| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The federation takes a party's `true` only where, at its history, every
other proposal it backed on that version is dead. A party's client, and
a node voting by itself, built a vote on the events proposing what it
votes on alone. A proposal made while the party's first `true` was
alive, at a history holding it, holds that `true` in its history, and
not the nays that ended the first proposal later: the party's `true` on
it was refused, though its record cast it. The compromise case: five
back X, Y is proposed, X dies, its backers back Y.
A vote now builds on one event proposing what it votes on, and on the
nays that freed its party (`client::building`), so the first proposal is
dead at its history too. One event proposing it is enough, so many
proposing it again don't push a vote past the dependencies an event may
name. A checkpoint's vote builds on its proposal alone: one of those
nays in the history of its heads, named, would put the vote beside them.
A party freed only after the heads were named backs that checkpoint not,
and its client says so before casting; it backs one proposed after.
Row 74 is tested (`federation_attack_74`); federation.md and the guides
say so.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Rules go by first match, and `{party}` matches only the names of the
version's parties: admitting a party named as a segment of a place, or
changing the rules or their order, moves who writes the places below
it, and what their writer wrote there counts no more once the version
passes. Nothing said so: a proposal showed only its fields' changes.
`client::writers` names, of the places holding a value, those whose
writer a version changes, as `place: before -> after` (`nobody` where no
rule gives it one). `continuum-party proposals` prints them under each
proposal's changes (`who writes …`), and a fork's check does for the
fork's version (`writers` in POST /events/fork). The guides and
federation.md say so; row 72 is tested (`federation_attack_72`).
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A node holding the history up to a fork's heads said whether it builds
the root, what it holds that those heads lack, and which parties' keys
the fork's version gives otherwise. A founder could change the rules, or
only their order, which says who writes where, and nobody joining was
shown it.
The check now says what the fork's version changes of the version
current at those heads, a line each as a proposal's are shown
(`client::changes`): `changes` in POST /events/fork, and
`continuum-party check` prints them. federation.md and the forking
guide say so, and that a fork's ID is compared whole: a founder trying
versions can steer its first few digits.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`--store-propose-versions` counted the versions since the checkpoint's
version, the one current at its heads. The version that moved the store
there is written after its heads, so it counted: with 1, a node proposed
a checkpoint again as soon as it backed one (`--store-back-after` after
the move), and the next one, and so on, every ten minutes for good.
It counts the versions written since that change more than moving to a
checkpoint now (`State::changed_since_checkpoint`): with 1, one
checkpoint after every other version, and none after a checkpoint. The
test goes on past the move.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`continuum --version` and `continuum-party --version` say, after the
release, the wire versions the build speaks, the federation and the
revisions of it it knows (with the `federation` feature), and the
Automerge version it makes documents with:
continuum 1.0.0
wire versions 52 to 52
federation 1: the base revision, revision 1 (merge-events)
automerge 0.12.0
`-V` says the release alone, as before; continuum-party had no version
at all. The Automerge version is the one the crate itself reports
(`document::engine_version`), so it follows Cargo.lock.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`GET /events/counts` says, of each node a party lists, what it said it
speaks and knows (`knows`, by node ID): the wire versions, the oldest and
the newest, and the newest revision of the federation it knows, by
number and ID and as people read it, its number null where this
continuum doesn't know it; null where it said nothing, a build from
before SPEAKS or one the node didn't hear from; the node's own as it is.
So the nodes still to upgrade before a revision passes show, every
party's, where before a party's operators could check only their own.
A party's client, backing a proposal that moves to another revision,
warns of every node of any party not known to know it, a line a party
naming each and what it said: once it passes, those stop at it till
upgraded. `next` warns alike, of the revision it moves to, or of the
later one it suggests. A warning, not a refusal: what a node heard is
no proof, and a node not heard from may well be upgraded.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A corpus of generated histories, committed, said what this code made of them, right or
not, and held hundreds of kilobytes a revision; generated from code that changes, it
could only be checked, never written again.
Each release that makes a revision is tagged `federation-<F>.<R>`, the federation's
number and the revision's (`federation-1.1`, revision 1 of federation 1).
`scripts/federation-check` writes histories from this tree (`write_histories`, an ignored
test): of each revision it knows and each kind the properties generate, those of a few
seeds from a random one it says, and the attack tests' crafted ones, as each test offered
them where nothing but offers made them. It judges them with `continuum-party judge` here
and with the continuum the latest such tag names (or one given), built in a worktree and
kept between runs, leaves out those whose root the tagged one reads as none, and says
where the two differ. Run before a release, not by `cargo quick`.
The corpus and its test are gone; the test plan and `federation.md` say how a release is
checked.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The attack rows' tests craft histories and assert what the design says becomes of each
event: worth judging by later releases too, as they were judged when the tests passed.
Their stores are made and offered through the harness (`Fed::new`, `Fed::offer`), and
while `recording` runs a test, each of them is recorded: its root, the events offered in
order, and whether nothing but offers made it what it became (an operator's drop doesn't).
A test that fails records nothing. `TESTS` names every attack test, which a test checks
against the file.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
To check that a release judges histories as an earlier one did, under every revision
that one knows, each must say what its store makes of the same histories, in the same
words.
`continuum-party judge` reads histories from its input, each `case <label>`, `root
<hex>` and `event <hex>` for each event in the order offered, and prints for each what
became of every event by kind (`became <ID> <kind>`, never a refusal's words) and what
the store reads after (`reads <JSON>`): its checkpoint, the current version, the values
at places, the members, and the event it stopped at; `root none` where the root reads as
none, as one of a revision this continuum doesn't know (`federation::judge`). The format
is never to change: an earlier release prints it too.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`the_store_judges_and_reads_as_the_model` asks that some history stop a store, where two
thirds pass a version this continuum doesn't read. Merge events in the generator shifted
every seeded history, and of the 64 cases with such versions none stopped; the corpus's
scan found stopping seeds only past them (279, 314, 330 and others).
Of the proposals a party knows, it now votes on, and writes the version event of, the
earliest on the version current where it writes more often than not, so that parties
vote alike and versions pass. And where none of the cases stopped a store, the test scans
later seeds of those kinds till one does, up to 1000, and checks it too: a stop is checked
whatever the generator's luck.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The corpora written from four seeds of each kind showed little: of 32 histories, 4
versions written, no move and no stop, and every merge event refused, as the generator
signed them with any of ten node keys, so the corpus of revision 1 judged as the base
revision's did.
A generated merge event is signed by a node its party lists there, more often than not.
Of each kind, the corpus keeps the histories of the first two seeds, and of the next 400
those showing what the ones kept don't (`shows`: of each kind of event, what became of
one; a version written, a move, a stop), eight at most. The check asks that together a
revision's cases show a version written, a move to a checkpoint, a stop, and a merge event
taken where the revision has merge events, else refused.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Nothing checked that judging under a revision stays what it was: a change to the fold
that alters what an earlier revision takes, refuses or reads parts nodes running it from
nodes that don't, and the tests regenerate their expectations with the code.
For each revision this continuum knows, a file in `src/federation/corpus/` holds
histories generated at that revision, of every kind the properties generate, each event's
bytes with what became of it, by kind and never by a refusal's words, and what the store
reads after; its first line names the revision by its ID. It is written once, as the
revision is made (`write_the_corpus`, an ignored test run by hand), and never edited
after; every later continuum judges it alike (`every_revision_judges_as_its_corpus_says`),
which fails where a revision has no corpus yet, saying how to write it.
The test plan describes it.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
An operator moving the federation to a revision had nothing to say which revisions a
node knows, nor which one the current version follows, and a hash where a name would do.
`GET /events` lists the revisions the node's continuum knows, each its number, its ID,
the feature it adds and what that adds, and as people read it ("revision 1
(merge-events)"); `GET /events/counts`, the current version's. `continuum-party next
--revision FEATURE` begins a version following the revision adding it, never an earlier
one than the current version's, and `next` says so where the node knows a later one.
`proposals` shows a change of revision as people read it, a revision this continuum
doesn't know so said. A client backs a version moving to a revision only where its node
knows it, and says why otherwise: once passed, a node that doesn't stops there.
The upgrades guide walks through moving to a revision: upgrade every node, propose, vote,
and what follows; the proposing guide lists `revision`, and the API's spec the rest.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A node proposed a checkpoint at the heads of what it held for a while: every event
written in that while, and every one built on an event beside those heads, as one party
writing now and then on something old makes them, was beside them, and refused once the
store moved. A voter whose while was shorter backed none, one whose while was longer
backed it and lost those.
It proposes at the heads its store holds, sorted: what was written before is in their
history, and only what is written while the vote takes its course may be beside them. It
proposes none where they are more than an event may name: under a revision with merge
events, it merges them first; otherwise, what is written after does. `--store-held-for`
keeps the voters' rule and how long a new proposal holds back a checkpoint.
`federation.md`, the guides and the options say so.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Past 64 heads, no event is above them all, and what is written builds on the earliest
64 alone: where nobody writes, heads apart stay apart, and a checkpoint naming them is
never written.
Under a revision with merge events, a node its party lists signs merge events with its
node key where its store holds more heads than an event may name, each on as many as it
may, the earliest taken first, until no more are left (`Holding::merge`). The worker does
so a random wait after the heads first were too many, as it puts again what the document
lacks, so that of the members few do at once.
`federation.md` says so under Nodes, and the guides say what a node writes by itself and
what its log says.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
What builds on many heads merges them, but only an event a party writes: in a quiet
federation, heads beside each other stay so, and past 64 no event is above them all.
Revision 1 (`merge-events`) adds merge events: `{"merge": true}`, signed with a node's
own key, the `key` its Ed25519 key, for the party whose node list names it. One counts for
nothing, and only gathers what it builds on into the history of what builds on it. Under
the base revision, signed by a node its party doesn't list, or by a party's key, it is
refused; the model alike. Generated federations begin at either revision, and their nodes
merge.
A node voting by itself backs no version changing the revision, on any version neither:
its party's operators vote on that one, once their nodes run a continuum that knows it.
`federation.md` lists the revisions, says what a merge event is, and row 71 is tested
(`federation_attack_71`).
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
What every node must agree on was named by the federation's number alone, and a change
that only took more kept it: a party could use it before every node ran it, and nodes
not upgraded refused what followed and parted from the others.
A version now names the revision it follows by its ID (`"revision": "<ID>"`), the
SHA-256 of the JCS list of the features it adds to the base revision federation 1 began
with (`federation::revision`); a version naming none follows the base revision, ECDSA
keys among it, so the versions written so far read as they did. A version names the base
revision only by leaving `revision` out, and a revision no earlier than the one of the
version it changes. A continuum that doesn't know a revision, another build's among
them, can't read a version naming it: it stops at a version event writing one, and says
which revision and what it knows. There are no revisions yet but the base revision.
`federation.md` says how a revision is rolled out, then passed, and what a later
continuum may leave out; the upgrades guide, and the one on a node stopped, alike.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A `true` holds its party until its proposal passes or is dead, and only other parties'
nays make it dead: where the parties yet to vote are too few, one of them staying quiet
binds the party on that version for good. The client says so before it casts such a
`true` (`client::binding`): where ending the proposal would take every party yet to vote,
or more, and those are a third of the parties or fewer.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The votes cast before count at a history from before too: a proposal that died, or a
rival, needs there only the votes it lacked, and after a close vote one key voting twice
is enough, at any time until a checkpoint above the version that followed. Nodes that
took that version refuse it; one lagging behind, or joining from the root, may take it.
`federation.md` said it took the keys of two thirds of the parties.
A node voting by itself proposes a checkpoint once so many versions were written since
its store's (`--store-propose-versions`), as the design lists: with 1, after every
version, so that what keys voting twice grow beside a version ends at a checkpoint above
it. `federation.md` says how little a rival version takes, row 20 too, and the guides the
option.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A node voting by itself proposes no checkpoint beside a proposal that holds it back, as
the checkpoint would lapse it, and a follower backs none so. A proposal held one back
where someone but its proposer backed it: two parties, or one and a stolen key, kept a
junk proposal alive, and no automatic checkpoint came while it lived, ending it taking
nays from more than a third each round. And one new, its proposer alone backing it, was
lapsed at once by a checkpoint its writes brought about.
A proposal that can still pass holds back now where a third of the parties back it,
someone but its proposer among them; or where it is new, held for less than a while
(`--store-held-for`), and its proposer has none older on the version: so it is heard
before a checkpoint lapses it, once a version for each proposer. Row 67 says so, and a
test of nine parties checks it.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A node following a party (`--store-follow`) handed it more than the text said:
* it copied the party's `false`: one party's nay freed bound followers, and its `true`
shown to some and its `false` to the rest passed a checkpoint at one history and made it
dead at another. It copies the `true` alone now, on any version too;
* a checkpoint lapses every other proposal: the followed party ended any proposal it
disliked by passing one. A node follows a checkpoint only where no proposal that changes
more can still pass that someone but its proposer backs;
* nothing bounded how often the store moved, so fresh events could be left out of every
checkpoint; and a node just started held nothing for a while, so the voters' rule kept
nothing. A node backs, and proposes, a checkpoint only once its store held its
checkpoint, or ran, for a while (`--store-back-after`, ten minutes unless set), by itself
or by hand.
`federation.md` says what following hands over, and row 58 what a follower on any
version copies; the guides and the example say the rest.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
No event is above more heads than it may name dependencies (64): a version naming more
for its checkpoint is never written. A node voting by itself proposed one at whatever
heads it held for a while, however many; it now proposes none past 64, as what is
written merges them, and a party's client backs none such (`client::backable`).
A version event names the votes passing a proposal, two thirds of its version's
parties: past 96 parties, more than an event may name. A version names at most 96 now
(`version::PARTIES`).
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A party's client builds on the heads its node shows (`GET /events`), and a node on its
own heads; an event names at most 64 dependencies. With more heads than that, where many
write at once and nothing merges, every event built on them was none.
`Store::building_on` gives the heads, as many as an event may name
(`Fold::DEPENDENCIES`, the federation's 64), the earliest taken first, so that what is
written merges what stayed apart the longest; `GET /events` shows those, and a node
voting by itself builds on them.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Anyone could propose a checkpoint's version again, by an event beside its heads. A node
voting by itself, and a party's client, built a vote on every event proposing what it
voted on, so every vote was beside the heads, and no version event written on them was
taken: the checkpoint could never move the store. And the voters' rule refused it once
that event was held for a while, as the heads left it out.
They vote on the events proposing it that are above the heads it names
(`State::proposing`), which `GET /events/counts` lists as `proposals`; where there are
none, `none` says so, the node casts nothing and the client says why. The voters' rule
leaves proposals and votes aside, as they lapse with the move.
Row 70 is tested (`federation_attack_70`).
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A key a version names, stolen, could write its party's node list at a history from
before the version that named the party's keys anew: written under the version before,
it counted, as naming keys anew leaves a list's `since` alone, and beside the list the
party wrote under the new version the lower ID won. The thief signed a few, kept the
lowest, and did so again after every list the party wrote.
Of a party's key sets, and of its node lists, those written under the latest version now
come first, then what no other has in its history, then the lowest ID; the model alike.
A list the party writes under the version that replaced the key stays, as `federation.md`
says. Key sets were safe already, by their `since`; one rule serves both.
This changes what counts where two of a party's lists, written under different
versions, are beside each other: nodes read them alike only once all run it.
Row 69 is tested (`federation_attack_69`).
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The model stops where `federation.md` says a node does: at a version event whose
proposal passed at its history, isn't a version as this continuum reads it, and changes
the version the model reads, it takes and refuses nothing more (`Verdict::Stopped`);
beside that version, such an event is refused, as the node refuses it of its own.
The property checking the store against the model runs on histories where parties
propose such versions too (a field this continuum doesn't know): written in order,
events come after what they build on, so both must stop at the same event, having taken
the same before it, the adversary's two versions changing one among them. A check that
some history stopped keeps the property from passing vacuously.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`GET /events/counts` gives each proposal on the current version `none`: why a party's
client backs it not (`client::backable`), where it is no version as this node reads it,
none changing the current one, or one naming the heads of the current one's checkpoint;
else `null`. So a node shows that a proposal is none, and why, before it passes: one that
passes all the same is never written, or, no version here, the node stops at its version
event. The dashboard shows it with the proposal, and `continuum-party proposals` says it
by the federation the client knows.
Row 48's test checks what a node shows of the proposal.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`Version::read` names what makes a version none: the field it lacks, or the one more it
has, that this continuum doesn't know (of the version, a party's keys or node list, a
rule), the federation it names beside the one this continuum knows, how many keys or
nodes a party has against how many it may, the node ID that is none, and of a key why it
is none (`keys::spelled`): its type, its point, or its spelling. A node that stops at a
version says so in `stopped` (`GET /events`) and its log; a party's client in what it
won't propose or back.
The guide to a node that stopped says what `why` tells.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A store that stopped can't tell which of what it holds back will be taken, nor which of
what waits: `Store::held_back` gives both, each after what it builds on. A node leaves
out none of it: it puts it again where its document lacks it (`Holding::lacking`), a
remake's snapshot holds it (`Holding::at_base`), and after a switch or a rejoin it puts
again what of it the document it left held (`Holding::left`). A remake while nodes are
stopped no longer drops what was put since the stop, nor the event they stopped at.
Tested: a node keeps what it holds back, what waited among it, through a snapshot, and a
store read anew from that stops there again; and a simulation: a swarm stopped at a
version compacts, a node away meanwhile rejoins and one started again with nothing reads
the new epoch, each stopping there, holding back what came after, until their operators
have them drop that event.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Of two versions changing the one it reads, a node takes the first it judges, joining or
not, and reports the other: its operator chooses, by dropping and allowing. No rule
holds a joining node back until it has synced with every seed: it learns of the other
members as it syncs, and its seeds may go away.
federation.md drops the joining rule from Changing the policy, and says so in what
isn't promised and in row 63; the guides say what a joining node takes. Row 63 is
tested (`federation_attack_63`): from the root, either side first, the operator
switching sides; and pinned at a later checkpoint, the chain old keys grew never taken.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A version event writing a proposal passed on the version a node reads, which doesn't
read as a version there (of a later federation, using what a later continuum takes, or
none at all), the node can't judge: `Fold::stops`. The store stops at it: it takes
nothing and refuses nothing from then on, holding back whatever comes, that event first
(`Offered::Stopped`), and keeps none of it across a restart, where it stops there again.
One beside the version the node reads is refused of its own, as any other.
Its operator has it drop that event (`POST /admin/events/drop`), or one it builds on:
it is refused as dropped, or as built on what was, any version event writing that
version with it, kept in the store file; the node judges what it held back and goes on
under the version before. Allowed again, it stops there once more.
The node logs the stop and its end; `GET /events` names the event, why, and how many it
holds back (`stopped`); a put answers `stopped`, written into the document all the same;
a node voting by itself casts nothing while stopped. The test fold's eras tagged `new`
stop a store.
Row 39 is tested (`federation_attack_39`); of rows 9, 10 and 48, a node stops at the
version event.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A fold may say what an event writes that others may write alike
(`Fold::writes`): of the federation, a version event's version. A node
whose operator has it drop such an event drops the taken events writing
the same with it, and refuses any writing it from then on, whoever wrote
it anew: of a version, it takes no other version event naming it and
writes none itself, though it holds the votes that passed it. The node
keeps what each dropped event writes in its store file, across restarts;
allowing one of them takes them all back.
Row 51 of the federation's attacks has its test, and waits no more.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The check that every attack row of the federation has its test looks
beside the code a row is about too: a node's (`held`), a party's client's
(`client`), and a node voting by itself (`vote`). Rows 45 (a version
written on the side a node doesn't read, refused as its own and reported
apart, the change that put it taken), 58 (a node following on
checkpoints only, unless its operator chose any version) and 65 (a
client keeping the nays that freed its `true`) have their tests there,
and wait no more.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
One check (`client::backable`) decides what a party's client proposes and
what it votes `true` on: a version, changing the current one as a version
must, whose checkpoint, where it names one, names none of the heads of
the current version's checkpoint, as a version naming those again is
never written. A proposal nobody may back is refused before it is
signed, saying why.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`keys` and `nodes` alone (`--list`) show the party's key set or node
list as it counts at the node, one a line, without a key. `--set` writes
it whole, none twice, in place of the arguments that did; `--add` and
`--remove` change it as it counts. A set or list left empty, whichever
way (`--set` with none, `--remove` of the last), is written with
`--force` only: none of the party's writes count without keys, nor its
nodes as members without a list.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
A vote or a proposal is signed with a key the current version names for
the party, as a key set and a node list are: the client checks it before
it signs, and records nothing where the key isn't one.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`keys` and `nodes` write the party's key set or node list whole, or, with
`--add` and `--remove`, the set or list as it counts at the node with
those added or taken off, each of which must change it; the client says
what it writes. Node IDs are checked as the federation spells them.
A set or list is signed with a key the current version names for the
party: the client checks that first, and where it isn't one, or the
party is none of the version, says that only a version naming the
party's keys or list anew changes them, which a party proposes and the
parties pass.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
`propose` says the proposal's hash, the version's, which `vote` takes;
with `--yes`, it votes `true` on it too, by the record, as `vote` does.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
The client proposes a version only where it changes the current one as a
version must (its number, the hash it names, each `since`), and says why
it doesn't otherwise: no other can pass.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`next` prints the current version numbered on, naming its hash as the
version it changes, and without the checkpoint it names, whose heads are
behind: what a party changes and proposes. The guides begin a version
with it.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
The client signs one event at a time and does nothing else meanwhile,
and an agent may wait for its user as long as that takes.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`--key` gives a public key itself, an `authorized_keys` line, as well as
a file of them: of a file of several, the first signs, with a warning
naming it, and another is given itself to sign with it. An agent that
doesn't hold the key given signs nothing, and the client stops before it
records or puts what it would have signed, saying which key it asked
for.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
The test fails without OpenSSH on the machine testing, rather than
passing without asking anything. Its directory is a scratch directory,
removed when the test ends, the agent stopped before it.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`scratch_dir` gives a guard (`Scratch`) that removes the directory with
all it holds when dropped, the test passing or failing. Each test keeps
it for as long as it uses the directory; the dashboard's browser check
writes its page into one.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Row 62 names an ECDSA signature's twins, `s` high (the order less `s`)
and `r` or `s` with zeros more in front, each none. Its test offers the
ECDSA vector's write with each (`keys::respelled`) to a store whose root
names that key, and has it take the write as it was signed.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A key held in hardware is never a file: only an ssh-agent signs with it. Given a public
key as `--key` (a `.pub` file, `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), the client asks
the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign what SSHSIG signs (a sign request with the key's
blob, no flags) and writes the blob around the agent's signature as `ssh-keygen -Y sign`
does. An ECDSA signature the agent gives with a high `s` is made low, the other of its
two spellings, which the federation takes. What it makes is checked before it is used.
A private key file signs as it did.
A test starts `ssh-agent`, adds an ECDSA and an Ed25519 key to it and deletes their
files, signs through it, and has both continuum and `ssh-keygen -Y verify` check each
signature, one of an agent's high-S answers among them. Without OpenSSH it asks nothing.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A party's keys may be held where no file has them, in a Secure Enclave or a phone, and
those are ECDSA keys on NIST P-256. Everywhere a party's key counts (a version's keys, a
key set, the key an event is signed with) such a key is taken beside an Ed25519 one,
spelled as `ssh-keygen` writes it, without a comment: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, a space,
and the base64 of its SSH encoding, its point uncompressed and on the curve.
Its signature is SSHSIG as an Ed25519 one is, hashed with `sha512`, its inner signature
over SHA-256 as SSH signs with such a key. ECDSA signatures are malleable: of `s` and
the curve's order less `s`, both check. So the federation takes one spelling alone: `s`
low, at most half the order, `r` and `s` each SSH's shortest mpint, and the blob reading
back to itself as an Ed25519 one does. What anyone makes of a party's signature is then
none, as before.
The vectors are a key `ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256` made, a first version naming it, and
a write and a key set `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signed with it, each taken; the signature's
high-S twin, which checks as ECDSA, and its `r` spelled longer are none. Ed25519 keys and
signatures are spelled and checked as they were.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
`GET /events` names the party the node is of (`party`, `--store-party`) and whether it
votes for it by itself (`votesByItself`, `--store-vote-key`), and so casts a vote by
hand (`POST /admin/events/vote`): what a page offering votes through the node asks.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`continuum-party` takes its options (`node`, `token`, `key`, `record`:
`config::PARTY_OPTIONS`) on the command line and in configuration files of the node's
format: `--config`, repeatable, arguments winning, `--unset`, includes and imports. The
configuration's loader takes the options it reads as a table (`config::with_options`,
`config::merged`, `file::load_with`), the node's or the client's, and a key naming
none of them is an error in either; `node` and `token` are secrets, never logged.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
`continuum-party proposals` lists the proposals on the current version at the node,
each with whether it passed or is dead and the parties voting `true` and `false`, as
`GET /events/counts` names them, and what its version changes of the current one, read
from an event proposing it, its signature checked: each field whose value differs, and
of `keys` and `nodes` each party's (`client::changes`).
|