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A token was checked when a request came, and a stream answered to it (the dashboard's
events, a subscription's links and messages, the store's streams) then went on for as
long as the client kept it open: past the token's expiry, past its user's tokens being
revoked, its user disabled or removed, its session ended.
Now a middleware inside `login::bearer` (`login::streams_end`) ends a streaming answer
(`text/event-stream`, `application/x-ndjson`) to a request with a token at the token's
deadline, its expiry, or as soon as the document no longer takes it
(`token::still_taken`, the checks `verify` makes of the document, now its own
function): looked at when a change touches protocol data (the root, a switch, among
it), and when a session ends on the node itself in a swarm without a registry
(`AppState::session_ended`). No polling: a timer for the expiry, and the changes as
they come. The client reconnects with the token it has then; a refreshed token is a
new one, so a stream lasts a token's lifetime at most (12 hours by default).
`futures` is a dependency of every build now (for `take_until`), not only of libp2p's
and Tor's.
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Logging out of the dashboard (`DELETE /auth/session`) only cleared the cookie: the
session's tokens stayed taken until they expired, by every node. Ending them took
`POST /auth/logout`, which ends all of a user's sessions.
Now `DELETE /auth/session` ends the session of the token it comes with (the cookie, or
a bearer token): where the swarm has a registry, it is recorded as
`_continuum/sessions/<user>/<session>` (`registry::session_path`), its value until when
the session would have lasted, and every node refuses the session's tokens once the
change reaches it (`token::Refused::Ended`): the page's own, its narrow tokens, and one
handed to another member's dashboard, all refreshed from it and keeping its ID. The
rules take the entry from the user itself or one who manages users, as a logout. A
remake's snapshot leaves out entries past that time, a user's map where none is left:
their tokens are expired anyway.
Without a registry the document can't record it: the node ending it refuses the
session's tokens itself (`AppState::ended_sessions`, until it restarts), others take
them until they expire, as a logout there is refused.
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A capability's path covered by prefix only, so what is the same at every key of a map
(each node's log filter, say, at `_continuum/local/<id>/log` from the next patch on)
took a capability per key. Now a `*` segment stands for any one key, as it already does
in signed paths and sealed places (`envelope`, `sealed`, which now share one `agree`):
* covering (`Capability::covers`): the pattern no longer than the path, and agreeing
with it segment by segment;
* listings (`reaches`): pattern and path agreeing on the segments both have, so every
key on the way shows, nothing past where the pattern differs;
* narrowing (`Capability::holds`, for a token's limit narrowed again and a refresh's):
at or below, a `*` only under a `*`: a limit naming one key never widens to all.
A `*` first is outside protocol data, so it never covers `_continuum`, as `[]` doesn't.
A key that is `*` itself can't be named alone. Every node judges changes by
capabilities, so all must read them alike: they run the same version.
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Review 6: a node remembers the challenges used until they expire, 10 000
at most, and refused every login by key once full. One user holding a
key could make 10 000 logins within five minutes and keep everyone else
out.
A user may now log in by key at most --key-logins-per-user times (100)
on a node within a challenge's lifetime, past which that user waits and
others don't; the 10 000 stay as the cap for all users together. The
lifetime, five minutes until now, is --challenge-lifetime.
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The dashboard had no way to log out; only the login page did.
It now shows the user beside the connection, and "log out" where the
page got in by its session: that ends this browser's session (DELETE
/auth/session), other sessions of the user going on, and opens the
login page. Where it got in by what it can't end, the browser's
password or the proxy's, it says so instead (the token answer now
names `login`, how the user proved it). After logging out, a page
still let in by the browser's password says so too.
A list of a user's sessions, to end one by one, is in future-work.md.
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Review finding 12, browsers: the session cookie had no Secure flag.
Behind a TLS proxy, the token it carries went over plain HTTP if
someone typed http://.
POST /auth/session now sets Secure when the request came over TLS, as
the proxy says (X-Forwarded-Proto, or Forwarded's proto, of the first
hop). A client saying so itself only keeps its own cookie off plain
HTTP. operations.md's nginx example sets the header.
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Review 3.1, part of finding 12: a signed value's payload bound path,
user, time and prev, but not the swarm. A user with the same name and
key in two swarms could have an envelope replayed from one into the
other, wherever the path holds no envelope yet (prev "").
The payload now names the swarm (`swarm`), and a node takes an envelope
only for its own. /auth/whoami says the swarm, and continuum-signed and
the example in api.md sign it. Wire version 44: nodes before this
refuse such envelopes, and those after refuse the old ones.
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Review finding 8, first part: a refreshed token's lifetime came from
the refresh request, and it kept the session's end. So the five-minute
read-all token a dashboard hands to another member's refreshed into a
12-hour one, renewable for seven days.
A token asked to live less (`lifetime`, at login or refresh) now ends
its session with it: nobody refreshes it past its end, its holder
included, and a session begun from it (POST /auth/session) ends then
too.
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Opening another member's dashboard passes a token reading only, for
five minutes, in the URL's fragment; its login page begins a session
with it. Tokens may be asked for with a shorter lifetime.
Auth plan M3 (hand-off).
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The cookie lets in GET, HEAD and the session's own requests; anything
changing something brings the token itself, which no page of another
site or port can make a browser send. The dashboard's writes send it.
Auth plan M3 (browsers).
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GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token
(from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser
without a user there and renews the session while open.
Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
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POST /auth/challenge and /auth/login/key: a node-signed challenge,
valid five minutes and taken once, signed with one of the user's SSH
keys (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-login), for a token.
Auth plan M7 (key login, M2b).
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_continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked,
written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users'
entries can be signed by their managers alone.
Auth plan M7.
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Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519
signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One
signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones.
Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed,
and writes with ?signed=true.
Auth plan M5.
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GET /admin/users no longer lists a manages flag per user: whether a
user may manage users follows from its capabilities.
Auth plan M1 (cleanup).
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POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh,
/auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring
Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and
--session-lifetime.
Auth plan M2.
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