| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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A strict remake takes a majority of members whose --strict-keys take
its manifest's signer: no node votes for one without, so
--follow-strict-remakes (1173) goes. A node that doesn't vote still
switches once the others commit, as with any remake.
So that an operator can tell why one fails: a strict remake aborted
for want of a majority (the voting period over, or a majority out of
reach) says in its reason (GET /admin/remakes/{id}, and the
coordinator's log) which members didn't vote, and that a member votes
for one only with its manifest signed by a key of its --strict-keys.
Each of those logs why itself (`Not voting for a strict remake`).
The sim a_strict_remake_too_few_take: only a takes the manifest; the
remake aborts, naming b and c.
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Until a swarm is strict, the user a change names is its node's word, so
any member could have planted registry entries, policy, bans or
user-signed values as any user, plain or signed by a key it put there
itself; writing the strict policy trusted all of it as it was.
A remake of a new kind, `strict`, turns a swarm strict instead:
* Its content is a manifest (access::strict): the swarm, the strict
policy, and each value kept at the places values are signed, by the
SHA-256 of its JSON, signed by an operator (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n
continuum-strict).
* Every node builds the next epoch as compaction does, keeping at the
signed places only the values the manifest names, as they were at
the base, and writing its policy (RemakeKind::protocol, the one kind
that changes protocol data). Writes after the base reach the new
epoch only by replays, judged by the strict policy.
* A node votes for one only with its manifest signed by one of
--strict-keys, keys given out of the document; without any, for none
(logged once, `Not voting for a strict remake`), unless
--follow-strict-remakes. A coordinator proposes only what it would
vote for (403). Once a majority commits one, every node switches, as
with any remake: refusing to switch would only cut a node off.
* GET /admin/strict-manifest gives the manifest keeping everything held
now, the values for review and the heads they are at;
continuum-signed strict shows them, signs once confirmed and proposes
at those heads.
The sim a_swarm_turning_strict_through_a_remake: a member plants a
registry entry as a manager; the operator's manifest leaves it out; a
and b, given the key, commit; c, without, follows; the entry is gone
and the policy strict everywhere.
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Review 6: a node remembers the challenges used until they expire, 10 000
at most, and refused every login by key once full. One user holding a
key could make 10 000 logins within five minutes and keep everyone else
out.
A user may now log in by key at most --key-logins-per-user times (100)
on a node within a challenge's lifetime, past which that user waits and
others don't; the 10 000 stay as the cap for all users together. The
lifetime, five minutes until now, is --challenge-lifetime.
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The API checks the path a request asks for; the rules judge everything
the change does. Where they disagreed, the honest node's change was
refused by every other node, and with signatures required the node was
refused as a whole. The plan had both gates run the same judgement.
Under a policy, each change a node makes (its own writes and those
through the API) is now judged by rules::judge as receivers will judge
it, before it is signed or sent; one every node would refuse is rolled
back (the document forked at the heads before it, same actor: the
change never left) and the request refused with 403 (StoreError::
Refused). rules::judge_held, judging a change the document holds,
moves from swarm::refusals to access::rules for both.
The simulations that play a member past its own checks write with a
helper that bypasses them (forge).
Review finding 3 (the same judgement at both gates).
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POST /auth/challenge and /auth/login/key: a node-signed challenge,
valid five minutes and taken once, signed with one of the user's SSH
keys (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-login), for a token.
Auth plan M7 (key login, M2b).
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Under a policy, a change by a node that isn't a member is refused with
all built on it: a node's registration is written before any write of
its own or through the API, not after (the registration itself
exempt).
Auth plan M6 (fix).
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"signatures": "required": a change counts only once a signature by its
committer vouches for it, and waits until then; every node then signs
every change it makes.
Auth plan M6.
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_continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every
change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node
doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused.
Auth plan M6.
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Sync messages carry, for each actor's writes, the latest signature the
sender checked; the receiver checks it once it holds the change.
Auth plan M5.
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Changes left unsigned are vouched for by the node's next signature:
--sign-every 1s (default) signs the latest within a second, all signs
every change, none only those that must be.
Auth plan M5.
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Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519
signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One
signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones.
Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed,
and writes with ?signed=true.
Auth plan M5.
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The dashboard reads every member's links from the members themselves;
LINKS and LINKS_REPLY, swarm::links and their wire tags go (wire
version bumped). Nodes the browser can't reach are drawn from what the
reachable ones measure.
Auth plan M3.
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GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links,
as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a
token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins,
without credentials.
Auth plan M3.
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POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh,
/auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring
Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and
--session-lifetime.
Auth plan M2.
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--bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change,
each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until
added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before.
Auth plan M1.
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The stamp is the only lock-free epoch label.
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This allows a lot of operations to drop mut.
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SyncPayload is now an opaque byte container in transport.
SyncSession::generate returns the encoded payload, state::decode_sync(&payload)
decodes it off the document lock (as before), and receive takes the decoded
message, which is a type only the session can open. transport/mod.rs no longer
imports Automerge.
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