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Going to another member's dashboard showed its login page for a moment: a browser
without a session there was sent from `/admin/dashboard` to `/login` (by
`auth::basic_auth`), which began a session with the token handed over and went on to
the dashboard.
Now the dashboard's page is served without authentication, as the login page is (it
holds nothing: what it shows it reads with the browser's session). Opened with a token
handed over, the page begins the session with it (`POST /auth/session`) before it reads
anything; without a session, `obtainTokens` goes to the login page, as the redirect
did. A request without credentials is refused at once rather than after the 1.5 s
that slow down guessing passwords: nothing is guessed there, and a page without a
session goes to the login page without waiting twice for it.
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The page renewed its token half way through its life by a timer. A timer fires late
where the computer slept or the tab was in the background, by when the token (and the
session cookie, which lives as long) may have ended: the page then fell back to
`POST /auth/login`, which takes a password the browser keeps (basic authentication),
and without one retried every 30 s, logged out without saying so.
Now whether the token is half way through its life is looked at again when the page
shows and every 30 s (`refreshIfDue`, one renewal at a time), so it is renewed while it
still can be, until the login ends (`--session-lifetime`). Where the login ended, or
there is none (400, 401, 403), the page goes to the login page; a node away is tried
again in 30 s. And the page no longer gets in by a password the browser keeps: only
by its session or through a proxy naming the user (`throughProxy`, `login: "header"`).
The node never challenges a browser for a password either (`WWW-Authenticate`, the
browser's prompt): not only on the dashboard's paths and for a page's own requests, but
for any request with `Sec-Fetch-*` or a `Mozilla/…` user agent. curl sends the password
unasked with `-u`, as before.
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Requests weren't logged at all, short of what a handler logs itself. Now a middleware,
outermost on the API (and on a relay-only node's), logs a line per request as web
servers do: method and path (with the query), status, the milliseconds until the answer
began (a stream goes on after), where it came from (the address, or `unix`), and the
user (`-` where none was authenticated). The user comes back on the response:
`basic_auth` puts it there, for a token as for a password or a trusted proxy's header.
At debug, under the target `http` (`RUST_LOG=info,http=debug`, or `PUT /admin/log`):
an open dashboard alone would fill the log at info. With the target off, the request
passes untouched.
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The credentials dialog listed a user's keys whole, to add one or
remove one but the last, and any failure replaced the dialog with the
error, the form lost.
* A key is shown short: its type, the first and last four characters
of what tells it apart (an Ed25519 key's base64 after the part all of
them share), its comment; the whole line in its tooltip.
* A key can be edited, its name and its line: saved under the name, a
new name written first and the old one removed.
* A user with a password on this node (`--htpasswd`) may remove its
last key: it logs in by the password. GET /auth/keys says so
(`password`), and DELETE /auth/keys/{id} takes it then; the rules no
longer keep the last key on every node (no other node can tell who
has a password where; under a strict policy the signed entry keeps
one still).
* What fails says why beside where it was asked (the add form, the
edited row, the removed one), which stays as it was, to be set right
and tried again.
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What is meant for browsers logs in on its page (/login), with the
passwords of --htpasswd; basic authentication's challenge stays for the
API, so curl -u keeps working. 1164 kept it from a page's own requests;
now nothing under /admin/dashboard is challenged either, whatever the
request: a browser opening the page without a user is sent to /login,
anything else answered 401 without a challenge.
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Opening a dashboard through its login page showed a 401 on /auth/login
and the browser's password prompt. The page asked for its token by the
browser's password first (POST /auth/login), with none to send, and the
401 carried a Basic challenge, which a browser answers with its prompt.
The page now asks by its session first (POST /auth/session), then by
the browser's password or the proxy's. And a 401 to a page's own
requests (Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty: fetch, EventSource) carries no
challenge: a page has its login of its own. Navigations and clients
without the header (curl) are still challenged.
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GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token
(from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser
without a user there and renews the session while open.
Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
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POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh,
/auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring
Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and
--session-lifetime.
Auth plan M2.
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--bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change,
each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until
added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before.
Auth plan M1.
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