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* simtest: row 15 with joiners handed an epoch they can't checktv12 hours1-40/+57
| | | | | | | | | | A node with an empty document can't tell an epoch made up from another it can't check: either way it takes the snapshot's checkpoint only where its operator named or pinned it. The others move to a checkpoint and compact; f, joining and pinning nothing, doesn't take their epoch, and g, pinning the checkpoint, takes it and reads what they read. A made-up epoch served by d, an honest node besides, is row 31's alone: d follows the others' epoch wherever it reaches them.
* simtest: d, serving a higher made-up epoch, is apart from the otherstv12 hours1-2/+9
| | | | | | Reaching the others, d rejoins their epoch, the lower, as any node holding a store does, and e, reaching only d, finds their epoch there, not d's. Cut off from them, d stays on the one it made up.
* simtest: row 15's made-up epoch is of a higher ID than the others'tv12 hours1-9/+13
| | | | | | | Of a lower one, the others try to rejoin it every so often, as in row 31, and f, rejoining their epoch, finds them away mid-sync and gives up for that, not for its checkpoint. Of a higher ID, they leave it alone; e, reaching only d, still takes it, as one joining takes the newer generation.
* simtest: in row 15, the joiner reads as the node serving it doestv12 hours1-6/+9
| | | | | | d, serving the epoch it made up, puts again there what its store holds, as every node holding a store does: e, judging every event, reads what d reads, the checkpoint the others moved to among it, not the root alone.
* simtest: row 31's later write builds on what is above the checkpointtv12 hours1-2/+2
| | | | | It builds on tv's write, the checkpoint's head: one built on the root isn't above the heads of the checkpoint the nodes moved to, and they refuse it.
* simtest: made-up epochs handed to a node holding a store (rows 15, 31)tv18 hours1-0/+176
| | | | | | | | | | d serves an epoch of the next generation it made up, of a lower ID than the others', its snapshot holding the root as the document stood before the checkpoint they moved to. A node joining with nothing that reaches only d takes it, the root being what its operator named, and reads only what it holds (15); one reaching only the others takes not their epoch, whose checkpoint it neither builds nor has pinned (15); the others try d's, find its root before their document's checkpoint, and stay on theirs (31).
* simtest: the remake rows of a swarm holding a storetv19 hours1-5/+396
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Simulations of the store's attack rows on remakes (`docs/store.md`, Attacks): a snapshot other than its base's isn't followed (11); one coordinator's two decisions for an epoch, shown to different nodes, end on the lower epoch (13); a node away while the others switch rejoins and puts again what it wrote meanwhile (16); after a compaction whose snapshot holds a checkpoint, a node away all along follows only once its operator pins it (24); a compaction whose base comes before a checkpoint, switched after nodes moved to it, leaves them there, and a node starting with nothing reads the new document to it (28); a member deciding many compactions at once moves every node to the lowest epoch, losing no event (30).
* simtest: events written beyond a compaction's base go again (row 12)tv19 hours1-0/+92
| | | | | | A swarm holding a store compacts: events written beyond the base, on nodes that switch later, are put again in the new epoch, and every node holds every event, reads the same, and refused no change.
* simtest: show a store's refusals and ballots in a failed simulation's dumptv21 hours1-10/+66
| | | | | | For a node holding a store, the dump shows each event it refused and why, the proposals on the current version with the parties proposing them and their votes, whether each passes there, and the version events it took.
* simtest: show what screening holds back in a failed simulation's dumptv22 hours1-1/+53
| | | | | | | | A failed simulation prints, for each node, the writer it writes as, the changes its screening keeps waiting (the latest few: whose writer and seq, how many of their dependencies it holds, whether a signature vouches for them) and the latest changes it refused, and, holding a store, the store's checkpoint, current version and what it took and refused.
* simtest: nodes started from a store's root synced before a test takes them aparttv23 hours1-1/+3
| | | | | | | The simulations of swarms holding a store start their nodes from the root and wait, besides each holding the store, until they synced: each took the others' handshakes and holds their entries. So a test taking nodes apart right after starts from nodes that know each other, as it means to.
* peer: a member's message before its handshake was taken asks for onetv23 hours1-1/+43
| | | | | | | | | | In a swarm holding a store, a node reads a peer's messages only by the party its handshake named. One whose handshake it hasn't taken (its reply lost, say) was cut off at its next message, as a non-member is, while the peer, which took ours, synced on, and neither said HELLO again. Now such a message goes unread, and the node says HELLO to the peer, as to any whose reply it waits for (`hello_again_now`): its reply names its party. What a peer refused as a non-member sends next is known to be a non-member's, its party kept, so that it asks for no HELLO. A simulation loses a's replies to b for a while.
* simtest: a fork whose root doesn't read as its heads do, found by who holds themtv23 hours1-1/+101
| | | | | | | | | `federation_attack_33`: beside the fork a node holding the history makes, one whose root leaves out tv's write, which counts at its heads. b, holding the history, builds the one and not the other (`fork::check`). Each fork's founder starts its swarm from its root and the events it keeps, and a node of lass joins each by its ID, taking it on its operator's word, and reads what the root keeps: tv's write in the one, carried by the changes founding its swarm, nothing in the other.
* document: the changes founding a fork's swarm, built from its root and what ↵tv23 hours1-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | it keeps A fork's root keeps events (`docs/store.md`, On Automerge): they follow its genesis change in changes of the same writer, built the same way, filled in the order of their IDs, events going into a change until their bytes there reach 1 MiB, the next event beginning the next change (`events::founding`). A swarm holding a store starts from all of them (`events::started`, given the events the root keeps; none for a federation's root).
* simtest: two checkpoints proposed at once, the one not backed dying by the naystv23 hours1-1/+134
| | | | | | | | `federation_attack_59`: a for tv and b for lass, apart, each propose a checkpoint once their stores took six events, and back it; c votes for makefu, following tv; each votes `false` on a checkpoint beside the one it backs (`--store-nay-beside`). a and b, together, vote `false` on each other's: the votes split. With c, tv's passes and every node moves there; lass's is dead by the nays of tv and makefu, which their records hold.
* simtest: a writer forked, its events reaching both sidestv24 hours1-0/+59
| | | | | | | `store_attack_10`: x1 and x2, tv's, start apart from one document under one writer, and each puts an event: changes of one writer at one number. Together, the documents part, each refusing the other's changes for good; the events reach every node, put again from the changes refused, and every node reads the same.
* simtest: a group naming many nodes is not every node's neighbourstv24 hours1-1/+51
| | | | | | | `store_attack_19`: makefu lists five nodes, tv two, and lass one, whose operator names tv's too (`--store-neighbour-parties`); each node keeps two neighbours by the graph among all members. a and b keep each other, and c one of them, whatever makefu's nodes are. The simulations' nodes started from the root may have their configuration adjusted.
* simtest: a proposal kept alive by its proposer alone holds back no checkpointtv24 hours1-1/+79
| | | | | | | | `federation_attack_67`: makefu proposes a version and backs it alone. a votes for tv by itself, proposing a checkpoint once its store took five events; b votes for lass, following tv; each with its party's record, begun before the federation. a proposes a checkpoint beside makefu's proposal, b backs it, a node writes it as it passed, and every node moves there.
* simtest: keys voting twice part honest nodes; their operators bring them backtv24 hours1-0/+110
| | | | | | | | `federation_attack_49`: tv backs a proposal of its own with lass, and one of lass's with makefu; b, apart, takes the other version than a and c. Together, they stay parted, each keeping the version it took. b's operator has it drop what it took and take the other side's (`Holding::drop_taken`, `allow`); or, where the versions named checkpoints, starts it again from the checkpoint the others moved to, pinned. No fork.
* simtest: a node away while the others moved to a checkpointtv24 hours1-0/+88
| | | | | | | | `store_attack_24`: c is away while a and b take a version passing on tv's and lass's votes that only moves to a checkpoint, move there, forget what came before, and take a write after it. Back, c builds the checkpoint from the document, which holds what came before, and reads what a and b read. What happens after a remake leaving it out comes with the remakes.
* simtest: different events to different peers, read alike once togethertv24 hours1-37/+205
| | | | | | | | | `federation_attack_28`: tv, lass and makefu, a node each, apart while each is given its own: two writes of tv's at one place, a write of lass's, and a proposal and the votes that pass it, each on another node. Apart, each reads its own; together, they read the same, the version that passed current, written by whichever node held it passed. The simulations of swarms holding a store share their federation, their nodes started from its root, and what they read of a node's store.
* simtest: a swarm holding a store, its members and a node its party doesn't listtv25 hours2-0/+109
| | | | | | | tv lists a and b, which start from the store's root; lass lists c, which joins by the store's ID; d is of lass too, which doesn't list it. Events put on a and on c reach a, b and c, which read them; d, which no member syncs with, gets nothing. A simulated node started on a document expects its swarm, as `run` has it do.
* handshake: the party its sender is oftv27 hours1-0/+2
| | | | | | | In a swarm holding a store, a node's handshakes name the party it is of (`docs/store.md`, Members), so that a peer tells whether it is a member before its entry reaches it: HELLO and HELLO_REPLY carry `party`, as `--store-party` says, None elsewhere and without the `federation` feature. Wire format version 52.
* federation: the store read from the documenttv27 hours1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node of a swarm holding a store holds the store, read from its document (`docs/store.md`, What the store takes from the document): `federation::held`. Whenever the document changes, a worker reads the events it holds that the store wasn't offered from it, under the document's lock, and offers them to the store without it, each taken as from anywhere: once its dependencies are held, judged at its history. Another document (a drop, a rejoin) is read as it comes, the store going on. The node reads its store anew from its document whenever it starts, from the root, by what is its own of it: the events it refused by what it took before, and those its operator had it drop, which it keeps in a file (`--store-file`), written whenever that changes, so that a store read anew in another order refuses what it refused before. A file that doesn't read stops the node from starting; without one, a restart may take what it refused.
* node: a swarm holding a store, started from its root or joined by its IDtv27 hours1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Behind the `federation` feature, two options: * `--store-root PATH` starts a swarm holding a store, or goes on with one, from the store's root, as bytes in the file, which the federation must take as a root. With no document to start on, the node builds the genesis change from it, as every node given the root does, and is ready at once; a document to start on must be of the root's swarm. * `--store-id ID` joins one through seeds by its ID, the root's SHA-256 in hex. An empty document of the first epoch takes as its root only that store's genesis change, built again from the root it holds (`document::events::is_genesis`), whatever peers name: the root pin doesn't wait for seeds, nor is disputed. Either names the swarm the node joins, which a state file must remember too, and can't be combined with the other, nor with what makes a new swarm's first change (`--genesis`, `--bootstrap-users`, `--bootstrap-keys`, `--bootstrap-policy`, `--remake`, `--genesis-root`). The root is read as a file of its own kind (`store`), counted among the node's files.
* state: a strict policy written where none judges, refused before it leavestv45 hours1-2/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Every node refuses a change writing a strict policy where the policy isn't strict (`rules::turns_strict`), whatever the policy before. But a node judges its own changes before they leave (`judged_here`) only under a policy judging every change: in a swarm without one, a strict policy written through its API was taken there and refused by every other node, with everything the node built on it. A change that leaves a policy where there was none to judge it is judged as every node will judge it, too. A change in a swarm that has no policy after it is judged by none, as before.
* rules: a swarm turns strict only at its start or through a strict remaketv2 days1-12/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A strict policy written into a running swarm left a time before it: changes written there, beside the turn, were refused by the nodes that took the turn first and taken by the others where they came first (a signed policy that isn't strict, among them, unseated the turn there); and a remake whose base preceded the turn had every switching node replay the turn as one of its own, each refusing the others'. A change writing a strict policy where the policy at its history isn't strict (`"signed"` at its `values`, or an envelope there asking for signed values) is now refused, in every swarm. A swarm turns strict at its start (`--bootstrap-policy`) or through a strict remake, each its epoch's first change: no change of a strict epoch is from before its policy, and the rule for the time before goes, with the walk that found the changes that turned a swarm strict and what kept them (`before_strict`, `turned_strict`, `Reads::strict_now`, `Reads::turned_now`, `store::writers`, `store::made`, `changes::in_history`). The strict swarm's simulation starts strict. access.md says so, and that a strict swarm can't move to a policy its nodes don't know by writing it.
* swarm: a new swarm's policy recorded in its genesis changetv2 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A swarm strict from its start had its policy written by its first user in a later change. A change is judged by the policy at its history, so any member could always add a change whose history is from before the policy: judged by none, needing no signature, taken whenever it comes. Since signed values are read by `seq`, an envelope planted there with the highest `seq` there is can never be followed: a ban, a user, a declaration, for good. `--bootstrap-policy JSON`, with `--genesis`, records the policy in the genesis change, with the first users: then no change of the swarm is from before it. It must be a policy this node knows, and a strict one needs `--bootstrap-keys`, or nobody could sign what decides who may do what.
* signed values: one reading of an envelope, everywheretv2 days1-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Three parts read an envelope three ways: the store's order took any string with the prefix whose meta held a `seq`, its reads any whose value decoded, the checks only one with four parts and a meta of exactly its fields. A string that the first two took and the checks refused was read first, read as the registry's or the policy's value, and treated as nothing by the check of the next write there. `document::signed` reads an envelope the one way: four parts, the value JSON, the meta exactly its six fields (one more, or one twice, and it isn't one), no newline in either, the signature decoding. The store's order, its plain reads, the checks, the API and the users API all go by it. What isn't one in every respect is a plain string, wherever it is read.
* signed values: value and meta apart, numbered; the highest seq is readtv2 days1-5/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A member could put a user's older signed value back beside a newer one: a change made with dependencies from before both is judged where the place was empty, so the older envelope (`prev` empty) is taken; and of values written at once, the one read was the one with the highest operation, which whoever writes the change steers. A revoked capability, a lifted ban or an earlier policy came back that way, signed by whoever signed it then. An envelope is now `cv2.<value>.<meta>.<signature>`: the value as its user wrote it, and apart from it what continuum adds (swarm, path, user, at, seq, prev), the signature over the value's line and the meta's. `seq` is one more than that of the envelope it replaces, 0 where it replaces none; every node checks it with `prev`. Of the values a place holds, written at once, signed ones are read before any other, the highest `seq` first, of equal ones the lower digest (`store::candidates`): reads, snapshots and writes all go by it. An older envelope beside a newer one changes nothing. `application/continuum-signed` is the value's line, the meta's, then the signature; `scripts/continuum-signed` writes and checks it so. The wire version goes up: nodes must agree on what a place's value is.
* simtest: hyparview's views settle within a reaffirm roundtv4 days1-1/+11
| | | | | | | | `active_views_settle_and_heal` waited 60 s for the views to settle, on lossy links. A DISCONNECT lost leaves a link at one end until the next reaffirm round (`REAFFIRM_EVERY`, 60 s): the wait timed out with one member holding another that no longer held it. It waits twice that, as the heal after it does.
* swarm: no SIGNATUREStv9 days2-12/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signatures sent on their own (SIGNATURES, every second, to each peer not sent them yet) flooded every link: a signature made after its change left, or one that came with changes, went to every neighbour, whether or not it got the change along with its signature elsewhere. With every change of a node signed as it leaves (1217) and signatures going where their changes go (1218), none is left for them to carry: the message, its task and its traffic counter go (wire version 46). Signatures waiting for their changes are offered as before when sync messages bring them, and the changes waiting for signatures judged again with the next batch.
* signatures: sign what is senttv9 days1-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node signed its changes no rule signs a while after them (--sign-every 1s): the change left at once, unsigned, and its signature followed on its own a second later, to every neighbour, over every link. A few writes made a cascade of SIGNATURES. Under a policy requiring signatures it signed every change as it was made instead. A node now signs its latest change, if no signature vouches for it, as a sync message takes it (--sign-every sent, the default): the signature leaves in the same message, and goes where the change goes. One signature per message, however many changes it carries, each vouching for those before it: a slow writer's every change is signed, a fast writer's batches are, at no threshold to pick. A policy requiring signatures signs what is sent too, even with `none`. `all` still signs every change as it is made; changes to protocol data, listed paths and ?signed=true writes are signed as they are made, as before. The interval, and the task signing on it, go.
* state: limit refused writes per usertv9 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | A write every node would refuse is rolled back by forking the document at the heads before it, under the write lock, at a cost that grows with the document's history. A user could ask for such writes in a loop. Count each user's refused writes over the last minute. Past --refused-writes-per-minute (default 10), its writes are answered 429 without being tried, until the oldest refusal leaves the minute.
* roots: an epoch's root pinned, and named in every handshaketv9 days2-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Review 2, N7, the care it raised: a joining node's empty document took as the first epoch's root whatever dependency-less change came first, from whichever peer it joined through; the first epoch's ID is all zeros, so nothing pinned it. A remake's epoch has its ID, the snapshot change's hash, which the rules hold its root to. * Every node names its epoch's root in HELLO and HELLO_REPLY (the epoch's ID for a remake's, its genesis change for the first; wire version 45). A node whose document starts from another root of the same epoch refuses the handshake, logging it: another history under the swarm's ID, a forged root or a genesis started again. * A joining node with an empty document takes as its root only the one it was given (--genesis-root, new), else the one its peers name, and none while they name different ones (access::screen::RootPin, kept in Screening across documents): one peer hands it another root only if it is all the joiner hears, or never, with --genesis-root. A root refused is listed with the refused, what builds on it with it. * The genesis node logs the root (`The swarm's root`); GET /admin/epochs shows it (`root`). A genesis started again under a remembered swarm ID used to merge with the nodes of it still running; they now refuse it (another root), and the docs say to join them with seeds instead. The epoch's identity stays as it is (generation 0 all zeros): records and epoch metadata name it so, and every comparison of epochs with them.
* remake: aborts written as the user who asks; no abort by timetv9 days1-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Review 2, N3: 1150 let any member write an abort decision once a remake had expired a grace period ago, judged by the change's own time, the writer's word. A member could race the coordinator's legitimate commit with an abort dated as it liked; both taken, Automerge shows one, and nodes that acted on the commit split from those that didn't. The two writers of such aborts are operator requests whose endpoints already need write on _continuum/remakes: aborting an expired remake (DELETE /admin/remakes/{id}) and superseding one (POST /admin/remakes?force=supersede). Both now commit as the user who asks (the proposal and its vote with them, for a supersede), which the rules take as one who may write the decision. The clause judging an abort by its time goes, and with it the time the rules carried. An expired remake is still aborted through any member, by an operator.
* strict: a manifest serves one remake, at its basetv9 days1-5/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Review 2, N1: a strict manifest wasn't bound to its base. Any member could propose an old, legitimately signed one again at the current heads; nodes would verify it and vote, and every value at a signed place changed or added since (a ban, a new user, a rotated key, a changed userSigned or sealed declaration) would be deleted, nothing after the base being left to replay. The manifest now names the epoch and the heads it was made at, and a node takes it (proposing or voting) only for a remake of that epoch with exactly that base. GET /admin/strict-manifest makes it so; continuum-signed strict proposes at those heads already.
* remake: no --follow-strict-remakes; a strict remake failing says whotv9 days2-1/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A strict remake takes a majority of members whose --strict-keys take its manifest's signer: no node votes for one without, so --follow-strict-remakes (1173) goes. A node that doesn't vote still switches once the others commit, as with any remake. So that an operator can tell why one fails: a strict remake aborted for want of a majority (the voting period over, or a majority out of reach) says in its reason (GET /admin/remakes/{id}, and the coordinator's log) which members didn't vote, and that a member votes for one only with its manifest signed by a key of its --strict-keys. Each of those logs why itself (`Not voting for a strict remake`). The sim a_strict_remake_too_few_take: only a takes the manifest; the remake aborts, naming b and c.
* remake: turning a running swarm strict, keeping what an operator signedtv9 days2-0/+115
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Until a swarm is strict, the user a change names is its node's word, so any member could have planted registry entries, policy, bans or user-signed values as any user, plain or signed by a key it put there itself; writing the strict policy trusted all of it as it was. A remake of a new kind, `strict`, turns a swarm strict instead: * Its content is a manifest (access::strict): the swarm, the strict policy, and each value kept at the places values are signed, by the SHA-256 of its JSON, signed by an operator (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-strict). * Every node builds the next epoch as compaction does, keeping at the signed places only the values the manifest names, as they were at the base, and writing its policy (RemakeKind::protocol, the one kind that changes protocol data). Writes after the base reach the new epoch only by replays, judged by the strict policy. * A node votes for one only with its manifest signed by one of --strict-keys, keys given out of the document; without any, for none (logged once, `Not voting for a strict remake`), unless --follow-strict-remakes. A coordinator proposes only what it would vote for (403). Once a majority commits one, every node switches, as with any remake: refusing to switch would only cut a node off. * GET /admin/strict-manifest gives the manifest keeping everything held now, the values for review and the heads they are at; continuum-signed strict shows them, signs once confirmed and proposes at those heads. The sim a_swarm_turning_strict_through_a_remake: a member plants a registry entry as a manager; the operator's manifest leaves it out; a and b, given the key, commit; c, without, follows; the entry is gone and the policy strict everywhere.
* login: logins by key capped per usertv9 days1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review 6: a node remembers the challenges used until they expire, 10 000 at most, and refused every login by key once full. One user holding a key could make 10 000 logins within five minutes and keep everyone else out. A user may now log in by key at most --key-logins-per-user times (100) on a node within a challenge's lifetime, past which that user waits and others don't; the 10 000 stay as the cap for all users together. The lifetime, five minutes until now, is --challenge-lifetime.
* simtest: forged changes, aborts of expired remakes, envelopes of another swarmtv9 days1-0/+185
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Simulations backing what the review's fixes changed, beyond their unit tests: * a_change_forged_under_another_members_actor (1145): a change made under b's actor at the seq of b's last change, judged by a: refused as forged, b not refused as a whole, b's next write taken. * an_expired_remake_aborted_by_any_member (1150): under the policy, a coordinator gone before it decides; b aborts its remake once it expired a grace period ago, c takes the abort, nothing refused. * a_strict_swarm (1155): a value alice signed for another swarm, replacing the one there, is refused as such.
* envelope: a signed value names its swarmtv9 days1-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review 3.1, part of finding 12: a signed value's payload bound path, user, time and prev, but not the swarm. A user with the same name and key in two swarms could have an envelope replayed from one into the other, wherever the path holds no envelope yet (prev ""). The payload now names the swarm (`swarm`), and a node takes an envelope only for its own. /auth/whoami says the swarm, and continuum-signed and the example in api.md sign it. Wire version 44: nodes before this refuse such envelopes, and those after refuse the old ones.
* simtest: the forged write refused by whichever node judges it firsttv9 days1-4/+9
| | | | | | | a_swarm_judging_every_change waited for c's forged write to be refused by a, b and d each. The first to judge it tells c, which drops it before the others may have it: wait for a refusal on any of them, then for c to drop it.
* simtest: refused by whichever node judges firsttv9 days1-10/+18
| | | | | | | | In a_strict_swarm and sealed_values, c's forged writes were waited for to be refused by a and by b. Whichever judges them first tells c, which drops them before the other may have judged them (it waits for their signature, or never gets them): wait for a refusal on either, then for c to drop them.
* access: a node judges its own changes before they leavetv9 days1-6/+88
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The API checks the path a request asks for; the rules judge everything the change does. Where they disagreed, the honest node's change was refused by every other node, and with signatures required the node was refused as a whole. The plan had both gates run the same judgement. Under a policy, each change a node makes (its own writes and those through the API) is now judged by rules::judge as receivers will judge it, before it is signed or sent; one every node would refuse is rolled back (the document forked at the heads before it, same actor: the change never left) and the request refused with 403 (StoreError:: Refused). rules::judge_held, judging a change the document holds, moves from swarm::refusals to access::rules for both. The simulations that play a member past its own checks write with a helper that bypasses them (forge). Review finding 3 (the same judgement at both gates).
* access: an epoch's root is never droppedtv10 days1-0/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A REFUSALS naming the swarm's first change made the node receiving it judge that change again in a document that isn't empty, refuse it as "a change without dependencies that isn't the epoch's root", and drop it with everything built on it: its whole document. The first epoch's root is now the first change a document holds, as it comes to an empty one or as it is in one; a change judged again on a peer's word is never refused for having no dependencies; and drop_taken refuses to drop an epoch's root, or anything that would leave nothing kept, logging an error instead. Review finding 1 (critical).
* simtest: members against the rules, and a policy unknowntv10 days1-0/+102
| | | | | | | | A member writing past its API's checks is refused, told, drops its change and is taken again; a node under a policy it doesn't know takes no writes and syncs on. Auth plan M6 (tests).
* swarm: changes taken unjudged, dropped (REFUSALS)tv10 days1-9/+83
| | | | | | | | | A node refusing changes a peer brought tells it which broke a rule; the peer judges them itself, and if its rules refuse them too, drops them with all built on them (its document forked without them, a fresh actor), quarantining its own writes among them. Wire version 42. Auth plan M6 (rejoin on taint).
* access: members refused as a wholetv10 days1-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats (sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is taken again or the epoch changes. Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
* simtest: sealed valuestv10 days1-1/+81
| | | | | | | A value sealed for its declared readers goes everywhere; one sealed for a stranger too, or plain, gets nothing past the others. Auth plan M8.