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A strict remake takes a majority of members whose --strict-keys take
its manifest's signer: no node votes for one without, so
--follow-strict-remakes (1173) goes. A node that doesn't vote still
switches once the others commit, as with any remake.
So that an operator can tell why one fails: a strict remake aborted
for want of a majority (the voting period over, or a majority out of
reach) says in its reason (GET /admin/remakes/{id}, and the
coordinator's log) which members didn't vote, and that a member votes
for one only with its manifest signed by a key of its --strict-keys.
Each of those logs why itself (`Not voting for a strict remake`).
The sim a_strict_remake_too_few_take: only a takes the manifest; the
remake aborts, naming b and c.
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Until a swarm is strict, the user a change names is its node's word, so
any member could have planted registry entries, policy, bans or
user-signed values as any user, plain or signed by a key it put there
itself; writing the strict policy trusted all of it as it was.
A remake of a new kind, `strict`, turns a swarm strict instead:
* Its content is a manifest (access::strict): the swarm, the strict
policy, and each value kept at the places values are signed, by the
SHA-256 of its JSON, signed by an operator (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n
continuum-strict).
* Every node builds the next epoch as compaction does, keeping at the
signed places only the values the manifest names, as they were at
the base, and writing its policy (RemakeKind::protocol, the one kind
that changes protocol data). Writes after the base reach the new
epoch only by replays, judged by the strict policy.
* A node votes for one only with its manifest signed by one of
--strict-keys, keys given out of the document; without any, for none
(logged once, `Not voting for a strict remake`), unless
--follow-strict-remakes. A coordinator proposes only what it would
vote for (403). Once a majority commits one, every node switches, as
with any remake: refusing to switch would only cut a node off.
* GET /admin/strict-manifest gives the manifest keeping everything held
now, the values for review and the heads they are at;
continuum-signed strict shows them, signs once confirmed and proposes
at those heads.
The sim a_swarm_turning_strict_through_a_remake: a member plants a
registry entry as a manager; the operator's manifest leaves it out; a
and b, given the key, commit; c, without, follows; the entry is gone
and the policy strict everywhere.
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Review 6: a node remembers the challenges used until they expire, 10 000
at most, and refused every login by key once full. One user holding a
key could make 10 000 logins within five minutes and keep everyone else
out.
A user may now log in by key at most --key-logins-per-user times (100)
on a node within a challenge's lifetime, past which that user waits and
others don't; the 10 000 stay as the cap for all users together. The
lifetime, five minutes until now, is --challenge-lifetime.
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The first users' SSH keys, recorded at genesis with their entries, so a
swarm can be strict from its start.
Auth plan M7.
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A node's signatures are saved with its document (--document-file) and
loaded with it.
Auth plan M5.
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Changes left unsigned are vouched for by the node's next signature:
--sign-every 1s (default) signs the latest within a second, all signs
every change, none only those that must be.
Auth plan M5.
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GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links,
as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a
token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins,
without credentials.
Auth plan M3.
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POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh,
/auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring
Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and
--session-lifetime.
Auth plan M2.
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The first users come only from --bootstrap-users; the genesis node
warns of htpasswd users that aren't among them.
Auth plan M1.
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Swarms started before the registry keep working without one; the
genesis node's options for a registry apply only to new swarms. What
tests and migration leave is noted in future-work.
Auth plan M1, bootstrap and migration (2.5).
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--bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change,
each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until
added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before.
Auth plan M1.
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_continuum/users/<name>: one entry per user, with capabilities by path
(read, write) granted by whom and when, and a disabled flag. Read
leniently: a damaged entry gives less, never more. Protocol data stays
apart: a capability outside _continuum never covers it.
Auth plan M1.
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