, logs a warning, and its callers add the actor to the
node's own (RemakeState::add_own_actor), which the document file's
header follows. The change is judged as any other. lifecycle.md says not
to start a copy of a node's data directory with --keep-actor, and what
the switch leaves: what both wrote before stays refused where the
other's came first.
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With --keep-actor, a node on a file whose last record is Closed writes on
as the actor the header names, which takes the file holding every change
of that actor. At a clean stop, the node's own workers go on writing
until it exits: its alive stamp in the member list, votes, a
coordinator's commit. One committed after Closed was appended, and sent
by the still-running sync, would be a change of that actor the file
lacks, and the next start would make another change with its number.
swarm::document_file::close now takes the document's write lock, marks
the file at the heads it sees there, and sets a fresh actor before
letting go: what the node writes after is no change of the marked actor.
A record the file worker appends after Closed (such a write, flushed)
leaves the file unmarked, which starts a fresh actor next time.
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At start, a node on a document file appends an Opened record before it
writes anything, so that a Closed record before it no longer says the
file holds every change of the actor it names. It does so now before
deciding which actor to write as, and DocumentFile::open says whether it
could: where the append fails (the disk full, permissions), the file
still ends with Closed, and later appends likely fail too. A crash, or a
clean stop whose last append failed (close then sees the file behind and
writes no mark), would leave that Closed standing for a run the file
never got. So with --keep-actor, the node writes on as the actor of
before only where the file was marked as opened; else it writes as a
fresh actor and warns.
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look with
Looking at a node (its figures, peers, dashboard: Need::Observe) takes
any capability, a token's limit applied. Caps::is_empty is now true where
no capability of the user meets one of the limit's (Capability::meet), as
well as where there are none: a token limited to the member list, for a
user who may only read data/eu, may not look.
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A token's limit narrows every endpoint but those under /auth, which any
registered user may call. Among them, PUT and DELETE /auth/keys/{id}
change the keys the user logs in with, and POST /auth/logout ends every
token of the user. With the token a dashboard hands to another member's
(the member list, read, five minutes), its holder could add a key of its
own and log in by it as the user, with everything the user may do.
These now take a password or a token without a limit
(Need::Credentials, refused where Caps::limited). A narrowed token still
refreshes within its limit, says who it is, lists the user's keys and
ends its own session (DELETE /auth/session): a dashboard opened from
another member's logs out with it.
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How many writers (Automerge actors) the document's changes have matters: a writer is a
node's run (each start, rejoin or drop makes one, a start keeping the one of before with
`--keep-actor` after a clean stop), and every transfer of the whole history carries a
signature for each. `/admin/stats` now says it (`document.writers`, and
`document_writers` for Prometheus), counted from the changes' metadata alongside the
saved size's measurement in the background (at least a minute apart), as that takes
time proportional to the document too; an export, which measures the size alone, keeps
the count of before. The dashboard's figures show it with the rest.
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actor
A node writes as a fresh Automerge actor at each start, so no change number of an actor
comes twice: one sent before a crash but not yet appended to the document file would
otherwise be made again, differently. An epoch thus gathers a writer per start, and
every transfer of its history carries a signature per writer.
The document file now says when it holds everything the node wrote:
* at a clean stop, after the last append, an empty `Closed` record, only where the
file is up to the document's heads (ready, not rejoining);
* as a node starts on the file, before anything is written, an empty `Opened` record,
so a crash from then on leaves a file without the mark;
* the header names the actor the node writes with (`current`).
With `--keep-actor` (off by default; needs `--document-file`), a node starting on a
file that ends with `Closed` writes on as that actor. A crash, a drop, a switch or a
rejoin still starts a fresh one, so an epoch's writers come to one per node plus one
per such event. lifecycle.md says so.
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`GET /auth/whoami` lists the user's capabilities (`caps`) and its token's `limit`, if
any, side by side; what the request may do is what both give, as endpoints decide it.
It says so now (`may`): the capabilities, or with a limit each capability met with each
of the limit's (`Capability::meet`): at the deeper of the two paths, a `*` of one
taking the other's key there, with the rights both name; nothing where the paths part,
no right is shared, or the path is protocol data one of them doesn't name.
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Docs and comments outside future-work.md and review-rejections.md say what the code
does, and point nowhere else for what it doesn't: the architecture page's map, the
transports' forwarders, keys with `/`, a strict swarm's registry, trust.md's "Not yet"
(now saying what isn't protected, in a sentence), the topology bench, and the comments
of the change benchmarks, capabilities' grantor, tokens, dissemination, refusals and
topology.
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Under a policy requiring signatures, a node takes a change only once a signature
vouches for it: one of the change itself, or of a later change of the same writer. A
writer is a node's run, each start, rejoin or drop making a fresh actor, so an epoch
gathers writers for as long as it lasts, and a transfer of its whole history (a joiner
pulling the document, a delta) must carry a signature for each of them, or the joiner
waits for the rest for good.
A message's signatures are now chosen by what it carries:
* changes, up to 256 signed among them: each one's signature;
* more (a whole document pulled): each writer's latest signed change among them, found
by the document's change metadata (`Signatures::for_changes`), vouching for the rest;
* a delta: each writer with changes in it (`get_changes_meta(from)`), its latest
verified signature (`for_delta`).
A message carries up to 65536 (6 MiB), and as many wait at the receiver for their
changes (a delta's come after it). So a transfer leaves writers unvouched only in an
epoch with more than 65536 runs writing since it began; a remake starts the count again.
Wire version 48.
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