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path: root/src/access/sealed.rs
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* signed values: one reading of an envelope, everywheretv43 hours1-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Three parts read an envelope three ways: the store's order took any string with the prefix whose meta held a `seq`, its reads any whose value decoded, the checks only one with four parts and a meta of exactly its fields. A string that the first two took and the checks refused was read first, read as the registry's or the policy's value, and treated as nothing by the check of the next write there. `document::signed` reads an envelope the one way: four parts, the value JSON, the meta exactly its six fields (one more, or one twice, and it isn't one), no newline in either, the signature decoding. The store's order, its plain reads, the checks, the API and the users API all go by it. What isn't one in every respect is a plain string, wherever it is read.
* signed values: value and meta apart, numbered; the highest seq is readtv47 hours1-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A member could put a user's older signed value back beside a newer one: a change made with dependencies from before both is judged where the place was empty, so the older envelope (`prev` empty) is taken; and of values written at once, the one read was the one with the highest operation, which whoever writes the change steers. A revoked capability, a lifted ban or an earlier policy came back that way, signed by whoever signed it then. An envelope is now `cv2.<value>.<meta>.<signature>`: the value as its user wrote it, and apart from it what continuum adds (swarm, path, user, at, seq, prev), the signature over the value's line and the meta's. `seq` is one more than that of the envelope it replaces, 0 where it replaces none; every node checks it with `prev`. Of the values a place holds, written at once, signed ones are read before any other, the highest `seq` first, of equal ones the lower digest (`store::candidates`): reads, snapshots and writes all go by it. An older envelope beside a newer one changes nothing. `application/continuum-signed` is the value's line, the meta's, then the signature; `scripts/continuum-signed` writes and checks it so. The wire version goes up: nodes must agree on what a place's value is.
* access: `*` for any one key in a capability's pathtv8 days1-8/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A capability's path covered by prefix only, so what is the same at every key of a map (each node's log filter, say, at `_continuum/local/<id>/log` from the next patch on) took a capability per key. Now a `*` segment stands for any one key, as it already does in signed paths and sealed places (`envelope`, `sealed`, which now share one `agree`): * covering (`Capability::covers`): the pattern no longer than the path, and agreeing with it segment by segment; * listings (`reaches`): pattern and path agreeing on the segments both have, so every key on the way shows, nothing past where the pattern differs; * narrowing (`Capability::holds`, for a token's limit narrowed again and a refresh's): at or below, a `*` only under a `*`: a limit naming one key never widens to all. A `*` first is outside protocol data, so it never covers `_continuum`, as `[]` doesn't. A key that is `*` itself can't be named alone. Every node judges changes by capabilities, so all must read them alike: they run the same version.
* envelope: a signed value names its swarmtv9 days1-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Review 3.1, part of finding 12: a signed value's payload bound path, user, time and prev, but not the swarm. A user with the same name and key in two swarms could have an envelope replayed from one into the other, wherever the path holds no envelope yet (prev ""). The payload now names the swarm (`swarm`), and a node takes an envelope only for its own. /auth/whoami says the swarm, and continuum-signed and the example in api.md sign it. Wire version 44: nodes before this refuse such envelopes, and those after refuse the old ones.
* access: values sealed for their readerstv10 days1-0/+378
cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys, which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt. Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers as users only (nodes hold no keys).