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* simtest: show a store's refusals and ballots in a failed simulation's dumptv19 hours1-10/+66
| | | | | | For a node holding a store, the dump shows each event it refused and why, the proposals on the current version with the parties proposing them and their votes, whether each passes there, and the version events it took.
* simtest: show what screening holds back in a failed simulation's dumptv19 hours1-1/+53
| | | | | | | | A failed simulation prints, for each node, the writer it writes as, the changes its screening keeps waiting (the latest few: whose writer and seq, how many of their dependencies it holds, whether a signature vouches for them) and the latest changes it refused, and, holding a store, the store's checkpoint, current version and what it took and refused.
* simtest: a swarm holding a store, its members and a node its party doesn't listtv22 hours1-0/+15
| | | | | | | tv lists a and b, which start from the store's root; lass lists c, which joins by the store's ID; d is of lass too, which doesn't list it. Events put on a and on c reach a, b and c, which read them; d, which no member syncs with, gets nothing. A simulated node started on a document expects its swarm, as `run` has it do.
* federation: the store read from the documenttv25 hours1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node of a swarm holding a store holds the store, read from its document (`docs/store.md`, What the store takes from the document): `federation::held`. Whenever the document changes, a worker reads the events it holds that the store wasn't offered from it, under the document's lock, and offers them to the store without it, each taken as from anywhere: once its dependencies are held, judged at its history. Another document (a drop, a rejoin) is read as it comes, the store going on. The node reads its store anew from its document whenever it starts, from the root, by what is its own of it: the events it refused by what it took before, and those its operator had it drop, which it keeps in a file (`--store-file`), written whenever that changes, so that a store read anew in another order refuses what it refused before. A file that doesn't read stops the node from starting; without one, a restart may take what it refused.
* node: a swarm holding a store, started from its root or joined by its IDtv25 hours1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Behind the `federation` feature, two options: * `--store-root PATH` starts a swarm holding a store, or goes on with one, from the store's root, as bytes in the file, which the federation must take as a root. With no document to start on, the node builds the genesis change from it, as every node given the root does, and is ready at once; a document to start on must be of the root's swarm. * `--store-id ID` joins one through seeds by its ID, the root's SHA-256 in hex. An empty document of the first epoch takes as its root only that store's genesis change, built again from the root it holds (`document::events::is_genesis`), whatever peers name: the root pin doesn't wait for seeds, nor is disputed. Either names the swarm the node joins, which a state file must remember too, and can't be combined with the other, nor with what makes a new swarm's first change (`--genesis`, `--bootstrap-users`, `--bootstrap-keys`, `--bootstrap-policy`, `--remake`, `--genesis-root`). The root is read as a file of its own kind (`store`), counted among the node's files.
* swarm: a new swarm's policy recorded in its genesis changetv2 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A swarm strict from its start had its policy written by its first user in a later change. A change is judged by the policy at its history, so any member could always add a change whose history is from before the policy: judged by none, needing no signature, taken whenever it comes. Since signed values are read by `seq`, an envelope planted there with the highest `seq` there is can never be followed: a ban, a user, a declaration, for good. `--bootstrap-policy JSON`, with `--genesis`, records the policy in the genesis change, with the first users: then no change of the swarm is from before it. It must be a policy this node knows, and a strict one needs `--bootstrap-keys`, or nobody could sign what decides who may do what.
* state: limit refused writes per usertv9 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | A write every node would refuse is rolled back by forking the document at the heads before it, under the write lock, at a cost that grows with the document's history. A user could ask for such writes in a loop. Count each user's refused writes over the last minute. Past --refused-writes-per-minute (default 10), its writes are answered 429 without being tried, until the oldest refusal leaves the minute.
* roots: an epoch's root pinned, and named in every handshaketv9 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Review 2, N7, the care it raised: a joining node's empty document took as the first epoch's root whatever dependency-less change came first, from whichever peer it joined through; the first epoch's ID is all zeros, so nothing pinned it. A remake's epoch has its ID, the snapshot change's hash, which the rules hold its root to. * Every node names its epoch's root in HELLO and HELLO_REPLY (the epoch's ID for a remake's, its genesis change for the first; wire version 45). A node whose document starts from another root of the same epoch refuses the handshake, logging it: another history under the swarm's ID, a forged root or a genesis started again. * A joining node with an empty document takes as its root only the one it was given (--genesis-root, new), else the one its peers name, and none while they name different ones (access::screen::RootPin, kept in Screening across documents): one peer hands it another root only if it is all the joiner hears, or never, with --genesis-root. A root refused is listed with the refused, what builds on it with it. * The genesis node logs the root (`The swarm's root`); GET /admin/epochs shows it (`root`). A genesis started again under a remembered swarm ID used to merge with the nodes of it still running; they now refuse it (another root), and the docs say to join them with seeds instead. The epoch's identity stays as it is (generation 0 all zeros): records and epoch metadata name it so, and every comparison of epochs with them.
* remake: no --follow-strict-remakes; a strict remake failing says whotv9 days1-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A strict remake takes a majority of members whose --strict-keys take its manifest's signer: no node votes for one without, so --follow-strict-remakes (1173) goes. A node that doesn't vote still switches once the others commit, as with any remake. So that an operator can tell why one fails: a strict remake aborted for want of a majority (the voting period over, or a majority out of reach) says in its reason (GET /admin/remakes/{id}, and the coordinator's log) which members didn't vote, and that a member votes for one only with its manifest signed by a key of its --strict-keys. Each of those logs why itself (`Not voting for a strict remake`). The sim a_strict_remake_too_few_take: only a takes the manifest; the remake aborts, naming b and c.
* remake: turning a running swarm strict, keeping what an operator signedtv9 days1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Until a swarm is strict, the user a change names is its node's word, so any member could have planted registry entries, policy, bans or user-signed values as any user, plain or signed by a key it put there itself; writing the strict policy trusted all of it as it was. A remake of a new kind, `strict`, turns a swarm strict instead: * Its content is a manifest (access::strict): the swarm, the strict policy, and each value kept at the places values are signed, by the SHA-256 of its JSON, signed by an operator (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-strict). * Every node builds the next epoch as compaction does, keeping at the signed places only the values the manifest names, as they were at the base, and writing its policy (RemakeKind::protocol, the one kind that changes protocol data). Writes after the base reach the new epoch only by replays, judged by the strict policy. * A node votes for one only with its manifest signed by one of --strict-keys, keys given out of the document; without any, for none (logged once, `Not voting for a strict remake`), unless --follow-strict-remakes. A coordinator proposes only what it would vote for (403). Once a majority commits one, every node switches, as with any remake: refusing to switch would only cut a node off. * GET /admin/strict-manifest gives the manifest keeping everything held now, the values for review and the heads they are at; continuum-signed strict shows them, signs once confirmed and proposes at those heads. The sim a_swarm_turning_strict_through_a_remake: a member plants a registry entry as a manager; the operator's manifest leaves it out; a and b, given the key, commit; c, without, follows; the entry is gone and the policy strict everywhere.
* login: logins by key capped per usertv9 days1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review 6: a node remembers the challenges used until they expire, 10 000 at most, and refused every login by key once full. One user holding a key could make 10 000 logins within five minutes and keep everyone else out. A user may now log in by key at most --key-logins-per-user times (100) on a node within a challenge's lifetime, past which that user waits and others don't; the 10 000 stay as the cap for all users together. The lifetime, five minutes until now, is --challenge-lifetime.
* access: --bootstrap-keystv10 days1-1/+1
| | | | | | | The first users' SSH keys, recorded at genesis with their entries, so a swarm can be strict from its start. Auth plan M7.
* simtest: the policy, and a remake under ittv10 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | A swarm judging every change: honest writes everywhere, a joining node registers, a forged write stays where it was made; a compaction under the policy refuses nothing honest. Auth plan M6.
* simtest: signed changestv10 days1-1/+2
| | | | | | | Every change vouched for on every node within a second; a forged signature vouches for nothing. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: kept in the document filetv10 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | A node's signatures are saved with its document (--document-file) and loaded with it. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: --sign-everytv10 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | Changes left unsigned are vouched for by the node's next signature: --sign-every 1s (default) signs the latest within a second, all signs every change, none only those that must be. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: changes signed by their nodetv10 days1-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519 signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones. Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed, and writes with ?signed=true. Auth plan M5.
* dashboard: without LINKS; LINKS removedtv10 days1-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | The dashboard reads every member's links from the members themselves; LINKS and LINKS_REPLY, swarm::links and their wire tags go (wire version bumped). Nodes the browser can't reach are drawn from what the reachable ones measure. Auth plan M3.
* dashboard: own links over the API, and CORStv10 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links, as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins, without credentials. Auth plan M3.
* auth: logging in, and tokens as bearerstv10 days1-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh, /auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and --session-lifetime. Auth plan M2.
* access: first users at genesistv10 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | --bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change, each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before. Auth plan M1.
* HyParView flood defaulttv11 days1-2/+2
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* flood disseminationtv11 days1-0/+1
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* HyParView (slim)tv11 days1-0/+10
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* plumtreetv11 days1-0/+5
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* push by defaulttv13 days1-1/+0
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* push changes experimenttv13 days1-0/+1
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* measure 2-hop neighbourhoodtv2026-11-031-0/+1
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* add propagation benchmarktv2026-11-031-0/+1
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* add stream heartbeattv2026-11-031-0/+1
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* add announce unreachable testtv2026-11-021-0/+14
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* add links relay testtv2026-11-021-1/+61
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* dashboard: double-click opens peer dashboardtv2026-11-021-0/+1
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* add restart teststv2026-11-011-0/+24
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* LWW everywhere, mostlytv2026-11-011-0/+1
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* move all automerge references to documenttv2026-10-311-2/+2
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* rename AutoMerge to Documenttv2026-10-311-2/+2
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* add peer clock skew warningtv2026-10-311-0/+1
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* move DELIVERY_LIMIT to sim transporttv2026-10-311-4/+1
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* simtest: unify SOON constanttv2026-10-311-0/+3
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* decouple simulation test from myceliumtv2026-10-301-0/+10
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* add support for several transportstv2026-10-271-0/+1
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* add identity layertv2026-10-271-0/+26
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* add Transport::delivery_limittv2026-10-271-4/+1
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* describe remake test failures in simulationtv2026-10-261-0/+3
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* show interpolated values in GET /admin/configtv2026-10-261-1/+1
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* add delta blobstv2026-10-261-0/+1
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* add remake tests on the simulatortv2026-10-261-0/+1
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* unreachability doesn't expiretv2026-10-261-1/+1
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* SyncSessions owns Automerge's sync statetv2026-10-261-2/+2
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