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Logging out of the dashboard (`DELETE /auth/session`) only cleared the cookie: the
session's tokens stayed taken until they expired, by every node. Ending them took
`POST /auth/logout`, which ends all of a user's sessions.
Now `DELETE /auth/session` ends the session of the token it comes with (the cookie, or
a bearer token): where the swarm has a registry, it is recorded as
`_continuum/sessions/<user>/<session>` (`registry::session_path`), its value until when
the session would have lasted, and every node refuses the session's tokens once the
change reaches it (`token::Refused::Ended`): the page's own, its narrow tokens, and one
handed to another member's dashboard, all refreshed from it and keeping its ID. The
rules take the entry from the user itself or one who manages users, as a logout. A
remake's snapshot leaves out entries past that time, a user's map where none is left:
their tokens are expired anyway.
Without a registry the document can't record it: the node ending it refuses the
session's tokens itself (`AppState::ended_sessions`, until it restarts), others take
them until they expire, as a logout there is refused.
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Setting a node's log filter took `write` on `_continuum`, all of the protocol data:
whoever could change one node's logging could change the swarm's members, remakes and
users too. Now what a node holds alone has paths of its own for capabilities, under
`_continuum/local/<node ID>/`: `log` (`/admin/log`), `config` (`/admin/config`) and
`debug` (`/debug`, always `write`), `read` to look and `write` to act
(`api::access::needed`, which takes the node's ID). So `_continuum/local/<node ID>` is
everything on one node, `_continuum/local/*/log` the log filter on every node, and
holders of `_continuum` keep it all.
Nothing is stored there: the store refuses writes under `_continuum/local`, and the
rules refuse a change touching it, as for epoch metadata. The quarantine stays with
`_continuum`: its entries are everyone's writes, which a node-local capability
mustn't show.
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_continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked,
written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users'
entries can be signed by their managers alone.
Auth plan M7.
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access::envelope: cv1.<payload>.<signature>, the payload naming the
path, value, user, time and the envelope it replaces (prev), signed
with one of the user's SSH keys from the registry (keys). Checked
against the registry as the writer saw it.
Auth plan M7.
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_continuum/banned/<node ID>: every node refuses the banned node's
changes from then on (judged as the ban stood) and leaves its
handshakes unanswered.
Auth plan M6.
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access::rules::judge: a change judged as its writer saw the document
(at its dependencies): committer a member or registering itself;
members' entries and votes their own; epochs and swarm ID from roots;
a remake's decision by its coordinator; the rest by the registry for
the user the change names.
Auth plan M6.
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_continuum/users/<name>: one entry per user, with capabilities by path
(read, write) granted by whom and when, and a disabled flag. Read
leniently: a damaged entry gives less, never more. Protocol data stays
apart: a capability outside _continuum never covers it.
Auth plan M1.
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