aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/federation
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* vote: a second `true` builds on the nays that freed its partytv2 hours3-11/+107
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The federation takes a party's `true` only where, at its history, every other proposal it backed on that version is dead. A party's client, and a node voting by itself, built a vote on the events proposing what it votes on alone. A proposal made while the party's first `true` was alive, at a history holding it, holds that `true` in its history, and not the nays that ended the first proposal later: the party's `true` on it was refused, though its record cast it. The compromise case: five back X, Y is proposed, X dies, its backers back Y. A vote now builds on one event proposing what it votes on, and on the nays that freed its party (`client::building`), so the first proposal is dead at its history too. One event proposing it is enough, so many proposing it again don't push a vote past the dependencies an event may name. A checkpoint's vote builds on its proposal alone: one of those nays in the history of its heads, named, would put the vote beside them. A party freed only after the heads were named backs that checkpoint not, and its client says so before casting; it backs one proposed after. Row 74 is tested (`federation_attack_74`); federation.md and the guides say so.
* continuum-party: which places a proposal gives another writertv3 hours3-2/+84
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rules go by first match, and `{party}` matches only the names of the version's parties: admitting a party named as a segment of a place, or changing the rules or their order, moves who writes the places below it, and what their writer wrote there counts no more once the version passes. Nothing said so: a proposal showed only its fields' changes. `client::writers` names, of the places holding a value, those whose writer a version changes, as `place: before -> after` (`nobody` where no rule gives it one). `continuum-party proposals` prints them under each proposal's changes (`who writes …`), and a fork's check does for the fork's version (`writers` in POST /events/fork). The guides and federation.md say so; row 72 is tested (`federation_attack_72`).
* fork: a fork's check says what its version changes, rules among ittv3 hours2-5/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node holding the history up to a fork's heads said whether it builds the root, what it holds that those heads lack, and which parties' keys the fork's version gives otherwise. A founder could change the rules, or only their order, which says who writes where, and nobody joining was shown it. The check now says what the fork's version changes of the version current at those heads, a line each as a proposal's are shown (`client::changes`): `changes` in POST /events/fork, and `continuum-party check` prints them. federation.md and the forking guide say so, and that a fork's ID is compared whole: a founder trying versions can steer its first few digits.
* vote: the version that moved the store counts not toward the next checkpointtv3 hours2-5/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | `--store-propose-versions` counted the versions since the checkpoint's version, the one current at its heads. The version that moved the store there is written after its heads, so it counted: with 1, a node proposed a checkpoint again as soon as it backed one (`--store-back-after` after the move), and the next one, and so on, every ten minutes for good. It counts the versions written since that change more than moving to a checkpoint now (`State::changed_since_checkpoint`): with 1, one checkpoint after every other version, and none after a checkpoint. The test goes on past the move.
* release: --version says what decides which builds work togethertv3 hours1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `continuum --version` and `continuum-party --version` say, after the release, the wire versions the build speaks, the federation and the revisions of it it knows (with the `federation` feature), and the Automerge version it makes documents with: continuum 1.0.0 wire versions 52 to 52 federation 1: the base revision, revision 1 (merge-events) automerge 0.12.0 `-V` says the release alone, as before; continuum-party had no version at all. The Automerge version is the one the crate itself reports (`document::engine_version`), so it follows Cargo.lock.
* federation: which nodes know a revision, in counts and before a `true`tv4 hours2-8/+100
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `GET /events/counts` says, of each node a party lists, what it said it speaks and knows (`knows`, by node ID): the wire versions, the oldest and the newest, and the newest revision of the federation it knows, by number and ID and as people read it, its number null where this continuum doesn't know it; null where it said nothing, a build from before SPEAKS or one the node didn't hear from; the node's own as it is. So the nodes still to upgrade before a revision passes show, every party's, where before a party's operators could check only their own. A party's client, backing a proposal that moves to another revision, warns of every node of any party not known to know it, a line a party naming each and what it said: once it passes, those stop at it till upgraded. `next` warns alike, of the revision it moves to, or of the later one it suggests. A warning, not a refusal: what a node heard is no proof, and a node not heard from may well be upgraded.
* federation: checked against the release a federation-<F>.<R> tag namesfederation-1.1tv4 hours3-317/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A corpus of generated histories, committed, said what this code made of them, right or not, and held hundreds of kilobytes a revision; generated from code that changes, it could only be checked, never written again. Each release that makes a revision is tagged `federation-<F>.<R>`, the federation's number and the revision's (`federation-1.1`, revision 1 of federation 1). `scripts/federation-check` writes histories from this tree (`write_histories`, an ignored test): of each revision it knows and each kind the properties generate, those of a few seeds from a random one it says, and the attack tests' crafted ones, as each test offered them where nothing but offers made them. It judges them with `continuum-party judge` here and with the continuum the latest such tag names (or one given), built in a worktree and kept between runs, leaves out those whose root the tagged one reads as none, and says where the two differ. Run before a release, not by `cargo quick`. The corpus and its test are gone; the test plan and `federation.md` say how a release is checked.
* attacks: the histories they offer, recorded while asked totv5 hours1-20/+159
| | | | | | | | | | | The attack rows' tests craft histories and assert what the design says becomes of each event: worth judging by later releases too, as they were judged when the tests passed. Their stores are made and offered through the harness (`Fed::new`, `Fed::offer`), and while `recording` runs a test, each of them is recorded: its root, the events offered in order, and whether nothing but offers made it what it became (an operator's drop doesn't). A test that fails records nothing. `TESTS` names every attack test, which a test checks against the file.
* federation: continuum-party judge, a store's verdicts in a format releases keeptv5 hours3-0/+205
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | To check that a release judges histories as an earlier one did, under every revision that one knows, each must say what its store makes of the same histories, in the same words. `continuum-party judge` reads histories from its input, each `case <label>`, `root <hex>` and `event <hex>` for each event in the order offered, and prints for each what became of every event by kind (`became <ID> <kind>`, never a refusal's words) and what the store reads after (`reads <JSON>`): its checkpoint, the current version, the values at places, the members, and the event it stopped at; `root none` where the root reads as none, as one of a revision this continuum doesn't know (`federation::judge`). The format is never to change: an earlier release prints it too.
* properties: votes mostly on the earliest proposal, a stop sought past the casestv12 hours1-39/+85
| | | | | | | | | | | | | `the_store_judges_and_reads_as_the_model` asks that some history stop a store, where two thirds pass a version this continuum doesn't read. Merge events in the generator shifted every seeded history, and of the 64 cases with such versions none stopped; the corpus's scan found stopping seeds only past them (279, 314, 330 and others). Of the proposals a party knows, it now votes on, and writes the version event of, the earliest on the version current where it writes more often than not, so that parties vote alike and versions pass. And where none of the cases stopped a store, the test scans later seeds of those kinds till one does, up to 1000, and checks it too: a stop is checked whatever the generator's luck.
* corpus: cases chosen by what they show, merges by nodes their party liststv13 hours2-16/+102
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The corpora written from four seeds of each kind showed little: of 32 histories, 4 versions written, no move and no stop, and every merge event refused, as the generator signed them with any of ten node keys, so the corpus of revision 1 judged as the base revision's did. A generated merge event is signed by a node its party lists there, more often than not. Of each kind, the corpus keeps the histories of the first two seeds, and of the next 400 those showing what the ones kept don't (`shows`: of each kind of event, what became of one; a version written, a move, a stop), eight at most. The check asks that together a revision's cases show a version written, a move to a checkpoint, a stop, and a merge event taken where the revision has merge events, else refused.
* federation: a corpus per revision, judged alike by every later continuumtv13 hours3-12/+261
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Nothing checked that judging under a revision stays what it was: a change to the fold that alters what an earlier revision takes, refuses or reads parts nodes running it from nodes that don't, and the tests regenerate their expectations with the code. For each revision this continuum knows, a file in `src/federation/corpus/` holds histories generated at that revision, of every kind the properties generate, each event's bytes with what became of it, by kind and never by a refusal's words, and what the store reads after; its first line names the revision by its ID. It is written once, as the revision is made (`write_the_corpus`, an ignored test run by hand), and never edited after; every later continuum judges it alike (`every_revision_judges_as_its_corpus_says`), which fails where a revision has no corpus yet, saying how to write it. The test plan describes it.
* federation: revisions shown, named, and moved to by handtv13 hours3-10/+153
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | An operator moving the federation to a revision had nothing to say which revisions a node knows, nor which one the current version follows, and a hash where a name would do. `GET /events` lists the revisions the node's continuum knows, each its number, its ID, the feature it adds and what that adds, and as people read it ("revision 1 (merge-events)"); `GET /events/counts`, the current version's. `continuum-party next --revision FEATURE` begins a version following the revision adding it, never an earlier one than the current version's, and `next` says so where the node knows a later one. `proposals` shows a change of revision as people read it, a revision this continuum doesn't know so said. A client backs a version moving to a revision only where its node knows it, and says why otherwise: once passed, a node that doesn't stops there. The upgrades guide walks through moving to a revision: upgrade every node, propose, vote, and what follows; the proposing guide lists `revision`, and the API's spec the rest.
* vote: a node proposes a checkpoint at the heads it holdstv13 hours1-25/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node proposed a checkpoint at the heads of what it held for a while: every event written in that while, and every one built on an event beside those heads, as one party writing now and then on something old makes them, was beside them, and refused once the store moved. A voter whose while was shorter backed none, one whose while was longer backed it and lost those. It proposes at the heads its store holds, sorted: what was written before is in their history, and only what is written while the vote takes its course may be beside them. It proposes none where they are more than an event may name: under a revision with merge events, it merges them first; otherwise, what is written after does. `--store-held-for` keeps the voters' rule and how long a new proposal holds back a checkpoint. `federation.md`, the guides and the options say so.
* held: a node merges its store's heads beyond what an event may nametv13 hours1-4/+132
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Past 64 heads, no event is above them all, and what is written builds on the earliest 64 alone: where nobody writes, heads apart stay apart, and a checkpoint naming them is never written. Under a revision with merge events, a node its party lists signs merge events with its node key where its store holds more heads than an event may name, each on as many as it may, the earliest taken first, until no more are left (`Holding::merge`). The worker does so a random wait after the heads first were too many, as it puts again what the document lacks, so that of the members few do at once. `federation.md` says so under Nodes, and the guides say what a node writes by itself and what its log says.
* federation: merge events, the first revisiontv13 hours11-30/+217
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | What builds on many heads merges them, but only an event a party writes: in a quiet federation, heads beside each other stay so, and past 64 no event is above them all. Revision 1 (`merge-events`) adds merge events: `{"merge": true}`, signed with a node's own key, the `key` its Ed25519 key, for the party whose node list names it. One counts for nothing, and only gathers what it builds on into the history of what builds on it. Under the base revision, signed by a node its party doesn't list, or by a party's key, it is refused; the model alike. Generated federations begin at either revision, and their nodes merge. A node voting by itself backs no version changing the revision, on any version neither: its party's operators vote on that one, once their nodes run a continuum that knows it. `federation.md` lists the revisions, says what a merge event is, and row 71 is tested (`federation_attack_71`).
* federation: a version names the revision of federation 1 it followstv13 hours3-4/+193
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | What every node must agree on was named by the federation's number alone, and a change that only took more kept it: a party could use it before every node ran it, and nodes not upgraded refused what followed and parted from the others. A version now names the revision it follows by its ID (`"revision": "<ID>"`), the SHA-256 of the JCS list of the features it adds to the base revision federation 1 began with (`federation::revision`); a version naming none follows the base revision, ECDSA keys among it, so the versions written so far read as they did. A version names the base revision only by leaving `revision` out, and a revision no earlier than the one of the version it changes. A continuum that doesn't know a revision, another build's among them, can't read a version naming it: it stops at a version event writing one, and says which revision and what it knows. There are no revisions yet but the base revision. `federation.md` says how a revision is rolled out, then passed, and what a later continuum may leave out; the upgrades guide, and the one on a node stopped, alike.
* continuum-party: warns before a true that only every nay left endstv15 hours2-0/+79
| | | | | | | | A `true` holds its party until its proposal passes or is dead, and only other parties' nays make it dead: where the parties yet to vote are too few, one of them staying quiet binds the party on that version for good. The client says so before it casts such a `true` (`client::binding`): where ending the proposal would take every party yet to vote, or more, and those are a third of the parties or fewer.
* vote: propose a checkpoint after so many versionstv15 hours2-9/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The votes cast before count at a history from before too: a proposal that died, or a rival, needs there only the votes it lacked, and after a close vote one key voting twice is enough, at any time until a checkpoint above the version that followed. Nodes that took that version refuse it; one lagging behind, or joining from the root, may take it. `federation.md` said it took the keys of two thirds of the parties. A node voting by itself proposes a checkpoint once so many versions were written since its store's (`--store-propose-versions`), as the design lists: with 1, after every version, so that what keys voting twice grow beside a version ends at a checkpoint above it. `federation.md` says how little a rival version takes, row 20 too, and the guides the option.
* vote: a proposal holds back checkpoints by a third, or new for a whiletv15 hours1-11/+88
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node voting by itself proposes no checkpoint beside a proposal that holds it back, as the checkpoint would lapse it, and a follower backs none so. A proposal held one back where someone but its proposer backed it: two parties, or one and a stolen key, kept a junk proposal alive, and no automatic checkpoint came while it lived, ending it taking nays from more than a third each round. And one new, its proposer alone backing it, was lapsed at once by a checkpoint its writes brought about. A proposal that can still pass holds back now where a third of the parties back it, someone but its proposer among them; or where it is new, held for less than a while (`--store-held-for`), and its proposer has none older on the version: so it is heard before a checkpoint lapses it, once a version for each proposer. Row 67 says so, and a test of nine parties checks it.
* vote: a follower copies no false, lapses nothing others back, waits after a movetv15 hours1-34/+142
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A node following a party (`--store-follow`) handed it more than the text said: * it copied the party's `false`: one party's nay freed bound followers, and its `true` shown to some and its `false` to the rest passed a checkpoint at one history and made it dead at another. It copies the `true` alone now, on any version too; * a checkpoint lapses every other proposal: the followed party ended any proposal it disliked by passing one. A node follows a checkpoint only where no proposal that changes more can still pass that someone but its proposer backs; * nothing bounded how often the store moved, so fresh events could be left out of every checkpoint; and a node just started held nothing for a while, so the voters' rule kept nothing. A node backs, and proposes, a checkpoint only once its store held its checkpoint, or ran, for a while (`--store-back-after`, ten minutes unless set), by itself or by hand. `federation.md` says what following hands over, and row 58 what a follower on any version copies; the guides and the example say the rest.
* federation: a checkpoint of 64 heads at most, a version of 96 partiestv15 hours3-5/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | No event is above more heads than it may name dependencies (64): a version naming more for its checkpoint is never written. A node voting by itself proposed one at whatever heads it held for a while, however many; it now proposes none past 64, as what is written merges them, and a party's client backs none such (`client::backable`). A version event names the votes passing a proposal, two thirds of its version's parties: past 96 parties, more than an event may name. A version names at most 96 now (`version::PARTIES`).
* store: a new event builds on as many heads as an event may nametv15 hours5-3/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | A party's client builds on the heads its node shows (`GET /events`), and a node on its own heads; an event names at most 64 dependencies. With more heads than that, where many write at once and nothing merges, every event built on them was none. `Store::building_on` gives the heads, as many as an event may name (`Fold::DEPENDENCIES`, the federation's 64), the earliest taken first, so that what is written merges what stayed apart the longest; `GET /events` shows those, and a node voting by itself builds on them.
* federation: votes on the events proposing a checkpoint above its headstv15 hours4-16/+147
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Anyone could propose a checkpoint's version again, by an event beside its heads. A node voting by itself, and a party's client, built a vote on every event proposing what it voted on, so every vote was beside the heads, and no version event written on them was taken: the checkpoint could never move the store. And the voters' rule refused it once that event was held for a while, as the heads left it out. They vote on the events proposing it that are above the heads it names (`State::proposing`), which `GET /events/counts` lists as `proposals`; where there are none, `none` says so, the node casts nothing and the client says why. The voters' rule leaves proposals and votes aside, as they lapse with the move. Row 70 is tested (`federation_attack_70`).
* fold: of a party's lists, those written under the latest version firsttv15 hours3-14/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A key a version names, stolen, could write its party's node list at a history from before the version that named the party's keys anew: written under the version before, it counted, as naming keys anew leaves a list's `since` alone, and beside the list the party wrote under the new version the lower ID won. The thief signed a few, kept the lowest, and did so again after every list the party wrote. Of a party's key sets, and of its node lists, those written under the latest version now come first, then what no other has in its history, then the lowest ID; the model alike. A list the party writes under the version that replaced the key stays, as `federation.md` says. Key sets were safe already, by their `since`; one rule serves both. This changes what counts where two of a party's lists, written under different versions, are beside each other: nodes read them alike only once all run it. Row 69 is tested (`federation_attack_69`).
* model: stops at a version it doesn't readtv21 hours2-14/+82
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The model stops where `federation.md` says a node does: at a version event whose proposal passed at its history, isn't a version as this continuum reads it, and changes the version the model reads, it takes and refuses nothing more (`Verdict::Stopped`); beside that version, such an event is refused, as the node refuses it of its own. The property checking the store against the model runs on histories where parties propose such versions too (a field this continuum doesn't know): written in order, events come after what they build on, so both must stop at the same event, having taken the same before it, the adversary's two versions changing one among them. A check that some history stopped keeps the property from passing vacuously.
* events: why no party's client backs a proposaltv21 hours3-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | `GET /events/counts` gives each proposal on the current version `none`: why a party's client backs it not (`client::backable`), where it is no version as this node reads it, none changing the current one, or one naming the heads of the current one's checkpoint; else `null`. So a node shows that a proposal is none, and why, before it passes: one that passes all the same is never written, or, no version here, the node stops at its version event. The dashboard shows it with the proposal, and `continuum-party proposals` says it by the federation the client knows. Row 48's test checks what a node shows of the proposal.
* version: say why a version is nonetv21 hours2-38/+99
| | | | | | | | | | | | `Version::read` names what makes a version none: the field it lacks, or the one more it has, that this continuum doesn't know (of the version, a party's keys or node list, a rule), the federation it names beside the one this continuum knows, how many keys or nodes a party has against how many it may, the node ID that is none, and of a key why it is none (`keys::spelled`): its type, its point, or its spelling. A node that stops at a version says so in `stopped` (`GET /events`) and its log; a party's client in what it won't propose or back. The guide to a node that stopped says what `why` tells.
* store: a stopped node leaves out none of what it holds backtv21 hours2-7/+143
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A store that stopped can't tell which of what it holds back will be taken, nor which of what waits: `Store::held_back` gives both, each after what it builds on. A node leaves out none of it: it puts it again where its document lacks it (`Holding::lacking`), a remake's snapshot holds it (`Holding::at_base`), and after a switch or a rejoin it puts again what of it the document it left held (`Holding::left`). A remake while nodes are stopped no longer drops what was put since the stop, nor the event they stopped at. Tested: a node keeps what it holds back, what waited among it, through a snapshot, and a store read anew from that stops there again; and a simulation: a swarm stopped at a version compacts, a node away meanwhile rejoins and one started again with nothing reads the new epoch, each stopping there, holding back what came after, until their operators have them drop that event.
* federation: a joining node takes the first of two versions, as any nodetv22 hours1-1/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | Of two versions changing the one it reads, a node takes the first it judges, joining or not, and reports the other: its operator chooses, by dropping and allowing. No rule holds a joining node back until it has synced with every seed: it learns of the other members as it syncs, and its seeds may go away. federation.md drops the joining rule from Changing the policy, and says so in what isn't promised and in row 63; the guides say what a joining node takes. Row 63 is tested (`federation_attack_63`): from the root, either side first, the operator switching sides; and pinned at a later checkpoint, the chain old keys grew never taken.
* federation: a node stops at a version it doesn't readtv22 hours7-31/+415
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A version event writing a proposal passed on the version a node reads, which doesn't read as a version there (of a later federation, using what a later continuum takes, or none at all), the node can't judge: `Fold::stops`. The store stops at it: it takes nothing and refuses nothing from then on, holding back whatever comes, that event first (`Offered::Stopped`), and keeps none of it across a restart, where it stops there again. One beside the version the node reads is refused of its own, as any other. Its operator has it drop that event (`POST /admin/events/drop`), or one it builds on: it is refused as dropped, or as built on what was, any version event writing that version with it, kept in the store file; the node judges what it held back and goes on under the version before. Allowed again, it stops there once more. The node logs the stop and its end; `GET /events` names the event, why, and how many it holds back (`stopped`); a put answers `stopped`, written into the document all the same; a node voting by itself casts nothing while stopped. The test fold's eras tagged `new` stop a store. Row 39 is tested (`federation_attack_39`); of rows 9, 10 and 48, a node stops at the version event.
* store: a drop refuses whatever writes what a dropped event writestv24 hours6-22/+203
| | | | | | | | | | | | | A fold may say what an event writes that others may write alike (`Fold::writes`): of the federation, a version event's version. A node whose operator has it drop such an event drops the taken events writing the same with it, and refuses any writing it from then on, whoever wrote it anew: of a version, it takes no other version event naming it and writes none itself, though it holds the votes that passed it. The node keeps what each dropped event writes in its store file, across restarts; allowing one of them takes them all back. Row 51 of the federation's attacks has its test, and waits no more.
* attacks: rows 45, 58 and 65 tested beside the code they testtv24 hours4-5/+161
| | | | | | | | | | | The check that every attack row of the federation has its test looks beside the code a row is about too: a node's (`held`), a party's client's (`client`), and a node voting by itself (`vote`). Rows 45 (a version written on the side a node doesn't read, refused as its own and reported apart, the change that put it taken), 58 (a node following on checkpoints only, unless its operator chose any version) and 65 (a client keeping the nays that freed its `true`) have their tests there, and wait no more.
* continuum-party: proposes only what a party may backtv29 hours2-12/+54
| | | | | | | | | One check (`client::backable`) decides what a party's client proposes and what it votes `true` on: a version, changing the current one as a version must, whose checkpoint, where it names one, names none of the heads of the current version's checkpoint, as a version naming those again is never written. A proposal nobody may back is refused before it is signed, saying why.
* continuum-party keys, nodes: shown given no change, --set, --forcetv29 hours1-46/+110
| | | | | | | | | | `keys` and `nodes` alone (`--list`) show the party's key set or node list as it counts at the node, one a line, without a key. `--set` writes it whole, none twice, in place of the arguments that did; `--add` and `--remove` change it as it counts. A set or list left empty, whichever way (`--set` with none, `--remove` of the last), is written with `--force` only: none of the party's writes count without keys, nor its nodes as members without a list.
* continuum-party: votes and proposals checked for the key a version namestv29 hours1-11/+16
| | | | | | A vote or a proposal is signed with a key the current version names for the party, as a key set and a node list are: the client checks it before it signs, and records nothing where the key isn't one.
* continuum-party keys, nodes: --add and --remove, and the key they needtv29 hours1-18/+198
| | | | | | | | | | | | | `keys` and `nodes` write the party's key set or node list whole, or, with `--add` and `--remove`, the set or list as it counts at the node with those added or taken off, each of which must change it; the client says what it writes. Node IDs are checked as the federation spells them. A set or list is signed with a key the current version names for the party: the client checks that first, and where it isn't one, or the party is none of the version, says that only a version naming the party's keys or list anew changes them, which a party proposes and the parties pass.
* continuum-party propose: the proposal's hash, and --yestv29 hours1-6/+18
| | | | | `propose` says the proposal's hash, the version's, which `vote` takes; with `--yes`, it votes `true` on it too, by the record, as `vote` does.
* continuum-party propose: only a version changing the current onetv29 hours1-1/+8
| | | | | | The client proposes a version only where it changes the current one as a version must (its number, the hash it names, each `since`), and says why it doesn't otherwise: no other can pass.
* continuum-party next: the version after the current one, to changetv29 hours1-0/+44
| | | | | | | `next` prints the current version numbered on, naming its hash as the version it changes, and without the checkpoint it names, whose heads are behind: what a party changes and proposes. The guides begin a version with it.
* continuum-party: why waiting for the ssh-agent may blockecdsatv30 hours1-0/+4
| | | | | The client signs one event at a time and does nothing else meanwhile, and an agent may wait for its user as long as that takes.
* continuum-party: a key the ssh-agent holds, given itselftv30 hours2-19/+107
| | | | | | | | | `--key` gives a public key itself, an `authorized_keys` line, as well as a file of them: of a file of several, the first signs, with a warning naming it, and another is given itself to sign with it. An agent that doesn't hold the key given signs nothing, and the client stops before it records or puts what it would have signed, saying which key it asked for.
* keys: signing through an ssh-agent tested wherever tests runtv30 hours1-21/+21
| | | | | | The test fails without OpenSSH on the machine testing, rather than passing without asking anything. Its directory is a scratch directory, removed when the test ends, the agent stopped before it.
* files: a test's scratch directory goes when the test endstv30 hours1-1/+2
| | | | | | | `scratch_dir` gives a guard (`Scratch`) that removes the directory with all it holds when dropped, the test passing or failing. Each test keeps it for as long as it uses the directory; the dashboard's browser check writes its page into one.
* attacks: row 62 with an ECDSA signature spelled otherwisetv30 hours2-0/+34
| | | | | | | Row 62 names an ECDSA signature's twins, `s` high (the order less `s`) and `r` or `s` with zeros more in front, each none. Its test offers the ECDSA vector's write with each (`keys::respelled`) to a store whose root names that key, and has it take the write as it was signed.
* continuum-party: signing through an ssh-agentslopulus45 hours5-19/+250
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A key held in hardware is never a file: only an ssh-agent signs with it. Given a public key as `--key` (a `.pub` file, `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), the client asks the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign what SSHSIG signs (a sign request with the key's blob, no flags) and writes the blob around the agent's signature as `ssh-keygen -Y sign` does. An ECDSA signature the agent gives with a high `s` is made low, the other of its two spellings, which the federation takes. What it makes is checked before it is used. A private key file signs as it did. A test starts `ssh-agent`, adds an ECDSA and an Ed25519 key to it and deletes their files, signs through it, and has both continuum and `ssh-keygen -Y verify` check each signature, one of an agent's high-S answers among them. Without OpenSSH it asks nothing.
* keys: a party's key may be ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, its signature low-S onlyslopulus45 hours4-33/+300
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A party's keys may be held where no file has them, in a Secure Enclave or a phone, and those are ECDSA keys on NIST P-256. Everywhere a party's key counts (a version's keys, a key set, the key an event is signed with) such a key is taken beside an Ed25519 one, spelled as `ssh-keygen` writes it, without a comment: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, a space, and the base64 of its SSH encoding, its point uncompressed and on the curve. Its signature is SSHSIG as an Ed25519 one is, hashed with `sha512`, its inner signature over SHA-256 as SSH signs with such a key. ECDSA signatures are malleable: of `s` and the curve's order less `s`, both check. So the federation takes one spelling alone: `s` low, at most half the order, `r` and `s` each SSH's shortest mpint, and the blob reading back to itself as an Ed25519 one does. What anyone makes of a party's signature is then none, as before. The vectors are a key `ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256` made, a first version naming it, and a write and a key set `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signed with it, each taken; the signature's high-S twin, which checks as ECDSA, and its `r` spelled longer are none. Ed25519 keys and signatures are spelled and checked as they were.
* events: the store's summary names the node's party, and whether it votes for ittv2 days1-0/+5
| | | | | | `GET /events` names the party the node is of (`party`, `--store-party`) and whether it votes for it by itself (`votesByItself`, `--store-vote-key`), and so casts a vote by hand (`POST /admin/events/vote`): what a page offering votes through the node asks.
* continuum-party: options from configuration files, as the node'stv2 days1-44/+70
| | | | | | | | | `continuum-party` takes its options (`node`, `token`, `key`, `record`: `config::PARTY_OPTIONS`) on the command line and in configuration files of the node's format: `--config`, repeatable, arguments winning, `--unset`, includes and imports. The configuration's loader takes the options it reads as a table (`config::with_options`, `config::merged`, `file::load_with`), the node's or the client's, and a key naming none of them is an error in either; `node` and `token` are secrets, never logged.
* continuum-party proposals: where each proposal stands, and what it changestv2 days2-0/+125
| | | | | | | | `continuum-party proposals` lists the proposals on the current version at the node, each with whether it passed or is dead and the parties voting `true` and `false`, as `GET /events/counts` names them, and what its version changes of the current one, read from an event proposing it, its signature checked: each field whose value differs, and of `keys` and `nodes` each party's (`client::changes`).