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* access: an ended session recorded until the login's endtv42 hours1-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Review 4, F7: `DELETE /auth/session` recorded the session as ended until the `session_exp` of the token it came with. A token handed to another member's dashboard has its `session_exp` cut to its own end (five minutes), and so has the session that dashboard keeps with it: logging out there recorded an end minutes away, the next remake's snapshot left it out, and the original browser's tokens of the same session, refreshable for days, were taken again. A token now keeps the login's end as it logged in (`Claims::login_exp`), which no refresh changes, and an ended session is recorded until then (or the token's `session_exp`, if later, as for a token from before the field).
* api: a stream opened with a token ends with ittv47 hours1-11/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A token was checked when a request came, and a stream answered to it (the dashboard's events, a subscription's links and messages, the store's streams) then went on for as long as the client kept it open: past the token's expiry, past its user's tokens being revoked, its user disabled or removed, its session ended. Now a middleware inside `login::bearer` (`login::streams_end`) ends a streaming answer (`text/event-stream`, `application/x-ndjson`) to a request with a token at the token's deadline, its expiry, or as soon as the document no longer takes it (`token::still_taken`, the checks `verify` makes of the document, now its own function): looked at when a change touches protocol data (the root, a switch, among it), and when a session ends on the node itself in a swarm without a registry (`AppState::session_ended`). No polling: a timer for the expiry, and the changes as they come. The client reconnects with the token it has then; a refreshed token is a new one, so a stream lasts a token's lifetime at most (12 hours by default). `futures` is a dependency of every build now (for `take_until`), not only of libp2p's and Tor's.
* access: ending a single sessiontv47 hours1-1/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Logging out of the dashboard (`DELETE /auth/session`) only cleared the cookie: the session's tokens stayed taken until they expired, by every node. Ending them took `POST /auth/logout`, which ends all of a user's sessions. Now `DELETE /auth/session` ends the session of the token it comes with (the cookie, or a bearer token): where the swarm has a registry, it is recorded as `_continuum/sessions/<user>/<session>` (`registry::session_path`), its value until when the session would have lasted, and every node refuses the session's tokens once the change reaches it (`token::Refused::Ended`): the page's own, its narrow tokens, and one handed to another member's dashboard, all refreshed from it and keeping its ID. The rules take the entry from the user itself or one who manages users, as a logout. A remake's snapshot leaves out entries past that time, a user's map where none is left: their tokens are expired anyway. Without a registry the document can't record it: the node ending it refuses the session's tokens itself (`AppState::ended_sessions`, until it restarts), others take them until they expire, as a logout there is refused.
* token: a banned node's tokens aren't takentv3 days1-1/+17
| | | | | | | | | Review finding 11: token::verify checked only that the issuer is a member, and a ban leaves the member entry. A compromised node's tokens stayed valid after it was banned, until it was forgotten too. A token issued by a banned node is now refused (BannedIssuer), as soon as the ban reaches the node judging it.
* access: logouts apart from users' entriestv4 days1-5/+4
| | | | | | | | _continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked, written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users' entries can be signed by their managers alone. Auth plan M7.
* docs: tokens through a proxy; token formats latertv4 days1-1/+2
| | | | | | | | operations.md: an nginx proxy passing requests with a token on to the node and asking the others for its own login. future-work: other token formats. Auth plan M2.
* access: tokenstv4 days1-0/+284
ct1 tokens: who, how they logged in, a session, when they expire, and optionally a narrower limit; signed by the issuing node's key and taken by every member (a node ID is its key). Revocation by the registry as it stands when a request comes. Auth plan M2.