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A sync message whose send fails gives back the changes it carried: the
next message takes them again. The signatures it carried weren't
given back: the peer's cursor stayed past them, so the changes went
again without them, and under a policy requiring signatures waited
for them until the next session; SIGNATURES no longer covers that.
A failed send now sends the peer all signatures again with the next
changes (each actor's latest, a few hundred at most).
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A sync message took the signatures its peer wasn't sent yet whenever it
had a body, an Automerge message saying only what we have included. A
signature belongs with the changes it vouches for: they go along the
trees, and a peer that got them elsewhere got the signatures with them.
Signatures now go in a message that carries changes (pushed, offered
as a delta, or in an Automerge message carrying some: SyncSession::
carrying), and in no other.
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A node signed its changes no rule signs a while after them (--sign-every
1s): the change left at once, unsigned, and its signature followed on
its own a second later, to every neighbour, over every link. A few
writes made a cascade of SIGNATURES. Under a policy requiring
signatures it signed every change as it was made instead.
A node now signs its latest change, if no signature vouches for it, as
a sync message takes it (--sign-every sent, the default): the
signature leaves in the same message, and goes where the change goes.
One signature per message, however many changes it carries, each
vouching for those before it: a slow writer's every change is signed,
a fast writer's batches are, at no threshold to pick. A policy
requiring signatures signs what is sent too, even with `none`. `all`
still signs every change as it is made; changes to protocol data,
listed paths and ?signed=true writes are signed as they are made, as
before. The interval, and the task signing on it, go.
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Review 3, R1: what a node received was vouched for only while its own
document's policy required signatures. A joiner's first sync, and
every node's message bringing `required`, went in by the rules alone:
a malicious first peer could plant changes under other members' actors
at their next seqs, their real ones then failing as duplicates for
good.
The signatures a message carries are always offered now, and the
screen always has them: a change waits for one where the policy at the
heads it is judged at requires it (rules::Reads::required, read once
per heads), whatever the receiving document holds. Changes written
under a policy not requiring signatures wait for none, as on every
other node; the check for forged changes runs always. Changes waiting
for a signature are judged again whenever signatures come.
The test of signatures required now takes the history into an empty
document; a new one takes changes written under a policy not requiring
them without any.
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Review 2, N7: a node screened received changes only while its own
document had a policy it enforces. A joiner's empty document has none,
so its first sync, as much history as the node it joins through chose,
was applied unjudged, and under signatures required unvouched; the same
for any node while the policy's own change arrived with later ones.
Sync messages, deltas and downloaded changes are now always screened,
each change judged by the policy at its dependencies (1135), so the
verdicts are the swarm's. While neither the document nor the changes
hold a policy (none touches a "policy" key: inspect::touch_key), only
an epoch's root is judged and nothing is placed: bench_screening, after
1188, measured placing everything at about as much again as applying
(564 ms + 543 ms for 100 000 changes), judging by the rules at about
five times (+2.5 s), which a document with a policy pays anyway.
access.md no longer lists the joiner's first sync, nor nodes agreeing
only as the policy reaches them (judged at the dependencies, they
agree), as left to do; changes::load_delta is for tests now.
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Review finding 5: vouching by (actor, seq) isn't bound to a hash. A
member can make a change under another member's actor at a seq that
member's signature covers. The change is then taken as vouched, and if
it breaks a rule, the honest member is refused as a whole and logged as
the one whose own change broke the rules.
A signature now vouches for its change and the changes of its actor it
builds on: in the document, as before; among received changes, those
it reaches through the batch's dependencies. A received change under an
actor at a seq whose change the document holds (a signature verified up
to it) is a fork: refused as forged, never as its actor's node's, not
told back in REFUSALS, and logged with the peer that brought it.
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A node refusing a member as a whole sent it nothing, and lifted that
only when a change of the member's was taken again. But a member that
dropped what was refused (REFUSALS) starts its sync sessions over, and
a fresh session sends no changes until the other side answers: the two
waited for each other, and the member stayed refused.
The refusal now notes the member's run and epoch_seq when it began; a
member with another document since (it dropped what was refused, or
rejoined) is synced with again.
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A node refusing changes a peer brought tells it which broke a rule; the
peer judges them itself, and if its rules refuse them too, drops them
with all built on them (its document forked without them, a fresh
actor), quarantining its own writes among them. Wire version 42.
Auth plan M6 (rejoin on taint).
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With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is
refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats
(sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is
taken again or the epoch changes.
Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
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A refused change is remembered by its hash: offered again it is refused
without decoding, judging or logging, so is one built on it, and a peer
offering nothing else is answered later each time, up to a minute.
Auth plan M6 (re-sending).
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"signatures": "required": a change counts only once a signature by its
committer vouches for it, and waits until then; every node then signs
every change it makes.
Auth plan M6.
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_continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every
change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node
doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused.
Auth plan M6.
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Sync messages carry, for each actor's writes, the latest signature the
sender checked; the receiver checks it once it holds the change.
Auth plan M5.
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