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A sync message carried the signatures its peer wasn't sent yet, by a
cursor per peer. Changes sent again, as after a message taken as
delivered and lost on the way, went without them: the peer was past
them. Under a policy requiring signatures they waited until the
writer's next signed change, or the next session.
A message now carries the signatures of the changes it carries
(Signatures::for_changes), whatever the peer was sent before: changes
sent again arrive vouched for as the first time. Past 256 (a message
carrying the batches of many writers), each writer's latest instead,
as a delta carries. The cursor goes, and with it resetting it after a
failed send or a new session.
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api.md's Signed changes says what sent, all and none do, what each
costs, and which to choose: sent for nearly every swarm, all where each
change should carry its own proof, none to save signatures where only
protocol data and listed paths need them; and that signatures travel
with their changes, a message carrying none taking none. access.md no
longer says signatures come on their own within a second.
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Review 3.1: a signed null stays as an envelope, so the value written
after it names it in prev and an envelope from before the deletion
can't be put back. api.md now says so.
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Review 3.1, part of finding 12: a signed value's payload bound path,
user, time and prev, but not the swarm. A user with the same name and
key in two swarms could have an envelope replayed from one into the
other, wherever the path holds no envelope yet (prev "").
The payload now names the swarm (`swarm`), and a node takes an envelope
only for its own. /auth/whoami says the swarm, and continuum-signed and
the example in api.md sign it. Wire version 44: nodes before this
refuse such envelopes, and those after refuse the old ones.
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Review finding 5: vouching by (actor, seq) isn't bound to a hash. A
member can make a change under another member's actor at a seq that
member's signature covers. The change is then taken as vouched, and if
it breaks a rule, the honest member is refused as a whole and logged as
the one whose own change broke the rules.
A signature now vouches for its change and the changes of its actor it
builds on: in the document, as before; among received changes, those
it reaches through the batch's dependencies. A received change under an
actor at a seq whose change the document holds (a signature verified up
to it) is a fork: refused as forged, never as its actor's node's, not
told back in REFUSALS, and logged with the peer that brought it.
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cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys,
which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose
values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the
recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt.
Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers
as users only (nodes hold no keys).
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PUT with application/continuum-signed writes an envelope where values
are signed (403/409 saying why); reads open envelopes and name the
signer (x-continuum-signed-by), ?raw=true shows them. Under strict,
unsigned writes reaching a signed value and the users API are 409.
Auth plan M7.
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"signatures": "required": a change counts only once a signature by its
committer vouches for it, and waits until then; every node then signs
every change it makes.
Auth plan M6.
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_continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every
change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node
doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused.
Auth plan M6.
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GET /admin/changes shows whether a signature by its node vouches for
each change.
Auth plan M5.
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Signatures no sync message took go on their own within a second, to
each peer not sent them yet (wire version bumped).
Auth plan M5.
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Sync messages carry, for each actor's writes, the latest signature the
sender checked; the receiver checks it once it holds the change.
Auth plan M5.
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A node's signatures are saved with its document (--document-file) and
loaded with it.
Auth plan M5.
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Changes left unsigned are vouched for by the node's next signature:
--sign-every 1s (default) signs the latest within a second, all signs
every change, none only those that must be.
Auth plan M5.
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Every node signs the changes it commits with its node key, an Ed25519
signature over the change's hash, kept beside the document. One
signature on an actor's latest change vouches for its earlier ones.
Protocol data and paths listed in _continuum/access/signed are signed,
and writes with ?signed=true.
Auth plan M5.
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api.md names users as the registry has them.
Auth plan M1 (docs).
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POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh,
/auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring
Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and
--session-lifetime.
Auth plan M2.
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Every request is judged by the registry the node holds: store reads
pruned to what the user may read, writes refused where it may not,
admin endpoints by protocol capabilities. Without a registry, as
before (--protocol-writers for protocol data).
Auth plan M1.
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