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Review 3.1, part of finding 12: a signed value's payload bound path,
user, time and prev, but not the swarm. A user with the same name and
key in two swarms could have an envelope replayed from one into the
other, wherever the path holds no envelope yet (prev "").
The payload now names the swarm (`swarm`), and a node takes an envelope
only for its own. /auth/whoami says the swarm, and continuum-signed and
the example in api.md sign it. Wire version 44: nodes before this
refuse such envelopes, and those after refuse the old ones.
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Under a policy, a remake's decision was taken from its coordinator only.
A node aborting an expired remake whose coordinator is gone
(DELETE /admin/remakes, after abortableAt) was refused by its own
judgement (403), so such a remake could never be decided.
The decision is now also taken from a user who may write it (the
protocol writers), and an abort from any member once the remake expired
a grace period ago (abortableAt, by the coordinator's grace period in
the proposal). The rules have no clock of their own, so that is judged
by the time the change says it was made: the writer's word, so a member
could abort a remake early, as it could ask its coordinator to, but
never commit one. Before then, an abort stays a request the coordinator
applies.
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Review finding 7, second part: a record carried into a new epoch whole
(proposal and decision in one change) was taken from any member, for
any remake ID. A member could write a forged record, decision included,
for a fresh ID in a single change.
The snapshot's epoch metadata now names the remake's coordinator, as
the quorum built it. The carried-record exception holds only in a
later epoch, only for the remake that made it, and only from the
coordinator its snapshot names, where there is no record yet. Wire
version 43: the snapshot, and so the epoch ID, changes.
The review suggested carrying the record inside the snapshot instead.
The snapshot can't hold the decision, which names the snapshot's own
hash. So the snapshot vouches for who may carry the record instead.
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Review finding 7, first part: the protocol-map rules looked at paths,
not actions. Any member could delete _continuum/members, /votes or
/remakes whole, or rewrite another remake's proposal (its coordinator)
and then write its decision.
What holds the members' entries, votes and remake records, and a
remake's record itself, are now made by a member only where there is
none; a proposal is written only where there is none. Replacing or
removing any of them is left to a user who may write there (the
protocol writers). An abort asked for stays any member's.
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The API checks the path a request asks for; the rules judge everything
the change does. Where they disagreed, the honest node's change was
refused by every other node, and with signatures required the node was
refused as a whole. The plan had both gates run the same judgement.
Under a policy, each change a node makes (its own writes and those
through the API) is now judged by rules::judge as receivers will judge
it, before it is signed or sent; one every node would refuse is rolled
back (the document forked at the heads before it, same actor: the
change never left) and the request refused with 403 (StoreError::
Refused). rules::judge_held, judging a change the document holds,
moves from swarm::refusals to access::rules for both.
The simulations that play a member past its own checks write with a
helper that bypasses them (forge).
Review finding 3 (the same judgement at both gates).
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Two writes the API lets a user make were refused by the rules:
* DELETE /peers/{pk}, with write on _continuum/forgotten alone, writes
the forget record and removes the member's entry in one change; the
rules wanted write on the entry. Removing an entry is now also taken
in a change forgetting that member, from a user who may forget it.
* DELETE /admin/users/{name}/tokens by a user who manages users writes
_continuum/logouts/<name>; the rules wanted write there. One who may
write _continuum/users may now write anyone's logouts entry.
Review finding 3 (DELETE /peers, revoking tokens).
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A write makes the maps on its way where there are none
(store::write_path); the rules judged each made map as a write at its
own path, so a user whose capability lies below a map not made yet
(write on servers/eu, a first PUT at servers/eu/0) had its first write
taken by its node and refused by every other. A map made where there
was none, in a change writing within it, is now judged by what is
written within it.
Review finding 3 (parent maps created on the way).
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The rules read the policy at the change's dependencies only for strict
mode, so history from before the policy was judged by today's rules
when a late node caught up, or when REFUSALS had it judged again. A
change written while the document had no policy, or one this node
doesn't know, is now judged by none.
Review finding 6.
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A node forgotten swarm-wide while alive cancels its forget record with
a change naming no user; the rules judged _continuum/forgotten by the
registry alone, so every node refused the cancellation and everything
the node wrote after it. A node may now write its own
_continuum/forgotten/<id>, as it may its member entry.
Review finding 4.
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A REFUSALS naming the swarm's first change made the node receiving it
judge that change again in a document that isn't empty, refuse it as
"a change without dependencies that isn't the epoch's root", and drop
it with everything built on it: its whole document.
The first epoch's root is now the first change a document holds, as it
comes to an empty one or as it is in one; a change judged again on a
peer's word is never refused for having no dependencies; and
drop_taken refuses to drop an epoch's root, or anything that would
leave nothing kept, logging an error instead.
Review finding 1 (critical).
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cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys,
which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose
values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the
recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt.
Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers
as users only (nodes hold no keys).
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Inspection gives each operation's kind; under strict every node
refuses, at a signed place, anything but an envelope that checks and
replaces the one there (deleting first as replacing does), anything
within one, and above one anything replacing what holds one.
Auth plan M7.
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_continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked,
written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users'
entries can be signed by their managers alone.
Auth plan M7.
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_continuum/banned/<node ID>: every node refuses the banned node's
changes from then on (judged as the ban stood) and leaves its
handshakes unanswered.
Auth plan M6.
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access::screen: a batch of received changes judged change by change,
those that change what rules read applied before the next is judged;
a refused change stays out with whatever builds on it, kept aside for
operators; changes missing dependencies wait.
Auth plan M6.
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access::rules::judge: a change judged as its writer saw the document
(at its dependencies): committer a member or registering itself;
members' entries and votes their own; epochs and swarm ID from roots;
a remake's decision by its coordinator; the rest by the registry for
the user the change names.
Auth plan M6.
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