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path: root/src/api/login.rs
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* dashboard: log out of this browser, and say what can't betv3 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The dashboard had no way to log out; only the login page did. It now shows the user beside the connection, and "log out" where the page got in by its session: that ends this browser's session (DELETE /auth/session), other sessions of the user going on, and opens the login page. Where it got in by what it can't end, the browser's password or the proxy's, it says so instead (the token answer now names `login`, how the user proved it). After logging out, a page still let in by the browser's password says so too. A list of a user's sessions, to end one by one, is in future-work.md.
* login: the session cookie Secure behind a TLS proxytv3 days1-1/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | Review finding 12, browsers: the session cookie had no Secure flag. Behind a TLS proxy, the token it carries went over plain HTTP if someone typed http://. POST /auth/session now sets Secure when the request came over TLS, as the proxy says (X-Forwarded-Proto, or Forwarded's proto, of the first hop). A client saying so itself only keeps its own cookie off plain HTTP. operations.md's nginx example sets the header.
* envelope: a signed value names its swarmtv3 days1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review 3.1, part of finding 12: a signed value's payload bound path, user, time and prev, but not the swarm. A user with the same name and key in two swarms could have an envelope replayed from one into the other, wherever the path holds no envelope yet (prev ""). The payload now names the swarm (`swarm`), and a node takes an envelope only for its own. /auth/whoami says the swarm, and continuum-signed and the example in api.md sign it. Wire version 44: nodes before this refuse such envelopes, and those after refuse the old ones.
* login: a token asked to live less ends its session with ittv3 days1-7/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review finding 8, first part: a refreshed token's lifetime came from the refresh request, and it kept the session's end. So the five-minute read-all token a dashboard hands to another member's refreshed into a 12-hour one, renewable for seven days. A token asked to live less (`lifetime`, at login or refresh) now ends its session with it: nobody refreshes it past its end, its holder included, and a session begun from it (POST /auth/session) ends then too.
* dashboard: a token handed over to another member's dashboardtv4 days1-6/+20
| | | | | | | | Opening another member's dashboard passes a token reading only, for five minutes, in the URL's fragment; its login page begins a session with it. Tokens may be asked for with a shorter lifetime. Auth plan M3 (hand-off).
* auth: the session cookie lets in reads onlytv4 days1-2/+13
| | | | | | | | The cookie lets in GET, HEAD and the session's own requests; anything changing something brings the token itself, which no page of another site or port can make a browser send. The dashboard's writes send it. Auth plan M3 (browsers).
* auth: a login page and browser sessionstv4 days1-14/+97
| | | | | | | | | GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token (from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser without a user there and renews the session while open. Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
* auth: logging in by keytv4 days1-6/+96
| | | | | | | | POST /auth/challenge and /auth/login/key: a node-signed challenge, valid five minutes and taken once, signed with one of the user's SSH keys (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-login), for a token. Auth plan M7 (key login, M2b).
* access: logouts apart from users' entriestv4 days1-4/+4
| | | | | | | | _continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked, written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users' entries can be signed by their managers alone. Auth plan M7.
* signatures: changes signed by their nodetv4 days1-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519 signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones. Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed, and writes with ?signed=true. Auth plan M5.
* access: no manages flagtv4 days1-4/+1
| | | | | | | GET /admin/users no longer lists a manages flag per user: whether a user may manage users follows from its capabilities. Auth plan M1 (cleanup).
* auth: logging in, and tokens as bearerstv4 days1-0/+341
POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh, /auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and --session-lifetime. Auth plan M2.