| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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What the maintainer asked of the design:
* Who votes is named by the remake's proposal: all users at its base,
as recommended, or a list. So those who vote say who votes next,
and nobody votes by a rule of who created it. What that costs is
said with it: every voter named counts toward what a decision
takes, and all users is whoever brought users in.
* What a policy no longer covers is uncovered at once where the
decision holds: shown aside by every node, taken away by its user
only, changed by nobody, and dropped once it has been seen there
for `uncovered` (a number; 0: at once). Within an epoch a rule
moves nothing in the document; the remake moves it.
* Being seen takes nothing but a node that is up: its stamp is
renewed about daily whatever else is written. A node left running
keeps its voter present; naming the voters deals with that.
* A release of a vote is best effort.
* Continuum changing under a swarm: versions agree by what they
compute, not by a number. Every stamp carries the digest of the
snapshot its node would build there; a remake is taken up by the
ID each node built; a node checks itself against the swarm before
it writes with a new version; a change of the rules is a change of
policy, and a node knows a policy by everything in it; recorded
vectors every version passes. What can't change, what changes
freely, and when it is a fork.
* Who may connect is outside the design; the swarm key is a note.
The attacks are 84.
future-work.md: several roots, present by the user's own signature, a
guide to moving to another swarm.
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What the maintainer asked of the design, and what it changed:
* Lines. A user is in while it has a line: a chain of creations and
vouches from the root. When its creator goes, one that another
vouched for stays without doing anything. The witnesses of its
claims are the users on the lines it stands on: its creation's, and
those of vouches it accepted (`accept`), so nobody gets a say about
a user's names by vouching for it unasked. Why only its signer
takes a vouch back is said where unvouching is.
* Lengths of time are read between two stamps of one node, with what
that node had seen at each: a voter is absent once a third of the
voters saw it silent for long, a user gone once they saw it out. No
clock is set against another, and why a third.
* Decisions. A proposal is decided as soon as the nodes of two thirds
of the voters hold its votes: at once, not at the end of a window.
Any number are open at a time, within a limit a voter. Of the
decisions of one matter the last holds, by which proposal was made
in sight of which, so two decided at once stop nothing. A remake's
base is named by its coordinator, a node of the proposer.
* The policy changes by a decision, as a whole, with no remake: a
remake throws history away and does nothing else. What a policy no
longer covers doesn't count, and a remake keeps it aside for an
epoch or drops it, as the policy says. Going apart by a fork stays
for those a decision leaves behind.
* What a remake leaves out, so that the document's size goes by what
stands: a release is a statement in its epoch, the remake deletes.
* Names are written as they are used, in the document and in the
rules alike, and compared by their segments: structure, not
meaning. A rule may leave a name to the voters to give.
* Who vouched for whom changes nothing in who connects to whom: a
node keeps its seeds and its user's other nodes as neighbours.
The attacks are 83, the stages fifteen.
future-work.md: guides to write (keys, the root, starting a swarm,
voting, a registry), policies merged.
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What the maintainer answered to the design's last two questions, and
what follows from it:
* The fractions are numbers of the policy like the others, changed by
a decision to any value: the share of the voters present a decision
takes (two thirds recommended), the share of all of them (half), and
the share whose stamps make the swarm's time and a user gone (a
third). What is promised of decisions is argued for the recommended
ones; Why it holds says what other values carry.
* Refusing a decision: a node follows every decision that counts
unless its operator has it refuse, by bounds on the policy's numbers
or by hand. It then moves to the epoch built at the decision's
history without it, which is the same for every node that refuses
the same decision: those who think alike go on together without
arranging it. While a proposal's votes run, a node whose bounds it
breaks says so. A remake or a change of policy is refused by
staying.
* A decision gives a user name with its namespace, as designed.
* No open question is left. The options not taken that the questions
listed are among the roads not taken: first users voting as soon as
created, voters let in without a remake, other reaches of an
unvouch, a gone user coming back, first keys by those who vouch,
a registry of only what is signed, numbers the design fixes.
The attacks are 78; the stages name them by their numbers.
future-work.md: bounds on more than numbers.
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What the maintainer answered to the questions the design had left:
* Every quantity of the design is a number of the policy, in one
table with what the design recommends (the times, the limits, how
much a remake's base may lack, how long the root's node lets a claim
wait). The genesis policy sets each, and a decision changes any to
any value: nothing constrains them. The fractions aren't numbers.
* While a user is out, the voters free its names or give them to
another by a decision, whatever `gone` says; a policy without `gone`
has the names wait until a vouch or a decision.
* Nobody is put out by a vote, said where unvouching is, with what
there is against a user that harms within the rules.
* A node keeps the epochs it left for as long as its operator says,
`archiveRetention` at least, and says which; so a node coming back,
or one joining from the genesis root, walks every epoch where an
archive is within reach, and shows where the walk doesn't end at its
peers' epoch.
* Settled, and listed so: who votes, from where an unvouch undoes,
gone for good, first keys by a decision, what the root holds
unsigned. Two questions remain: whether the fractions are numbers
too, and whether a decision gives a user name with its namespace.
future-work.md: an archive of every epoch.
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What the maintainer answered to the design's open questions, in the
design:
* The numbers. The limits and the times are the policy's numbers, set
in the genesis policy and changed by a decision: 64 keys, 64 nodes
and 256 addresses a user for a start; `window`, `absent`, `gone`,
`archiveRetention`. A lowered limit takes nothing away.
* A user nobody vouches for is out, and its names wait for it: nobody
else claims them. Out for 30 days, as the stamps of a third of the
voters show, it is gone: its names are free, and no vouch brings it
back. So whoever relied on a vouch that an unvouch or a cut took
back has that long to find another, and loses nothing meanwhile.
* First keys by a decision. The voters are above every user's first
keys: they give a user that lost them new ones, with a cut for the
old. The promises say so, and what isn't promised: a name against
two thirds of the voters.
* What a decision is made of (a proposal, a vote, its release, the
decision) is taken in any node's change, so a user without a node
votes at whatever node it reaches, or by a vote carried to one. Such
a user names another party's node to carry for it.
* Coming back after remakes: by the archives on nobody's word, epoch
by epoch, as far as peers keep them; else by an ID the operator
gives, never because peers advertise an epoch. A statement is
carried over from the epoch before only; older ones are quarantined
for the user to sign again.
* Resolving reads the decisions first: nothing below changes them.
* The questions that remain are put with their options: who has a
vote and from when, whether the voters put a user out against those
who vouch for it, from where an unvouch undoes, whether gone is for
good, the price of first keys by a decision, and what the root
holds unsigned.
The attacks are 76; the stages name them by their numbers.
future-work.md: barring a user by a decision, and voting made easy for
a user without a node.
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federation.md designs what the krebs registry needs of continuum: a
swarm several parties keep, any of them possibly malicious. Nothing of
it is built. It is a mode a swarm is started in: one that isn't
federated stays as it is.
* The parties, what an adversary can do, and what is promised to an
honest node: only valid changes; the same document and the same
resolved registry for the same changes; values signed by their users;
one holder per name; a claim nobody takes once the root's node saw
it; no waiting for anyone to write; and, with fewer than a third of
the voters present malicious, decisions by two thirds of them. And
what isn't: one history under a partition, a name never contested,
decisions against a third, against keys stolen later, against a
malicious voter on both sides of a long partition, or with half the
voters gone; a swarm no forked actor splits.
* The design, on the strict policy. The policy is in the root. Users
come by statements that only add; a user is its creation, its keys a
tree, its nodes those it names. Vouching and the line; unvouching,
with what exactly it takes back. A namespace per user. Names of
declared kinds claimed, with rules and limits as data, some kept for
a user without a claim. Of two claims out of each other's sight, one
is late where its own side can be shown to have seen the other
first; where that leaves not exactly one, the name is contested, and
a release gives it up. Cuts: what a key signed outside a set of
changes stops counting, whenever it shows up; a key is cut off by one
above it only. Bans change what those who follow read, not what
anyone takes.
* Decisions: votes signed by the voters, over days, by numbers the
document holds and a decision changes. Who votes is in an epoch's
root change: the root alone at first, then, with each remake, the
users a root created, so nobody fills the votes without two thirds
of those there agreeing. A time read from the document, by which
those away for long don't count; a decision taken up by the voters'
nodes while its votes run, and counting with two thirds of those
present and more than half of all, so that honest voters never make
two however long a partition lasts. The
root's seat given anew by a decision, and what a root finds when it
comes back. Remakes: the base is the decision's history, every node
builds the snapshot from the registry as it resolves, statements are
carried over, and what counted at the base is final. A change of
policy as a fork each operator follows or not, as Bitcoin changes
its rules; it may name who votes on its side, and is the way out
for those a decision leaves behind.
* What every node judges and how the registry resolves, how a partition
shows and how a side comes back, links along the line, tokens of
one's own party only. Why the promises hold, the roads not taken,
what members are trusted with then, what is continuum's and what the
application's, 69 attacks with the tests that show them, the
registry's layout with moving in and writing out, fourteen stages,
and ten open questions with a choice for each.
future-work.md gets what the design leaves.
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The document file's format names itself in its first line
(continuum-document/2) and each record's kind in its first byte. A
record of a kind the reading version doesn't know makes the file
unusable: the node doesn't start on it unless told to move it aside
(--force badDocumentFile). lifecycle.md says so: a file one version
wrote is read only by versions knowing every kind of record in it. The
format's comment names the Opened record a node appends as it starts on
the file, which undoes the clean stop's mark.
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A sync message larger than the threshold for its peer (16 chunks, lower
on a slow link or after a message to it failed whole) goes as a delta:
the peer fetches its changes in chunks, from any node holding them. Its
signatures, each writer's latest with changes in it, went in the
envelope offering it: up to 65536 of them, 6 MiB, in one message, the
size the delta exists to avoid. Nor did an Automerge message count its
signatures (one per writer in a whole document pulled) towards the
threshold.
A delta's signatures are now a blob of their own: the offerer packs and
keeps them (Blobs::keep, the latest 64), and the spec names them by
BLAKE3 hash and size (DeltaSpec::signatures, None where no signature
vouches for its changes). They are served as content (BlobId::Content),
so their hash checks them. The receiver fetches them from the offerer
alone, as another node holding the changes holds signatures of its own,
before the changes, and offers them under the write lock just before
judging the changes, so they wait for them as before. The envelope of a
delta carries none. An Automerge message's signatures count towards its
size: past the threshold, it goes as a delta.
Wire version 49.
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With --keep-actor, a node on a document file that ends with a clean stop
writes on as the actor the file names. Two nodes started on copies of
one file (a copied data directory, a restored disk image while the
original runs) both do, and both make that actor's next change number:
peers holding one refuse the other as forged, and everything built on
it.
screen::apply_bytes, the way every received change comes in, now looks
for a change of the actor the node writes as that the node doesn't hold:
only another node can have made it. The node then writes on as a fresh
actor at once, logs a warning, and its callers add the actor to the
node's own (RemakeState::add_own_actor), which the document file's
header follows. The change is judged as any other. lifecycle.md says not
to start a copy of a node's data directory with --keep-actor, and what
the switch leaves: what both wrote before stays refused where the
other's came first.
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At start, a node on a document file appends an Opened record before it
writes anything, so that a Closed record before it no longer says the
file holds every change of the actor it names. It does so now before
deciding which actor to write as, and DocumentFile::open says whether it
could: where the append fails (the disk full, permissions), the file
still ends with Closed, and later appends likely fail too. A crash, or a
clean stop whose last append failed (close then sees the file behind and
writes no mark), would leave that Closed standing for a run the file
never got. So with --keep-actor, the node writes on as the actor of
before only where the file was marked as opened; else it writes as a
fresh actor and warns.
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A token's limit narrows every endpoint but those under /auth, which any
registered user may call. Among them, PUT and DELETE /auth/keys/{id}
change the keys the user logs in with, and POST /auth/logout ends every
token of the user. With the token a dashboard hands to another member's
(the member list, read, five minutes), its holder could add a key of its
own and log in by it as the user, with everything the user may do.
These now take a password or a token without a limit
(Need::Credentials, refused where Caps::limited). A narrowed token still
refreshes within its limit, says who it is, lists the user's keys and
ends its own session (DELETE /auth/session): a dashboard opened from
another member's logs out with it.
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With the other options of the document file: what it does, what it saves (a writer per
node and per crash or drop, rather than per start), and what it must not meet: two
nodes started from copies of one document file, or a node from an older copy of its
own, which would write as the same actor.
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How many writers (Automerge actors) the document's changes have matters: a writer is a
node's run (each start, rejoin or drop makes one, a start keeping the one of before with
`--keep-actor` after a clean stop), and every transfer of the whole history carries a
signature for each. `/admin/stats` now says it (`document.writers`, and
`document_writers` for Prometheus), counted from the changes' metadata alongside the
saved size's measurement in the background (at least a minute apart), as that takes
time proportional to the document too; an export, which measures the size alone, keeps
the count of before. The dashboard's figures show it with the rest.
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actor
A node writes as a fresh Automerge actor at each start, so no change number of an actor
comes twice: one sent before a crash but not yet appended to the document file would
otherwise be made again, differently. An epoch thus gathers a writer per start, and
every transfer of its history carries a signature per writer.
The document file now says when it holds everything the node wrote:
* at a clean stop, after the last append, an empty `Closed` record, only where the
file is up to the document's heads (ready, not rejoining);
* as a node starts on the file, before anything is written, an empty `Opened` record,
so a crash from then on leaves a file without the mark;
* the header names the actor the node writes with (`current`).
With `--keep-actor` (off by default; needs `--document-file`), a node starting on a
file that ends with `Closed` writes on as that actor. A crash, a drop, a switch or a
rejoin still starts a fresh one, so an epoch's writers come to one per node plus one
per such event. lifecycle.md says so.
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`GET /auth/whoami` lists the user's capabilities (`caps`) and its token's `limit`, if
any, side by side; what the request may do is what both give, as endpoints decide it.
It says so now (`may`): the capabilities, or with a limit each capability met with each
of the limit's (`Capability::meet`): at the deeper of the two paths, a `*` of one
taking the other's key there, with the rights both name; nothing where the paths part,
no right is shared, or the path is protocol data one of them doesn't name.
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Docs and comments outside future-work.md and review-rejections.md say what the code
does, and point nowhere else for what it doesn't: the architecture page's map, the
transports' forwarders, keys with `/`, a strict swarm's registry, trust.md's "Not yet"
(now saying what isn't protected, in a sentence), the topology bench, and the comments
of the change benchmarks, capabilities' grantor, tokens, dissemination, refusals and
topology.
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Under a policy requiring signatures, a node takes a change only once a signature
vouches for it: one of the change itself, or of a later change of the same writer. A
writer is a node's run, each start, rejoin or drop making a fresh actor, so an epoch
gathers writers for as long as it lasts, and a transfer of its whole history (a joiner
pulling the document, a delta) must carry a signature for each of them, or the joiner
waits for the rest for good.
A message's signatures are now chosen by what it carries:
* changes, up to 256 signed among them: each one's signature;
* more (a whole document pulled): each writer's latest signed change among them, found
by the document's change metadata (`Signatures::for_changes`), vouching for the rest;
* a delta: each writer with changes in it (`get_changes_meta(from)`), its latest
verified signature (`for_delta`).
A message carries up to 65536 (6 MiB), and as many wait at the receiver for their
changes (a delta's come after it). So a transfer leaves writers unvouched only in an
epoch with more than 65536 runs writing since it began; a remake starts the count again.
Wire version 48.
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Review 4, R3 partly: nodes refuse a strict remake of a strict swarm by its kind, a label
the proposal and the snapshot's metadata carry. A majority of members labelling one
`compact`, its snapshot holding the registry it wants, gets it followed: nodes whose own
build differs take the quorum's snapshot. access.md says outright that a strict swarm's
registry, policy and bans change by its users' signatures against a minority of members;
comparing a downloaded snapshot with the node's own build at the signed places, and
refusing the switch where they differ, goes to future-work.md.
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Review 4, 1269's note: the node challenges for a password (`WWW-Authenticate`) only
what isn't a browser, by `Sec-Fetch-*` or a `Mozilla/…` user agent. A client calling
itself Mozilla that waits for a challenge before sending its password would get none:
api.md says to send the password with the request, as `curl -u` does, and why.
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Review 4, 1258's note: the glossary says that a path whose way out broke while the
peer's PINGs still come is found by this node's own unanswered PINGs, which with the
turns come every one to two intervals, up to twice as long as before, and what still
finds it at once.
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Review 4, 1257's note: measurements.md now says that no endpoint takes a secret in its
query, but every path read or written is in the request log, and paths are data here,
so the lines go wherever the node's log goes; and that a user who may set the node's
log filter may turn them on.
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Review 4, 1250's note: a key's comment was kept as given, unbounded but by the request
limit (2 MiB), in protocol data every node holds and the dashboard shows. It says whose
and where the key is: at most 256 bytes now (`sshsig::MAX_COMMENT`), a longer one
refused with the key.
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Review 4, appendix: api.md's Signed changes said a node passes on each node's latest
signature (true of deltas, not of messages carrying changes) and that every change
arrives vouched for. It now says what a message carries (its changes' signatures, each
run's latest past 4096 and for a delta), that a node signs each of its runs' latest
unvouched change at start and when its document is swapped (1277), and the two cases
that still arrive unvouched (a change vouched for only by a refused one, postponed;
more than 4096 runs writing in an epoch).
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Review 4, F12: `Screening::of` started screening over when the document was swapped (a
drop, a switch, a rejoin), the root pin alone carried on, so whether the document had
held a policy (`policed`, 1211) was forgotten there too, not only across a restart as
documented: after a drop with the policy removed meanwhile, late changes written under
it went in unjudged again.
It is carried on now, as the root pin is; what belongs to the old document (changes
waiting, refusals, drops held) still starts over. access.md says so.
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Review 4, F11: only streams answered to a token ended with it (1273); one opened by
password (basic authentication) or a proxy's header went on after its user was
disabled or removed.
`streams_end` now wraps those too, by the user `basic_auth` leaves on the answer: such
a stream ends once the document no longer has its user, enabled
(`token::user_taken`, the part of a token's check about its user, which
`still_taken` uses too), looked at as the stream begins and as protocol data changes.
No expiry: a password has none.
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Review 4, R2 partly (F8): a joining node waited for "each of its seeds" to name the
swarm's root as a count, of every admitted peer that named one. Node identities are
self-made and admission is the swarm key: a member answering a joiner under as many
identities as it has seeds, naming its own root within the wait, made the joiner pin
it before the real seeds answered, and refuse them after as another history.
Now the seeds are the nodes proven at the seeds' addresses (`roots::seed_found`, as
`bootstrap::resolve_seeds` finds them), and only their roots count toward the wait
and start its clock. Another peer naming a root still disputes it (no root while they
differ), so such a member can keep a joiner from joining, as any member can, but not
hand it another root. access.md says so.
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Review 4, F4: `?shallow=true` kept every entry the user may at least pass through, and
a shallow read inlines short scalars' values with their types and sizes. A scalar at a
level a `*` passes through (a capability on `data/*/public`, an entry `data/count:
42`) showed its value though no capability covers it; before `*`, only a scalar where
a capability expected a map did.
Now an entry the user may read only partly is shown only as the way through it is: a
map, with no more than its type (not its size, the number of its keys); anything else
there (a scalar, a list, which a deep read leaves out too) isn't shown. Entries it may
read whole are as they were.
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A token was checked when a request came, and a stream answered to it (the dashboard's
events, a subscription's links and messages, the store's streams) then went on for as
long as the client kept it open: past the token's expiry, past its user's tokens being
revoked, its user disabled or removed, its session ended.
Now a middleware inside `login::bearer` (`login::streams_end`) ends a streaming answer
(`text/event-stream`, `application/x-ndjson`) to a request with a token at the token's
deadline, its expiry, or as soon as the document no longer takes it
(`token::still_taken`, the checks `verify` makes of the document, now its own
function): looked at when a change touches protocol data (the root, a switch, among
it), and when a session ends on the node itself in a swarm without a registry
(`AppState::session_ended`). No polling: a timer for the expiry, and the changes as
they come. The client reconnects with the token it has then; a refreshed token is a
new one, so a stream lasts a token's lifetime at most (12 hours by default).
`futures` is a dependency of every build now (for `take_until`), not only of libp2p's
and Tor's.
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Logging out of the dashboard (`DELETE /auth/session`) only cleared the cookie: the
session's tokens stayed taken until they expired, by every node. Ending them took
`POST /auth/logout`, which ends all of a user's sessions.
Now `DELETE /auth/session` ends the session of the token it comes with (the cookie, or
a bearer token): where the swarm has a registry, it is recorded as
`_continuum/sessions/<user>/<session>` (`registry::session_path`), its value until when
the session would have lasted, and every node refuses the session's tokens once the
change reaches it (`token::Refused::Ended`): the page's own, its narrow tokens, and one
handed to another member's dashboard, all refreshed from it and keeping its ID. The
rules take the entry from the user itself or one who manages users, as a logout. A
remake's snapshot leaves out entries past that time, a user's map where none is left:
their tokens are expired anyway.
Without a registry the document can't record it: the node ending it refuses the
session's tokens itself (`AppState::ended_sessions`, until it restarts), others take
them until they expire, as a logout there is refused.
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After "log out" the page went to the login page, and the browser's back button brought
it back as it was (kept whole in its history): the map, the peers and the console went
on updating, by the stream it still had open and the subscriptions' token it still
held, though the session had ended (the document box, reading anew, got 401s).
Now leaving for the login page (`toLogin`: logging out, or the login ending) stops the
page's reading first: its stream, its subscriptions, its timers and tokens. And a page
the browser brings back whole (`pageshow`, `persisted`) loads again instead, so it
reads with the session it has now, and without one goes to the login page.
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Going to another member's dashboard showed its login page for a moment: a browser
without a session there was sent from `/admin/dashboard` to `/login` (by
`auth::basic_auth`), which began a session with the token handed over and went on to
the dashboard.
Now the dashboard's page is served without authentication, as the login page is (it
holds nothing: what it shows it reads with the browser's session). Opened with a token
handed over, the page begins the session with it (`POST /auth/session`) before it reads
anything; without a session, `obtainTokens` goes to the login page, as the redirect
did. A request without credentials is refused at once rather than after the 1.5 s
that slow down guessing passwords: nothing is guessed there, and a page without a
session goes to the login page without waiting twice for it.
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The page renewed its token half way through its life by a timer. A timer fires late
where the computer slept or the tab was in the background, by when the token (and the
session cookie, which lives as long) may have ended: the page then fell back to
`POST /auth/login`, which takes a password the browser keeps (basic authentication),
and without one retried every 30 s, logged out without saying so.
Now whether the token is half way through its life is looked at again when the page
shows and every 30 s (`refreshIfDue`, one renewal at a time), so it is renewed while it
still can be, until the login ends (`--session-lifetime`). Where the login ended, or
there is none (400, 401, 403), the page goes to the login page; a node away is tried
again in 30 s. And the page no longer gets in by a password the browser keeps: only
by its session or through a proxy naming the user (`throughProxy`, `login: "header"`).
The node never challenges a browser for a password either (`WWW-Authenticate`, the
browser's prompt): not only on the dashboard's paths and for a page's own requests, but
for any request with `Sec-Fetch-*` or a `Mozilla/…` user agent. curl sends the password
unasked with `-u`, as before.
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A node in focus showed this node's `/peers` entry for it and the links it reports:
what this node knows of it, never what it says of itself, though the page subscribes to
it. Now a subscribed node in focus shows its own figures first (`Node:`), as this
node's are (its `/admin/stats`), then this node's entry for it (`as this node sees it`)
and its links, each a branch. A link in focus shows each end's paths to the other as
that end has them: this node's, and a subscribed node's from its `/peers`.
The page reads them from the node every 2 s while it is in focus (`readFigures`,
`figuresOf`), with its narrow token, which may look at a node as any user with a
capability may; pages of other origins may now call `/admin/stats` and `/peers`
(`cors::open`), as they do a node's links and messages. Where they can't be read, the
box says why.
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A subscribed node's messages come without being written out (their stream leaves the
text out: up to 8 KiB each, 500 at a time), so the figures box said only when, both
ends, type and size of one. Now the node answers for one message by its number,
`GET /admin/dashboard/messages/own/{seq}` (`{"text": …}`, `404` once it isn't kept),
which pages of other origins may call as they do its streams (`cors::open`), and the
page reads it when the message is shown, with its narrow token, and keeps it on the
message. Where it can't be read, the box says why.
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The console said with whom a message went, not how: the message log was noted above
the identity layer (`CountingTransport`), where a message is to or from a node, and the
address it went to (the paths layer picks one, `Paths::send_first`) or came from is
gone. Only the paths layer's own PINGs and PONGs, logged under their addresses, had one.
Now the identity layer notes the node's messages (`MessageLog::set_addressed`), with
the address each went to (`IdentityTransport::send_proven` returns it) or came from;
`CountingTransport` leaves them to it, and still notes them where there is no identity
layer (tests). A console line ends with the transport (the address's scheme, in its
colour on the map, the address in the tooltip), and the figures box shows the address.
A subscribed node's messages carry theirs too, and the map runs every message along
its transport's line, not only the PINGs and PONGs.
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Setting a node's log filter took `write` on `_continuum`, all of the protocol data:
whoever could change one node's logging could change the swarm's members, remakes and
users too. Now what a node holds alone has paths of its own for capabilities, under
`_continuum/local/<node ID>/`: `log` (`/admin/log`), `config` (`/admin/config`) and
`debug` (`/debug`, always `write`), `read` to look and `write` to act
(`api::access::needed`, which takes the node's ID). So `_continuum/local/<node ID>` is
everything on one node, `_continuum/local/*/log` the log filter on every node, and
holders of `_continuum` keep it all.
Nothing is stored there: the store refuses writes under `_continuum/local`, and the
rules refuse a change touching it, as for epoch metadata. The quarantine stays with
`_continuum`: its entries are everyone's writes, which a node-local capability
mustn't show.
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A capability's path covered by prefix only, so what is the same at every key of a map
(each node's log filter, say, at `_continuum/local/<id>/log` from the next patch on)
took a capability per key. Now a `*` segment stands for any one key, as it already does
in signed paths and sealed places (`envelope`, `sealed`, which now share one `agree`):
* covering (`Capability::covers`): the pattern no longer than the path, and agreeing
with it segment by segment;
* listings (`reaches`): pattern and path agreeing on the segments both have, so every
key on the way shows, nothing past where the pattern differs;
* narrowing (`Capability::holds`, for a token's limit narrowed again and a refresh's):
at or below, a `*` only under a `*`: a limit naming one key never widens to all.
A `*` first is outside protocol data, so it never covers `_continuum`, as `[]` doesn't.
A key that is `*` itself can't be named alone. Every node judges changes by
capabilities, so all must read them alike: they run the same version.
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The node's keepalives take turns between the two sides (`PeerState::keepalive_due_at`),
but the paths layer pinged every path in use every `probe_every` (the keepalive interval,
30 s at least) whatever the peer did: a PING from the peer over the path didn't count.
So both sides pinged each path every interval, often within a second of each other
(seen on the dashboard: a PING answered, and our own PING right after it).
Now a PING from the peer over a path is noted (`PathState::peer_probe`), and a path is
pinged again (`rested`) an interval after the peer's PING, if that came last; after
ours, an interval and a half while the peer pings too (its PING within two intervals
before ours), so its turn comes first; else an interval. One exchange per interval
goes over a path, as the measurements' "two keepalives per neighbour per interval"
says, and each side measures every other interval; a shorter `--keepalive` measures
more often. A path whose way out broke while the peer's PINGs still come in is found by
our own PINGs half as often; a failed send or unanswered traffic (`suspect`) still
pings at once.
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Requests weren't logged at all, short of what a handler logs itself. Now a middleware,
outermost on the API (and on a relay-only node's), logs a line per request as web
servers do: method and path (with the query), status, the milliseconds until the answer
began (a stream goes on after), where it came from (the address, or `unix`), and the
user (`-` where none was authenticated). The user comes back on the response:
`basic_auth` puts it there, for a token as for a password or a trusted proxy's header.
At debug, under the target `http` (`RUST_LOG=info,http=debug`, or `PUT /admin/log`):
an open dashboard alone would fill the log at info. With the target off, the request
passes untouched.
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The remake dialog set the kind, its input, the settle time and the switch delay, but not
the replay window or the archive retention. Now each has two fields, epochs and an age,
their defaults as placeholders: both empty sends nothing (the node's defaults), one
given sends that limit alone, as the API reads it; in the body, or for an import in the
query (`replayWindow`, `archiveRetention`). Epochs that aren't a whole number are
refused in the page.
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An import uploaded as `application/octet-stream` takes `rules`, `baseHeads`, `settle`
and `switchDelay` in the query, but not the retentions: for those the document had to
go base64-encoded in the JSON form. Now `replayWindow` and `archiveRetention` go in the
query too, as JSON like the rules (`{"epochs":1,"age":"7d"}`, as in the body).
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Every snapshot carried the metadata of all earlier epochs (`_continuum/epochs`)
forward, so it grew by an entry, a clock per actor among it, with every remake. Only a
rejoining node reads an earlier entry: a node on epoch P reads P+1's (its clock, when
it was proposed, its replay window) and every one up to the swarm's epoch (kind,
translation, whether it was strict). It replays only while P+1's replay window covers
it; beyond, its writes are quarantined whatever the entries say.
So a snapshot now leaves out the generations older than the oldest whose replay window
still covers a node on the epoch before it (`snapshot::left_out`), judged by the
remake's `proposedAt`: the same on every node, and earlier than any rejoining node's
clock, so nothing a node can still replay through goes. Metadata that doesn't read
stays, with all after it.
A strict remake's metadata stays for good: by it a rejoining node, however far behind,
tells a strict remake of a swarm strict already (`catchup::prepare`, which reads the
generations it finds). There is at most one, short of such a remake. No new key and no
change to the rejoin: a node beyond the window that finds some entries and not others
quarantines with "cannot translate" rather than "outside the replay window".
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A key's line was stored as the key alone (`ssh-ed25519 <base64>`), whatever comment it
came with, both from `PUT /auth/keys/<name>` and from `--bootstrap-keys`. Now its
comment is kept after it (`PublicKey::kept_line`), the spaces between its words made
one. The comment checks nothing: every use of a key parses the line, and the parse
reads the key alone.
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The credentials dialog listed a user's keys whole, to add one or
remove one but the last, and any failure replaced the dialog with the
error, the form lost.
* A key is shown short: its type, the first and last four characters
of what tells it apart (an Ed25519 key's base64 after the part all of
them share), its comment; the whole line in its tooltip.
* A key can be edited, its name and its line: saved under the name, a
new name written first and the old one removed.
* A user with a password on this node (`--htpasswd`) may remove its
last key: it logs in by the password. GET /auth/keys says so
(`password`), and DELETE /auth/keys/{id} takes it then; the rules no
longer keep the last key on every node (no other node can tell who
has a password where; under a strict policy the signed entry keeps
one still).
* What fails says why beside where it was asked (the add form, the
edited row, the removed one), which stays as it was, to be set right
and tried again.
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A right press on a node started dragging it, as any press did: the map
took hold of the pointer, so the right-click went to the map and the
node's menu didn't open, and letting go put the node in focus. The
right button now opens the node's menu alone. Its entry for the node's
dashboard is `go to its dashboard`, greyed where the node publishes
none (and on this node's own), its tooltip saying where it goes or why
not.
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With the entries' menus (1238), editing had three ways in: the
double-click, the `+` on a map's or list's row, and the menu. The
double-click and the `+` go; the menu does all of it. The title,
which stands for the root (its row isn't shown), now takes the
right-click too: its menu adds a key at the top level.
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The document box edited an entry by a double-click and added to a map
or list by the `+` on its row; a key couldn't be renamed, and a list's
`+` always asked for an index.
A right-click on an entry, or a finger held on it half a second, opens
its menu: `Edit value` (as the double-click), `Rename key` for a map's
key, and on a map `Add a key`, on a list `Append an item` or `Insert
an item at…`. Renaming reads the value, writes it under the new key
and deletes the old one (two writes, the value as JSON; a key that
exists already isn't overwritten). Inside a field being edited, and
where an entry offers nothing, the browser's own menu shows.
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A stream's lag in the tooltip of `behind: …` was one figure, from when
a node logged a message to when the page had it: a second and a half
for a node a LAN away said nothing of where it went.
The node now stamps each `messages` event with when it sent it
(`{"sent": …, "messages": […]}`), and the tooltip splits each stream's
lag: how long its batches waited in the node, from logging the first
message to sending the batch (the node's own clock: exact), and how
long they took on the way, from sending to arriving. This node's own
stream is always listed, beside the three slowest.
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The console appended messages as their streams brought them, a
subscribed node's later than this node's by its path, each line with
its node's own clock's time: lines of one moment came apart, and their
times read out of order.
Each message is now listed by when its node logged it, on this node's
clock, as the map runs them (`aheadOf`): one a slower stream brought
late goes in among those of its moment. The time shown is on this
node's clock; a subscribed node's own clock's time is in its tooltip.
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