| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Under a policy requiring signatures, a node takes a change only once a signature
vouches for it: one of the change itself, or of a later change of the same writer. A
writer is a node's run, each start, rejoin or drop making a fresh actor, so an epoch
gathers writers for as long as it lasts, and a transfer of its whole history (a joiner
pulling the document, a delta) must carry a signature for each of them, or the joiner
waits for the rest for good.
A message's signatures are now chosen by what it carries:
* changes, up to 256 signed among them: each one's signature;
* more (a whole document pulled): each writer's latest signed change among them, found
by the document's change metadata (`Signatures::for_changes`), vouching for the rest;
* a delta: each writer with changes in it (`get_changes_meta(from)`), its latest
verified signature (`for_delta`).
A message carries up to 65536 (6 MiB), and as many wait at the receiver for their
changes (a delta's come after it). So a transfer leaves writers unvouched only in an
epoch with more than 65536 runs writing since it began; a remake starts the count again.
Wire version 48.
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Review 4, F10: a sync message signed the node's latest change under the document's
write lock (`sign_sent`), then was made under its read lock: a write committed in
between went in the message unsigned, and under a policy requiring signatures waited at
the peer until the next signed change came with it, or a resend.
Now the message is made under a read lock taken after signing, and if a write came in
between (`AppState::sign_due` again under that lock), signed again: a few times at
most, past them it goes as before, its signature with the next message.
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Review 4, R2 partly (F8): a joining node waited for "each of its seeds" to name the
swarm's root as a count, of every admitted peer that named one. Node identities are
self-made and admission is the swarm key: a member answering a joiner under as many
identities as it has seeds, naming its own root within the wait, made the joiner pin
it before the real seeds answered, and refuse them after as another history.
Now the seeds are the nodes proven at the seeds' addresses (`roots::seed_found`, as
`bootstrap::resolve_seeds` finds them), and only their roots count toward the wait
and start its clock. Another peer naming a root still disputes it (no root while they
differ), so such a member can keep a joiner from joining, as any member can, but not
hand it another root. access.md says so.
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A sync message carried the signatures its peer wasn't sent yet, by a
cursor per peer. Changes sent again, as after a message taken as
delivered and lost on the way, went without them: the peer was past
them. Under a policy requiring signatures they waited until the
writer's next signed change, or the next session.
A message now carries the signatures of the changes it carries
(Signatures::for_changes), whatever the peer was sent before: changes
sent again arrive vouched for as the first time. Past 256 (a message
carrying the batches of many writers), each writer's latest instead,
as a delta carries. The cursor goes, and with it resetting it after a
failed send or a new session.
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A sync message whose send fails gives back the changes it carried: the
next message takes them again. The signatures it carried weren't
given back: the peer's cursor stayed past them, so the changes went
again without them, and under a policy requiring signatures waited
for them until the next session; SIGNATURES no longer covers that.
A failed send now sends the peer all signatures again with the next
changes (each actor's latest, a few hundred at most).
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Signatures sent on their own (SIGNATURES, every second, to each peer
not sent them yet) flooded every link: a signature made after its
change left, or one that came with changes, went to every neighbour,
whether or not it got the change along with its signature elsewhere.
With every change of a node signed as it leaves (1217) and signatures
going where their changes go (1218), none is left for them to carry:
the message, its task and its traffic counter go (wire version 46).
Signatures waiting for their changes are offered as before when sync
messages bring them, and the changes waiting for signatures judged
again with the next batch.
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A sync message took the signatures its peer wasn't sent yet whenever it
had a body, an Automerge message saying only what we have included. A
signature belongs with the changes it vouches for: they go along the
trees, and a peer that got them elsewhere got the signatures with them.
Signatures now go in a message that carries changes (pushed, offered
as a delta, or in an Automerge message carrying some: SyncSession::
carrying), and in no other.
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A node signed its changes no rule signs a while after them (--sign-every
1s): the change left at once, unsigned, and its signature followed on
its own a second later, to every neighbour, over every link. A few
writes made a cascade of SIGNATURES. Under a policy requiring
signatures it signed every change as it was made instead.
A node now signs its latest change, if no signature vouches for it, as
a sync message takes it (--sign-every sent, the default): the
signature leaves in the same message, and goes where the change goes.
One signature per message, however many changes it carries, each
vouching for those before it: a slow writer's every change is signed,
a fast writer's batches are, at no threshold to pick. A policy
requiring signatures signs what is sent too, even with `none`. `all`
still signs every change as it is made; changes to protocol data,
listed paths and ?signed=true writes are signed as they are made, as
before. The interval, and the task signing on it, go.
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Review 3, R5: a node given its root (--genesis-root) refused a peer
naming another only change by change while its document was empty,
each with an entry among the refused; the handshake went through, as
there was no root of its own yet to compare with. The root given is
now compared too: a peer naming another is refused at the handshake,
logged once, as one whose document starts from another root.
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Review 3, R4: whether a batch was judged followed the receiving
document's policy now (and whether the batch writes one). After the
policy was removed, or replaced by a version the node doesn't know,
changes written under it and received late went in unjudged, while
nodes that had them earlier judged them; REFUSALS gave up likewise.
Screening now remembers that the document held a policy, known or not
(Screening::policed), and judges what it receives while it does, each
change by the policy at its dependencies; REFUSALS judges then too
(not under a policy the node doesn't know, as before). Not across a
restart, which access.md says.
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Review 3, R2: the root pin was set by the first HELLO_REPLY, and the
first sync, a round trip later, took that root; a peer naming another
afterwards was refused as another history. So the seed that answered
first decided, not "none while they disagree", and a malicious seed
makes itself fastest.
A node joining with an empty document of the first epoch now takes no
root (RootPin::Awaiting, roots left for later) until each of its seeds
named one, or ROOT_WAIT (10 s) passed since the first did; then the
one they name, none while they differ, as before. With --genesis-root
it takes that one alone, at once. access.md, the option's help and
example.toml say so; switching roots later, while the joiner holds
nothing of its own, is postponed.
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Review 3, R1: what a node received was vouched for only while its own
document's policy required signatures. A joiner's first sync, and
every node's message bringing `required`, went in by the rules alone:
a malicious first peer could plant changes under other members' actors
at their next seqs, their real ones then failing as duplicates for
good.
The signatures a message carries are always offered now, and the
screen always has them: a change waits for one where the policy at the
heads it is judged at requires it (rules::Reads::required, read once
per heads), whatever the receiving document holds. Changes written
under a policy not requiring signatures wait for none, as on every
other node; the check for forged changes runs always. Changes waiting
for a signature are judged again whenever signatures come.
The test of signatures required now takes the history into an empty
document; a new one takes changes written under a policy not requiring
them without any.
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Review 2, N7, the care it raised: a joining node's empty document took
as the first epoch's root whatever dependency-less change came first,
from whichever peer it joined through; the first epoch's ID is all
zeros, so nothing pinned it. A remake's epoch has its ID, the snapshot
change's hash, which the rules hold its root to.
* Every node names its epoch's root in HELLO and HELLO_REPLY (the
epoch's ID for a remake's, its genesis change for the first; wire
version 45). A node whose document starts from another root of the
same epoch refuses the handshake, logging it: another history under
the swarm's ID, a forged root or a genesis started again.
* A joining node with an empty document takes as its root only the one
it was given (--genesis-root, new), else the one its peers name, and
none while they name different ones (access::screen::RootPin, kept
in Screening across documents): one peer hands it another root only
if it is all the joiner hears, or never, with --genesis-root. A root
refused is listed with the refused, what builds on it with it.
* The genesis node logs the root (`The swarm's root`); GET
/admin/epochs shows it (`root`).
A genesis started again under a remembered swarm ID used to merge with
the nodes of it still running; they now refuse it (another root), and
the docs say to join them with seeds instead.
The epoch's identity stays as it is (generation 0 all zeros): records
and epoch metadata name it so, and every comparison of epochs with
them.
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Review 2, N7: a node screened received changes only while its own
document had a policy it enforces. A joiner's empty document has none,
so its first sync, as much history as the node it joins through chose,
was applied unjudged, and under signatures required unvouched; the same
for any node while the policy's own change arrived with later ones.
Sync messages, deltas and downloaded changes are now always screened,
each change judged by the policy at its dependencies (1135), so the
verdicts are the swarm's. While neither the document nor the changes
hold a policy (none touches a "policy" key: inspect::touch_key), only
an epoch's root is judged and nothing is placed: bench_screening, after
1188, measured placing everything at about as much again as applying
(564 ms + 543 ms for 100 000 changes), judging by the rules at about
five times (+2.5 s), which a document with a policy pays anyway.
access.md no longer lists the joiner's first sync, nor nodes agreeing
only as the policy reaches them (judged at the dependencies, they
agree), as left to do; changes::load_delta is for tests now.
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A node told (REFUSALS) that it holds a change the swarm's rules refuse,
and whose own rules refuse it too, dropped it and everything built on
it on one peer's word, however much that was; its own writes among them
went to the quarantine, the others' nowhere.
* A drop taking more than 100 changes, or more than ten and a tenth of
the document, now
waits until a second member names the same change: the node's rules
and one peer's word could both be off. Logged as an error, counted in
/admin/stats (sync.dropsHeld).
* The others' changes dropped are listed with the refused (GET
/admin/refused, "taken unjudged, dropped"), for operators to see.
The cheap half of asking the others (future-work.md, Telling a
malicious change from a wrong policy).
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Only a user who may manage users could change a user's keys: a user
couldn't add a new laptop's key, or remove a lost one.
A user now manages its own keys, whatever else it may do:
* GET /auth/keys: its keys, its entry, and the envelope holding it
under a strict policy (`signed`), to sign against.
* PUT /auth/keys/{id} with an authorized_keys line, DELETE
/auth/keys/{id}: one change, as the user. The rules take a write of
_continuum/users/<name>/keys/… from the user it names.
* Under a strict policy, the user signs its entry with only its keys
changed, with a key it holds already (envelope::check takes that from
the user itself), PUT to its own entry even without write on the
registry; continuum-signed key-add and key-remove do so.
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Since judge_held moved to access::rules (1140), swarm::refusals uses
ReadDoc no more; clippy warned.
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Review finding 5: vouching by (actor, seq) isn't bound to a hash. A
member can make a change under another member's actor at a seq that
member's signature covers. The change is then taken as vouched, and if
it breaks a rule, the honest member is refused as a whole and logged as
the one whose own change broke the rules.
A signature now vouches for its change and the changes of its actor it
builds on: in the document, as before; among received changes, those
it reaches through the batch's dependencies. A received change under an
actor at a seq whose change the document holds (a signature verified up
to it) is a fork: refused as forged, never as its actor's node's, not
told back in REFUSALS, and logged with the peer that brought it.
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A node refusing a member as a whole sent it nothing, and lifted that
only when a change of the member's was taken again. But a member that
dropped what was refused (REFUSALS) starts its sync sessions over, and
a fresh session sends no changes until the other side answers: the two
waited for each other, and the member stayed refused.
The refusal now notes the member's run and epoch_seq when it began; a
member with another document since (it dropped what was refused, or
rejoined) is synced with again.
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The API checks the path a request asks for; the rules judge everything
the change does. Where they disagreed, the honest node's change was
refused by every other node, and with signatures required the node was
refused as a whole. The plan had both gates run the same judgement.
Under a policy, each change a node makes (its own writes and those
through the API) is now judged by rules::judge as receivers will judge
it, before it is signed or sent; one every node would refuse is rolled
back (the document forked at the heads before it, same actor: the
change never left) and the request refused with 403 (StoreError::
Refused). rules::judge_held, judging a change the document holds,
moves from swarm::refusals to access::rules for both.
The simulations that play a member past its own checks write with a
helper that bypasses them (forge).
Review finding 3 (the same judgement at both gates).
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A REFUSALS naming the swarm's first change made the node receiving it
judge that change again in a document that isn't empty, refuse it as
"a change without dependencies that isn't the epoch's root", and drop
it with everything built on it: its whole document.
The first epoch's root is now the first change a document holds, as it
comes to an empty one or as it is in one; a change judged again on a
peer's word is never refused for having no dependencies; and
drop_taken refuses to drop an epoch's root, or anything that would
leave nothing kept, logging an error instead.
Review finding 1 (critical).
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A node refusing changes a peer brought tells it which broke a rule; the
peer judges them itself, and if its rules refuse them too, drops them
with all built on them (its document forked without them, a fresh
actor), quarantining its own writes among them. Wire version 42.
Auth plan M6 (rejoin on taint).
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With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is
refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats
(sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is
taken again or the epoch changes.
Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
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A refused change is remembered by its hash: offered again it is refused
without decoding, judging or logging, so is one built on it, and a peer
offering nothing else is answered later each time, up to a minute.
Auth plan M6 (re-sending).
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The first users' SSH keys, recorded at genesis with their entries, so a
swarm can be strict from its start.
Auth plan M7.
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Under a policy, a change by a node that isn't a member is refused with
all built on it: a node's registration is written before any write of
its own or through the API, not after (the registration itself
exempt).
Auth plan M6 (fix).
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_continuum/banned/<node ID>: every node refuses the banned node's
changes from then on (judged as the ban stood) and leaves its
handshakes unanswered.
Auth plan M6.
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"signatures": "required": a change counts only once a signature by its
committer vouches for it, and waits until then; every node then signs
every change it makes.
Auth plan M6.
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_continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every
change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node
doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused.
Auth plan M6.
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Signatures no sync message took go on their own within a second, to
each peer not sent them yet (wire version bumped).
Auth plan M5.
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Sync messages carry, for each actor's writes, the latest signature the
sender checked; the receiver checks it once it holds the change.
Auth plan M5.
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A node's signatures are saved with its document (--document-file) and
loaded with it.
Auth plan M5.
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The dashboard reads every member's links from the members themselves;
LINKS and LINKS_REPLY, swarm::links and their wire tags go (wire
version bumped). Nodes the browser can't reach are drawn from what the
reachable ones measure.
Auth plan M3.
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The tree drawn is computed as every node computes its own part of it:
from the member list, and whom it and its neighbours reach, as they
told it; no longer from the links members report over LINKS.
Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).
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GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links,
as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a
token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins,
without credentials.
Auth plan M3.
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registry::exists counted any value at _continuum/users as a registry;
keys_at answers None where there is no map, and its users (records,
members, forget records, remakes) say what they make of it.
Auth plan M1 (fix).
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/admin/users: list, add (one or several), remove, disable, grant and
revoke capabilities; each one change, refused if it would lock its
writer out. Capabilities as the store's paths name them.
Auth plan M1.
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--bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change,
each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until
added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before.
Auth plan M1.
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A node with no neighbours and no high-priority ask outstanding asks
with high priority, even of members that refused it before, so it
never stays without neighbours (a transient seen in the simulations).
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