| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Dots and flashes ran straight from sender to receiver, whatever line
the message took: a PING over another transport, drawn as a curved
line beside the one in use, crossed the map off its line.
Each message now runs along the line it went over, as drawn (`route`:
the link's quadratic curve, its control point where renderGraph put
it): a message naming the address it went to (the paths layer's PINGs
and PONGs) over that address's transport's line, any other over the
line in use; a flash's streak bends with it.
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On a dynamic map, links pull toward their lengths against the nodes
pushing each other apart, at one strength. A `pull` slider before the
layout's toggle, shown while dynamic, sets it from a quarter to four
times as hard (2 to its value, once at first), kept in the browser;
the map moves to the new balance smoothly.
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A link was dotted where an end reported no links. Members used to
report their links to every dashboard (LINKS); the page now reads a
member's links only while subscribed to it, so a dotted link said no
more than that its other end isn't subscribed, which the node shows
already (hollow), and most links were dotted. The style and its
legend entry go; the link's tooltip says when one end alone reports
it.
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The map's dots and the console coloured six kinds of message; PROBE,
PRUNE/GRAFT, NEIGHBOUR and REFUSALS were drawn in the text colour and
missing from the legend. Each kind (`traffic`'s counters) now has a
colour, and the legend names them all, saying which messages a kind
stands for where its name doesn't.
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The user's name, top right, opens a menu:
* "credentials…": the user's keys (GET /auth/keys), one added with its
.pub line or removed but the last (/auth/keys/{id}); under a strict
policy, how to sign them anew (continuum-signed key-add, key-remove);
and where its password is: each node's --htpasswd, its operator's.
* "log out": this browser's session ends. Where the page got in by
what it can't end (the browser's password, the proxy's), it is greyed
(aria-disabled, not disabled, so a click still lands), its tooltip
saying how to log out, and a click says so in a dialog.
The log out button and the text beside the name from 1165 go into it.
Checked in Chromium against stubbed endpoints: the menu, both log out
cases, the credentials dialog, no errors, nothing the content policy
refuses.
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The dashboard had no way to log out; only the login page did.
It now shows the user beside the connection, and "log out" where the
page got in by its session: that ends this browser's session (DELETE
/auth/session), other sessions of the user going on, and opens the
login page. Where it got in by what it can't end, the browser's
password or the proxy's, it says so instead (the token answer now
names `login`, how the user proved it). After logging out, a page
still let in by the browser's password says so too.
A list of a user's sessions, to end one by one, is in future-work.md.
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Opening a dashboard through its login page showed a 401 on /auth/login
and the browser's password prompt. The page asked for its token by the
browser's password first (POST /auth/login), with none to send, and the
401 carried a Basic challenge, which a browser answers with its prompt.
The page now asks by its session first (POST /auth/session), then by
the browser's password or the proxy's. And a 401 to a page's own
requests (Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty: fetch, EventSource) carries no
challenge: a page has its login of its own. Navigations and clients
without the header (curl) are still challenged.
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Review finding 12, browsers: the dashboard holds a bearer token in
memory and edits the document, but had no content security policy and
could be framed by any page of the same site (another port on the same
host, anything sharing a domain behind a proxy), acting with its user's
token.
The dashboard and the login page now come with a policy that runs only
their own inline script (by its hash, computed when first served),
loads nothing from elsewhere, and lets no page frame them
(frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options DENY). Fetches stay open to
any origin, as the members' dashboards are wherever the member list
says.
The browser check (check.js) loads the page from a file, without the
header, so the policy wants one look in a browser.
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Review finding 8, second part: opening another member's dashboard
handed it a token reading everything (READ_ALL). A member writes its
own dashboard URL, so a malicious one received a read-everything token
under the operator's identity: /admin/config, /admin/changes,
/admin/log and the rest, on every node the user reaches.
The token handed over now reads the member list only (READ_MEMBERS, as
sent to subscribed nodes), which is enough to draw the map; the user
logs in at the other dashboard to see more. With 1151 it lasts five
minutes and isn't refreshed past them.
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Flashes are drawn beneath the nodes' labels.
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messages: off / dots / flash: a message expands at its own speed and
leaves an afterglow fading out in the direction it went.
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Opening another member's dashboard passes a token reading only, for
five minutes, in the URL's fragment; its login page begins a session
with it. Tokens may be asked for with a shorter lifetime.
Auth plan M3 (hand-off).
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With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is
refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats
(sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is
taken again or the epoch changes.
Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
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The cookie lets in GET, HEAD and the session's own requests; anything
changing something brings the token itself, which no page of another
site or port can make a browser send. The dashboard's writes send it.
Auth plan M3 (browsers).
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GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token
(from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser
without a user there and renews the session while open.
Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
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Subscribed nodes' data merged into the state as the page patches it,
not overwritten by the next patch.
Auth plan M3 (fix).
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The dashboard reads every member's links from the members themselves;
LINKS and LINKS_REPLY, swarm::links and their wire tags go (wire
version bumped). Nodes the browser can't reach are drawn from what the
reachable ones measure.
Auth plan M3.
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The page compares the clocks the reports on its map carry: this
node's peers', and those of the nodes it subscribes to; the node no
longer gathers them from LINKS (api/dashboard/clocks.rs goes).
Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).
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The tree drawn is computed as every node computes its own part of it:
from the member list, and whom it and its neighbours reach, as they
told it; no longer from the links members report over LINKS.
Auth plan M3 (preparing LINKS' removal).
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Each tick's messages of a subscribed node, listed in the console with
this node's own, from its own stream.
Auth plan M3 (live data from every reachable node).
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The page reads a subscribed node's message counts from it too, and
draws them as dots on the map, as this node's own.
Auth plan M3 (live data from every reachable node).
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Double-click a node to subscribe: the page reads its own links from it
directly with a narrowed token (reading the member list only), drawn
over what this node knows; kept per swarm in the browser.
Auth plan M3.
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GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links,
as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a
token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins,
without credentials.
Auth plan M3.
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The dashboard's document box is read through the store, as its user
may, and the page is told only of changes where its user may read.
Auth plan M1 (the dashboard).
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