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* dashboard: hand over a token reading the member list onlytv13 days2-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Review finding 8, second part: opening another member's dashboard handed it a token reading everything (READ_ALL). A member writes its own dashboard URL, so a malicious one received a read-everything token under the operator's identity: /admin/config, /admin/changes, /admin/log and the rest, on every node the user reaches. The token handed over now reads the member list only (READ_MEMBERS, as sent to subscribed nodes), which is enough to draw the map; the user logs in at the other dashboard to see more. With 1151 it lasts five minutes and isn't refreshed past them.
* login: a token asked to live less ends its session with ittv13 days1-7/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review finding 8, first part: a refreshed token's lifetime came from the refresh request, and it kept the session's end. So the five-minute read-all token a dashboard hands to another member's refreshed into a 12-hour one, renewable for seven days. A token asked to live less (`lifetime`, at login or refresh) now ends its session with it: nobody refreshes it past its end, its holder included, and a session begun from it (POST /auth/session) ends then too.
* access: a node judges its own changes before they leavetv13 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The API checks the path a request asks for; the rules judge everything the change does. Where they disagreed, the honest node's change was refused by every other node, and with signatures required the node was refused as a whole. The plan had both gates run the same judgement. Under a policy, each change a node makes (its own writes and those through the API) is now judged by rules::judge as receivers will judge it, before it is signed or sent; one every node would refuse is rolled back (the document forked at the heads before it, same actor: the change never left) and the request refused with 403 (StoreError:: Refused). rules::judge_held, judging a change the document holds, moves from swarm::refusals to access::rules for both. The simulations that play a member past its own checks write with a helper that bypasses them (forge). Review finding 3 (the same judgement at both gates).
* dashboard: flashes below labelstv2026-11-071-3/+5
| | | | Flashes are drawn beneath the nodes' labels.
* dashboard: message flashestv2026-11-071-31/+93
| | | | | messages: off / dots / flash: a message expands at its own speed and leaves an afterglow fading out in the direction it went.
* dashboard: a token handed over to another member's dashboardtv2026-11-073-9/+52
| | | | | | | | Opening another member's dashboard passes a token reading only, for five minutes, in the URL's fragment; its login page begins a session with it. Tokens may be asked for with a shorter lifetime. Auth plan M3 (hand-off).
* access: members refused as a wholetv2026-11-074-3/+49
| | | | | | | | | With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats (sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is taken again or the epoch changes. Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
* auth: the session cookie lets in reads onlytv2026-11-072-10/+27
| | | | | | | | The cookie lets in GET, HEAD and the session's own requests; anything changing something brings the token itself, which no page of another site or port can make a browser send. The dashboard's writes send it. Auth plan M3 (browsers).
* auth: a login page and browser sessionstv2026-11-076-18/+226
| | | | | | | | | GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token (from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser without a user there and renews the session while open. Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
* access: values sealed for their readerstv2026-11-071-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys, which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt. Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers as users only (nodes hold no keys).
* auth: logging in by keytv2026-11-072-7/+101
| | | | | | | | POST /auth/challenge and /auth/login/key: a node-signed challenge, valid five minutes and taken once, signed with one of the user's SSH keys (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-login), for a token. Auth plan M7 (key login, M2b).
* access: signed values judged on receipttv2026-11-071-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | Inspection gives each operation's kind; under strict every node refuses, at a signed place, anything but an envelope that checks and replaces the one there (deleting first as replacing does), anything within one, and above one anything replacing what holds one. Auth plan M7.
* api: signed values at the storetv2026-11-072-7/+278
| | | | | | | | | PUT with application/continuum-signed writes an envelope where values are signed (403/409 saying why); reads open envelopes and name the signer (x-continuum-signed-by), ?raw=true shows them. Under strict, unsigned writes reaching a signed value and the users API are 409. Auth plan M7.
* access: logouts apart from users' entriestv2026-11-071-4/+4
| | | | | | | | _continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked, written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users' entries can be signed by their managers alone. Auth plan M7.
* access: the policy enforcedtv2026-11-072-0/+42
| | | | | | | | _continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused. Auth plan M6.
* remake: forgetting and releasing name their usertv2026-11-071-4/+11
| | | | | | | Forget records and released quarantines name the user who made them, so they are judged by its capabilities. Auth plan M6.
* signatures: verified changestv2026-11-071-10/+16
| | | | | | | GET /admin/changes shows whether a signature by its node vouches for each change. Auth plan M5.
* signatures: on their own (SIGNATURES)tv2026-11-071-0/+1
| | | | | | | Signatures no sync message took go on their own within a second, to each peer not sent them yet (wire version bumped). Auth plan M5.
* signatures: changes signed by their nodetv2026-11-073-7/+31
| | | | | | | | | | Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519 signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones. Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed, and writes with ?signed=true. Auth plan M5.
* access: no manages flagtv2026-11-072-8/+3
| | | | | | | GET /admin/users no longer lists a manages flag per user: whether a user may manage users follows from its capabilities. Auth plan M1 (cleanup).
* dashboard: subscriptions under patchestv2026-11-071-5/+17
| | | | | | | Subscribed nodes' data merged into the state as the page patches it, not overwritten by the next patch. Auth plan M3 (fix).
* dashboard: without LINKS; LINKS removedtv2026-11-074-220/+272
| | | | | | | | | The dashboard reads every member's links from the members themselves; LINKS and LINKS_REPLY, swarm::links and their wire tags go (wire version bumped). Nodes the browser can't reach are drawn from what the reachable ones measure. Auth plan M3.
* dashboard: clocks on the pagetv2026-11-073-143/+50
| | | | | | | | The page compares the clocks the reports on its map carry: this node's peers', and those of the nodes it subscribes to; the node no longer gathers them from LINKS (api/dashboard/clocks.rs goes). Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).
* dashboard: the writers' trees as this node knows themtv2026-11-071-39/+5
| | | | | | | | The tree drawn is computed as every node computes its own part of it: from the member list, and whom it and its neighbours reach, as they told it; no longer from the links members report over LINKS. Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).
* dashboard: subscribed nodes' messages in the consoletv2026-11-073-74/+139
| | | | | | | Each tick's messages of a subscribed node, listed in the console with this node's own, from its own stream. Auth plan M3 (live data from every reachable node).
* dashboard: subscribed nodes' messages as dotstv2026-11-073-60/+166
| | | | | | | The page reads a subscribed node's message counts from it too, and draws them as dots on the map, as this node's own. Auth plan M3 (live data from every reachable node).
* dashboard: subscriptionstv2026-11-071-7/+218
| | | | | | | | Double-click a node to subscribe: the page reads its own links from it directly with a narrowed token (reading the member list only), drawn over what this node knows; kept per swarm in the browser. Auth plan M3.
* dashboard: own links over the API, and CORStv2026-11-073-0/+202
| | | | | | | | | GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links, as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins, without credentials. Auth plan M3.
* auth: logging in, and tokens as bearerstv2026-11-075-5/+442
| | | | | | | | | POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh, /auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and --session-lifetime. Auth plan M2.
* access: the users endpointstv2026-11-074-66/+438
| | | | | | | | /admin/users: list, add (one or several), remove, disable, grant and revoke capabilities; each one change, refused if it would lock its writer out. Capabilities as the store's paths name them. Auth plan M1.
* dashboard: what its user may readtv2026-11-071-3/+69
| | | | | | | The dashboard's document box is read through the store, as its user may, and the page is told only of changes where its user may read. Auth plan M1 (the dashboard).
* access: keeping the swarm manageabletv2026-11-072-19/+104
| | | | | | | | | A write that would leave its own writer unable to manage users (deleting, disabling or narrowing its entry, removing the registry) is refused; --protocol-writers can set a registry right that nobody may manage any more. Auth plan M1.
* access: authorization at the APItv2026-11-073-45/+491
| | | | | | | | | Every request is judged by the registry the node holds: store reads pruned to what the user may read, writes refused where it may not, admin endpoints by protocol capabilities. Without a registry, as before (--protocol-writers for protocol data). Auth plan M1.
* access: first users at genesistv2026-11-071-0/+7
| | | | | | | | --bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change, each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before. Auth plan M1.
* dashboard: remake with golden count down halostv2026-11-071-32/+55
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* dashboard: polish remake ringstv2026-11-071-13/+42
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* dashboard: remake switch delaytv2026-11-061-3/+13
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* dashboard: figures root in titletv2026-11-061-14/+23
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* dashboard: document root in titletv2026-11-061-5/+18
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* HyParView (slim)tv2026-11-061-0/+1
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* plumtreetv2026-11-061-0/+1
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* dashboard: drop neighbour columntv2026-11-061-4/+9
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* dashboard: remaketv2026-11-061-2/+164
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* dashboard: rates without linkstv2026-11-061-27/+84
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* indirect probestv2026-11-061-0/+1
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* handshakes countedtv2026-11-061-1/+6
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* trees at runtimetv2026-11-062-0/+19
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* swarm neighbourstv2026-11-061-1/+1
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* dashboard: browser checkstv2026-11-052-0/+114
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* dashboard: snapshot lazytv2026-11-051-18/+47
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