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* federation: merge events, the first revisiontv13 hours1-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | What builds on many heads merges them, but only an event a party writes: in a quiet federation, heads beside each other stay so, and past 64 no event is above them all. Revision 1 (`merge-events`) adds merge events: `{"merge": true}`, signed with a node's own key, the `key` its Ed25519 key, for the party whose node list names it. One counts for nothing, and only gathers what it builds on into the history of what builds on it. Under the base revision, signed by a node its party doesn't list, or by a party's key, it is refused; the model alike. Generated federations begin at either revision, and their nodes merge. A node voting by itself backs no version changing the revision, on any version neither: its party's operators vote on that one, once their nodes run a continuum that knows it. `federation.md` lists the revisions, says what a merge event is, and row 71 is tested (`federation_attack_71`).
* continuum-party: signing through an ssh-agentslopulus45 hours1-5/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A key held in hardware is never a file: only an ssh-agent signs with it. Given a public key as `--key` (a `.pub` file, `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), the client asks the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign what SSHSIG signs (a sign request with the key's blob, no flags) and writes the blob around the agent's signature as `ssh-keygen -Y sign` does. An ECDSA signature the agent gives with a high `s` is made low, the other of its two spellings, which the federation takes. What it makes is checked before it is used. A private key file signs as it did. A test starts `ssh-agent`, adds an ECDSA and an Ed25519 key to it and deletes their files, signs through it, and has both continuum and `ssh-keygen -Y verify` check each signature, one of an agent's high-S answers among them. Without OpenSSH it asks nothing.
* keys: a party's key may be ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, its signature low-S onlyslopulus45 hours1-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A party's keys may be held where no file has them, in a Secure Enclave or a phone, and those are ECDSA keys on NIST P-256. Everywhere a party's key counts (a version's keys, a key set, the key an event is signed with) such a key is taken beside an Ed25519 one, spelled as `ssh-keygen` writes it, without a comment: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, a space, and the base64 of its SSH encoding, its point uncompressed and on the curve. Its signature is SSHSIG as an Ed25519 one is, hashed with `sha512`, its inner signature over SHA-256 as SSH signs with such a key. ECDSA signatures are malleable: of `s` and the curve's order less `s`, both check. So the federation takes one spelling alone: `s` low, at most half the order, `r` and `s` each SSH's shortest mpint, and the blob reading back to itself as an Ed25519 one does. What anyone makes of a party's signature is then none, as before. The vectors are a key `ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256` made, a first version naming it, and a write and a key set `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signed with it, each taken; the signature's high-S twin, which checks as ECDSA, and its `r` spelled longer are none. Ed25519 keys and signatures are spelled and checked as they were.
* federation: events made, as a party's client makes themtv3 days1-0/+79
| | | | | | | What makes a signed event (`event::signed`) and what each does (`write`, `keys`, `nodes`, `proposal`, `vote`), and a version event (`event::version_event`), move from the tests' harness into `federation::event`, for a party's client to make them as the tests do: the harness makes its events through them.
* federation: the federation as the store's foldtv3 days1-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `Federation` is the store's fold for `docs/federation.md`. The state judging reads is the state of an event's history, which the store builds from the checkpoint and that history alone; so the version current there is the state's, the highest-numbered one written, and a history holding two versions of one number is refused. * A signed event's party is a party of the version current at its history. A write is signed by a key among its party's (those of its key set that counts, else those its version names) where a rule gives its party the place; a key set, node list, proposal or vote by a key its version names. * A vote is on the version current at its history, for a proposal proposed on it; a `true` only where every other proposal its party backs on that version is dead. Passing and dead go by the parties voting each way, a party with both counting for both. * A version event writes a proposal on the version current at its history, passed there, which is a version changing that one; one naming a checkpoint names heads after the current checkpoint at which it is current too, none in another's history, the version event above them. A node keeps a version event only where it changes the version it reads, or writes one it took. * What counts is read by the current version: of each party's writes at a place it may write, signed by a key among its party's, and of its key sets and node lists written under a version at least their `since`, the latest, then the lowest ID. A checkpoint keeps what counts at its heads and the proposals and votes on the version current there; a fork's root what counts at its heads by its version; the members are the nodes each party's node list names. Tests take a federation through writes, a key set, a proposal passing, one yes at a time, two versions changing one, a checkpoint and a node starting from it, and a fork. Events are read with their signature checked once, where they are judged.
* federation: events and checkpoints as bytes, and a harness that signs themtv3 days1-0/+316
`Event::read` reads an event and says what makes one none (`docs/federation.md`, Events): bytes that aren't the JCS of the JSON they read as, larger than 256 KiB, with no dependency or more than 64, not ascending, or a field missing or more; and of a signed event, a party that is no party's name, a key or signature that doesn't read back to itself or doesn't hold, a path, key set, node list or vote spelled otherwise. A proposal is taken whatever it holds, named by its hash; a version event names a hash. `Checkpoint` reads and writes `{"at", "keeps", "version"}`, a root among them, which is no event. The tests' harness (`docs/federation-tests.md`, The harness) makes parties with keys from seeds, signs each kind of event as the design says, and spells versions out.