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* access: a node judges its own changes before they leavetv3 days1-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The API checks the path a request asks for; the rules judge everything the change does. Where they disagreed, the honest node's change was refused by every other node, and with signatures required the node was refused as a whole. The plan had both gates run the same judgement. Under a policy, each change a node makes (its own writes and those through the API) is now judged by rules::judge as receivers will judge it, before it is signed or sent; one every node would refuse is rolled back (the document forked at the heads before it, same actor: the change never left) and the request refused with 403 (StoreError:: Refused). rules::judge_held, judging a change the document holds, moves from swarm::refusals to access::rules for both. The simulations that play a member past its own checks write with a helper that bypasses them (forge). Review finding 3 (the same judgement at both gates).
* access: forgetting and revoking as the API letstv3 days1-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Two writes the API lets a user make were refused by the rules: * DELETE /peers/{pk}, with write on _continuum/forgotten alone, writes the forget record and removes the member's entry in one change; the rules wanted write on the entry. Removing an entry is now also taken in a change forgetting that member, from a user who may forget it. * DELETE /admin/users/{name}/tokens by a user who manages users writes _continuum/logouts/<name>; the rules wanted write there. One who may write _continuum/users may now write anyone's logouts entry. Review finding 3 (DELETE /peers, revoking tokens).
* access: maps made on the way judged by what they holdtv3 days1-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | A write makes the maps on its way where there are none (store::write_path); the rules judged each made map as a write at its own path, so a user whose capability lies below a map not made yet (write on servers/eu, a first PUT at servers/eu/0) had its first write taken by its node and refused by every other. A map made where there was none, in a change writing within it, is now judged by what is written within it. Review finding 3 (parent maps created on the way).
* access: judged by the policy written undertv3 days1-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | The rules read the policy at the change's dependencies only for strict mode, so history from before the policy was judged by today's rules when a late node caught up, or when REFUSALS had it judged again. A change written while the document had no policy, or one this node doesn't know, is now judged by none. Review finding 6.
* access: a forgotten node cancels its own recordtv3 days1-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | A node forgotten swarm-wide while alive cancels its forget record with a change naming no user; the rules judged _continuum/forgotten by the registry alone, so every node refused the cancellation and everything the node wrote after it. A node may now write its own _continuum/forgotten/<id>, as it may its member entry. Review finding 4.
* dashboard: a token handed over to another member's dashboardtv3 days1-1/+3
| | | | | | | | Opening another member's dashboard passes a token reading only, for five minutes, in the URL's fragment; its login page begins a session with it. Tokens may be asked for with a shorter lifetime. Auth plan M3 (hand-off).
* swarm: changes taken unjudged, dropped (REFUSALS)tv3 days1-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | A node refusing changes a peer brought tells it which broke a rule; the peer judges them itself, and if its rules refuse them too, drops them with all built on them (its document forked without them, a fresh actor), quarantining its own writes among them. Wire version 42. Auth plan M6 (rejoin on taint).
* access: members refused as a wholetv3 days1-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | With signatures required, a member whose own change broke a rule is refused as a whole: sent nothing, shown in /peers (refused), in stats (sync.refusedPeers) and on the dashboard, until a change of its is taken again or the epoch changes. Auth plan M6 (diverged standing).
* auth: the session cookie lets in reads onlytv3 days1-1/+4
| | | | | | | | The cookie lets in GET, HEAD and the session's own requests; anything changing something brings the token itself, which no page of another site or port can make a browser send. The dashboard's writes send it. Auth plan M3 (browsers).
* access: refused oncetv3 days1-1/+4
| | | | | | | | A refused change is remembered by its hash: offered again it is refused without decoding, judging or logging, so is one built on it, and a peer offering nothing else is answered later each time, up to a minute. Auth plan M6 (re-sending).
* auth: a login page and browser sessionstv3 days1-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | GET /login without authentication: log in by password or with a token (from a login by key). POST/DELETE /auth/session keep the token as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie; the dashboard sends a browser without a user there and renews the session while open. Auth plan M2/M3 (browsers).
* docs: reading keys and declarationstv3 days1-0/+18
| | | | | | | Clients checking signatures or sealing read the registry and _continuum/access: operators grant reading them. Auth plan M7, M8 (docs).
* scripts: sealing and opening in the reference clienttv3 days1-0/+4
| | | | | | | continuum-signed seal and open, with age, for the readers declared or CONTINUUM_READERS. Auth plan M8.
* access: values sealed for their readerstv3 days1-0/+37
| | | | | | | | | | cs1.<age file>: a value encrypted with age to its readers' SSH keys, which no node decrypts. _continuum/access/sealed declares paths whose values must be sealed, for named readers or anyone; nodes check the recipients by age's key tags, at the API and on receipt. Auth plan M8, reworked: sealed values instead of containers, readers as users only (nodes hold no keys).
* scripts: a reference client for signed valuestv3 days1-0/+4
| | | | | | | | scripts/continuum-signed (ssh-keygen, curl, jq): login by key, put and delete signed values, get envelopes, verify one against its user's keys. Auth plan M7.
* access: --bootstrap-keystv3 days1-1/+4
| | | | | | | The first users' SSH keys, recorded at genesis with their entries, so a swarm can be strict from its start. Auth plan M7.
* auth: logging in by keytv3 days1-0/+16
| | | | | | | | POST /auth/challenge and /auth/login/key: a node-signed challenge, valid five minutes and taken once, signed with one of the user's SSH keys (ssh-keygen -Y sign -n continuum-login), for a token. Auth plan M7 (key login, M2b).
* access: signed values judged on receipttv3 days1-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | Inspection gives each operation's kind; under strict every node refuses, at a signed place, anything but an envelope that checks and replaces the one there (deleting first as replacing does), anything within one, and above one anything replacing what holds one. Auth plan M7.
* access: a node registers before it writestv3 days1-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | Under a policy, a change by a node that isn't a member is refused with all built on it: a node's registration is written before any write of its own or through the API, not after (the registration itself exempt). Auth plan M6 (fix).
* api: signed values at the storetv3 days1-0/+32
| | | | | | | | | PUT with application/continuum-signed writes an envelope where values are signed (403/409 saying why); reads open envelopes and name the signer (x-continuum-signed-by), ?raw=true shows them. Under strict, unsigned writes reaching a signed value and the users API are 409. Auth plan M7.
* access: logouts apart from users' entriestv3 days1-1/+1
| | | | | | | | _continuum/logouts/<name> holds when a user's tokens were last revoked, written by the user itself or by one who may manage users, so users' entries can be signed by their managers alone. Auth plan M7.
* access: banstv3 days1-1/+16
| | | | | | | | _continuum/banned/<node ID>: every node refuses the banned node's changes from then on (judged as the ban stood) and leaves its handshakes unanswered. Auth plan M6.
* access: signatures requiredtv3 days1-3/+8
| | | | | | | | "signatures": "required": a change counts only once a signature by its committer vouches for it, and waits until then; every node then signs every change it makes. Auth plan M6.
* access: the policy enforcedtv3 days1-0/+47
| | | | | | | | _continuum/access/policy ({"version": 1}) has every node screen every change it receives, on every path changes come in. A policy a node doesn't know stops its writes through the API. GET /admin/refused. Auth plan M6.
* dashboard: subscribed nodes' messages in the consoletv3 days1-2/+2
| | | | | | | Each tick's messages of a subscribed node, listed in the console with this node's own, from its own stream. Auth plan M3 (live data from every reachable node).
* dashboard: subscribed nodes' messages as dotstv3 days1-2/+3
| | | | | | | The page reads a subscribed node's message counts from it too, and draws them as dots on the map, as this node's own. Auth plan M3 (live data from every reachable node).
* dashboard: own links over the API, and CORStv3 days1-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | GET /admin/dashboard/links/own and its event stream: a node's own links, as LINKS_REPLY carried them, for other members' dashboards with a token. CORS for the members' dashboard origins and --cors-origins, without credentials. Auth plan M3.
* auth: logging in, and tokens as bearerstv3 days1-0/+32
| | | | | | | | | POST /auth/login (by htpasswd or the proxy), /auth/refresh, /auth/logout, GET /auth/whoami; every request may bring Authorization: Bearer instead of a password. --token-lifetime and --session-lifetime. Auth plan M2.
* access: the users endpointstv3 days1-15/+38
| | | | | | | | /admin/users: list, add (one or several), remove, disable, grant and revoke capabilities; each one change, refused if it would lock its writer out. Capabilities as the store's paths name them. Auth plan M1.
* access: bootstrap users onlytv3 days1-3/+6
| | | | | | | The first users come only from --bootstrap-users; the genesis node warns of htpasswd users that aren't among them. Auth plan M1.
* dashboard: what its user may readtv3 days1-1/+2
| | | | | | | The dashboard's document box is read through the store, as its user may, and the page is told only of changes where its user may read. Auth plan M1 (the dashboard).
* access: genesis of swarms from before the registrytv3 days1-8/+5
| | | | | | | | Swarms started before the registry keep working without one; the genesis node's options for a registry apply only to new swarms. What tests and migration leave is noted in future-work. Auth plan M1, bootstrap and migration (2.5).
* access: keeping the swarm manageabletv3 days1-2/+13
| | | | | | | | | A write that would leave its own writer unable to manage users (deleting, disabling or narrowing its entry, removing the registry) is refused; --protocol-writers can set a registry right that nobody may manage any more. Auth plan M1.
* access: authorization at the APItv3 days1-0/+50
| | | | | | | | | Every request is judged by the registry the node holds: store reads pruned to what the user may read, writes refused where it may not, admin endpoints by protocol capabilities. Without a registry, as before (--protocol-writers for protocol data). Auth plan M1.
* access: first users at genesistv3 days1-0/+42
--bootstrap-users gives a new swarm a registry from its first change, each first user with everything; other users may do nothing until added. Without it the swarm has no registry and works as before. Auth plan M1.