| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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A party's keys may be held where no file has them, in a Secure Enclave or a phone, and
those are ECDSA keys on NIST P-256. Everywhere a party's key counts (a version's keys, a
key set, the key an event is signed with) such a key is taken beside an Ed25519 one,
spelled as `ssh-keygen` writes it, without a comment: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, a space,
and the base64 of its SSH encoding, its point uncompressed and on the curve.
Its signature is SSHSIG as an Ed25519 one is, hashed with `sha512`, its inner signature
over SHA-256 as SSH signs with such a key. ECDSA signatures are malleable: of `s` and
the curve's order less `s`, both check. So the federation takes one spelling alone: `s`
low, at most half the order, `r` and `s` each SSH's shortest mpint, and the blob reading
back to itself as an Ed25519 one does. What anyone makes of a party's signature is then
none, as before.
The vectors are a key `ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256` made, a first version naming it, and
a write and a key set `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signed with it, each taken; the signature's
high-S twin, which checks as ECDSA, and its `r` spelled longer are none. Ed25519 keys and
signatures are spelled and checked as they were.
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Review 4, 1250's note: a key's comment was kept as given, unbounded but by the request
limit (2 MiB), in protocol data every node holds and the dashboard shows. It says whose
and where the key is: at most 256 bytes now (`sshsig::MAX_COMMENT`), a longer one
refused with the key.
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A key's line was stored as the key alone (`ssh-ed25519 <base64>`), whatever comment it
came with, both from `PUT /auth/keys/<name>` and from `--bootstrap-keys`. Now its
comment is kept after it (`PublicKey::kept_line`), the spaces between its words made
one. The comment checks nothing: every use of a key parses the line, and the parse
reads the key alone.
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cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys,
which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose
values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the
recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt.
Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers
as users only (nodes hold no keys).
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access::envelope: cv1.<payload>.<signature>, the payload naming the
path, value, user, time and the envelope it replaces (prev), signed
with one of the user's SSH keys from the registry (keys). Checked
against the registry as the writer saw it.
Auth plan M7.
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access::sshsig: OpenSSH's SSHSIG, verified and made natively (Ed25519,
sha512/sha256), checked against OpenSSH's own test vector.
Auth plan M7.
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