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* continuum-party: why waiting for the ssh-agent may blockecdsatv42 hours1-0/+4
| | | | | The client signs one event at a time and does nothing else meanwhile, and an agent may wait for its user as long as that takes.
* continuum-party: a key the ssh-agent holds, given itselftv42 hours5-28/+123
| | | | | | | | | `--key` gives a public key itself, an `authorized_keys` line, as well as a file of them: of a file of several, the first signs, with a warning naming it, and another is given itself to sign with it. An agent that doesn't hold the key given signs nothing, and the client stops before it records or puts what it would have signed, saying which key it asked for.
* keys: signing through an ssh-agent tested wherever tests runtv42 hours2-22/+22
| | | | | | The test fails without OpenSSH on the machine testing, rather than passing without asking anything. Its directory is a scratch directory, removed when the test ends, the agent stopped before it.
* files: a test's scratch directory goes when the test endstv42 hours5-12/+34
| | | | | | | `scratch_dir` gives a guard (`Scratch`) that removes the directory with all it holds when dropped, the test passing or failing. Each test keeps it for as long as it uses the directory; the dashboard's browser check writes its page into one.
* guides: which keys an ssh-agent signs a party's events withtv42 hours1-4/+10
| | | | | | | A smartcard's or a security key's PIV key, through PKCS#11, or a key in a Secure Enclave or a phone, each ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 or ssh-ed25519; a security key's FIDO key (`-t ecdsa-sk`, `-t ed25519-sk`) is no party's key.
* attacks: row 62 with an ECDSA signature spelled otherwisetv42 hours3-1/+35
| | | | | | | Row 62 names an ECDSA signature's twins, `s` high (the order less `s`) and `r` or `s` with zeros more in front, each none. Its test offers the ECDSA vector's write with each (`keys::respelled`) to a store whose root names that key, and has it take the write as it was signed.
* federation.md, guides: a change taking what was refused keeps the numbertv42 hours2-0/+14
| | | | | | | | A change that only has the federation take what it refused, reading nothing it took otherwise, as ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 keys, keeps the federation's number: it is rolled out to every node first, and used after. A node that doesn't take it refuses what uses it, a version naming such a key among them.
* Cargo.toml: p256 with the federation alonetv42 hours1-2/+2
| | | | | A party's ECDSA keys are the federation's: without the `federation` feature, p256 isn't built.
* guides: keys in an ssh-agentslopulus2 days3-6/+30
| | | | | | A party's key is `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`; the client signs with a private key file or through an ssh-agent holding the key, given its public key. Code of its own signing with ECDSA makes `s` low, which `ssh-keygen` does only half the time.
* federation.md, federation-tests.md: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 keys, their ↵slopulus2 days2-17/+28
| | | | | | | | signature low-S A key is `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, spelled alike; an ECDSA signature is over SHA-256, its `s` low and `r` and `s` SSH's shortest mpints, so that it is spelled one way. The vectors and the agent test, among the harness's.
* continuum-party: signing through an ssh-agentslopulus2 days6-20/+251
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A key held in hardware is never a file: only an ssh-agent signs with it. Given a public key as `--key` (a `.pub` file, `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), the client asks the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign what SSHSIG signs (a sign request with the key's blob, no flags) and writes the blob around the agent's signature as `ssh-keygen -Y sign` does. An ECDSA signature the agent gives with a high `s` is made low, the other of its two spellings, which the federation takes. What it makes is checked before it is used. A private key file signs as it did. A test starts `ssh-agent`, adds an ECDSA and an Ed25519 key to it and deletes their files, signs through it, and has both continuum and `ssh-keygen -Y verify` check each signature, one of an agent's high-S answers among them. Without OpenSSH it asks nothing.
* keys: a party's key may be ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, its signature low-S onlyslopulus2 days6-38/+313
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A party's keys may be held where no file has them, in a Secure Enclave or a phone, and those are ECDSA keys on NIST P-256. Everywhere a party's key counts (a version's keys, a key set, the key an event is signed with) such a key is taken beside an Ed25519 one, spelled as `ssh-keygen` writes it, without a comment: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, a space, and the base64 of its SSH encoding, its point uncompressed and on the curve. Its signature is SSHSIG as an Ed25519 one is, hashed with `sha512`, its inner signature over SHA-256 as SSH signs with such a key. ECDSA signatures are malleable: of `s` and the curve's order less `s`, both check. So the federation takes one spelling alone: `s` low, at most half the order, `r` and `s` each SSH's shortest mpint, and the blob reading back to itself as an Ed25519 one does. What anyone makes of a party's signature is then none, as before. The vectors are a key `ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256` made, a first version naming it, and a write and a key set `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signed with it, each taken; the signature's high-S twin, which checks as ECDSA, and its `r` spelled longer are none. Ed25519 keys and signatures are spelled and checked as they were.
* dashboard: the federation, in a swarm holding a storetv3 days7-11/+488
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | In a swarm holding a store, the snapshot names the node's party, and the document box shows what counts as the node reads it, read every 5 s: the current version, the parties with their keys and nodes, the rules, the values at places as a tree with who writes there, the proposals on the version with where each stands, who voted what and what its version changes, and what the node refused. `document` beside `remake…` shows the document underneath. Where the node votes for its party by itself, a proposal that can still pass has a vote of each kind, cast through the node on a second click. The page writes no values: a party signs its writes with its key.
* events: the store's summary names the node's party, and whether it votes for ittv3 days5-11/+27
| | | | | | `GET /events` names the party the node is of (`party`, `--store-party`) and whether it votes for it by itself (`votesByItself`, `--store-vote-key`), and so casts a vote by hand (`POST /admin/events/vote`): what a page offering votes through the node asks.
* continuum-party: options from configuration files, as the node'stv3 days5-70/+216
| | | | | | | | | `continuum-party` takes its options (`node`, `token`, `key`, `record`: `config::PARTY_OPTIONS`) on the command line and in configuration files of the node's format: `--config`, repeatable, arguments winning, `--unset`, includes and imports. The configuration's loader takes the options it reads as a table (`config::with_options`, `config::merged`, `file::load_with`), the node's or the client's, and a key naming none of them is an error in either; `node` and `token` are secrets, never logged.
* continuum-party proposals: where each proposal stands, and what it changestv3 days3-0/+136
| | | | | | | | `continuum-party proposals` lists the proposals on the current version at the node, each with whether it passed or is dead and the parties voting `true` and `false`, as `GET /events/counts` names them, and what its version changes of the current one, read from an event proposing it, its signature checked: each field whose value differs, and of `keys` and `nodes` each party's (`client::changes`).
* events: counts names who voted what, and whether a proposal passed or is deadtv3 days6-23/+120
| | | | | | | | `GET /events/counts` gives each proposal on the current version the parties voting `true` and `false` (`yes`, `no`), whether it passed and whether it is dead (`passed`, `dead`), as the node reads its votes (`State::tally`, which the fold judges by too), so that reading where a vote stands takes no fetch of every vote. A party's client still decides its votes by the votes it checks itself.
* guides: designing a federation's rulestv3 days2-0/+91
| | | | | | How rules match, a namespace each, zones and blocks a party holds by its name, shared places given by rules of their own and kept apart from party names, what rules cost in votes and size, and the krebs registry's rules as an example.
* guides: building on a federated swarm's APItv3 days2-0/+91
| | | | | | Reading what counts and when to read again, writing through the party's client or as events of its own spelled and signed as the federation does, when a write counts, one writer at a place, keeping a namespace in step, and the store API refusing writes.
* guides: what to watch in a federated swarmtv3 days2-0/+47
| | | | | | Beside what every node needs watching: a version a node refused, a node without its store, the proposals and the version, the members, the events beyond the checkpoint, and the store's log lines at warn and error.
* guides: upgrades and the federation's numbertv3 days2-0/+36
| | | | | | Upgrading the nodes of a federated swarm, each party its own, close together; what the federation's number names, fixed by vectors; a version of another federation refused, and moving to the next one by a version.
* guides: remakes under a federationtv3 days2-0/+64
| | | | | | Compactions only, the electorate among the store's members, the snapshot holding the store read at the base, what a node puts again after a switch, the lower of two epochs, which epochs a node rejoins, and a swarm that never remakes.
* guides: refusals and dropstv3 days2-0/+73
| | | | | | What `GET /events/refused` shows and of which kinds, the events a refused change carried, what the store file keeps across restarts, having a node drop events and take them back, and when an operator does.
* guides: a drop's answer as the node writes ittv3 days1-1/+1
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* guides: a node voting by itselftv3 days2-0/+77
| | | | | | Setting up a node to vote for its party, its key and the party's one record, voting by hand through it, its rules for following, proposing checkpoints and voting `false` beside, what it keeps to, and what its log says.
* guides: a version begun from the current one leaves out its checkpointtv3 days1-1/+3
| | | | | | The current version may name a checkpoint, whose heads are behind: a version naming them again is never written. Writing a version leaves it out unless the version moves the store on.
* guides: common changes to a federation's versiontv3 days2-0/+111
| | | | | | The next version begun from the current one, and recipes as jq filters for letting a party in, taking one out, giving and taking back a place, zones and blocks, and keys named anew; what a party changes by itself; and a version that only moves the store on.
* guides: what a federation promisestv3 days2-0/+63
| | | | | Who a party and the adversary are, the three promises in plain words, what isn't promised, and what that asks of a party, an operator and an application.
* guides: forking and following in a federationtv3 days2-0/+80
| | | | | | | When a group forks, choosing the heads, the fork's version, its root as a node builds it, starting the fork's nodes and beginning a record there; what a node holding the history finds of a fork's root; and following a fork, coming back, and groups that parted coming together.
* guides: when things go wrong in a federationtv3 days2-0/+83
| | | | | | | A version a node refused by what it took before, finding from the parties' records who voted twice, having a node drop one side's version and take the other's, answering by a fork, and what keeps a node from holding its store, syncing, taking an event, or starting.
* guides: checkpoints in a federationtv3 days2-0/+80
| | | | | | | What a move to a checkpoint keeps and loses, a version only moving the store on and the heads to name, a node proposing checkpoints by its operator's rules, backing only heads that leave out nothing held for a while (which a node voting by itself checks and a party's client doesn't), signing again after a move, and nodes that weren't there.
* guides: a federated party's keystv3 days2-0/+87
| | | | | | The keys a version names, kept apart with the party's record, and those of its key set, signing its writes; changing a set and signing again what should stay; changing the keys a version names; a stolen key of either kind; and the node key, which is no party's.
* guides: proposing and voting in a federationtv3 days2-0/+118
| | | | | | | Writing a version from the current one, its `since`s and what makes one none, proposing it, voting through the party's client by its record and what the client refuses to cast, voting through a node that votes for its party, a lost record, and when a proposal passes or dies, with the counts for some numbers of parties.
* guides: writing and reading in a federationtv3 days2-0/+114
| | | | | | Places and the rules naming their writers, a write through the party's client and what it may hold, what counts and what stops counting, the refusals a node names, signing again what a move refused, and what `GET /events/counts` shows.
* guides: running a node of a federationtv3 days2-0/+111
| | | | | | | What a node of a federated swarm does otherwise than any: its store options and file, members syncing with members only, its API letting in whoever its operator lets in to do everything, the store API refusing writes, joining by ID and from a pinned checkpoint, and what it writes by itself.
* guides: getting started with a federationtv3 days3-3/+201
| | | | | | | `docs/guides/federation/` holds the guides to a federated swarm, the design saying what the rules are and they how to live by them. The first: two parties start a federation, a node each, write, read, and let a third party in by their votes. The README points to them.
* continuum-party keys: a key set from authorized_keys lines, comments left outtv3 days1-3/+11
| | | | | | The federation spells a key without a comment, so a key set holding a line's comment is none. `continuum-party keys` takes each key as an `authorized_keys` line, one argument each, and writes it as the federation spells it.
* client: a record begun from the store's root casts on its first versiontv3 days2-9/+42
| | | | | | | | | | A record casts nothing on the version current when it began, as a `true` sent before may be held back somewhere. A federation's first version is current from its start, so a record begun at a node casts nothing on it, and with every party's begun so, no proposal on it can pass. `continuum-party init PARTY --root FILE` begins a record from the file the store's swarm starts from, for a party that never voted in it (`Record::before`): nothing was sent before it, and it casts on every version, the first too. A node voting by itself takes such a record as its `--store-vote-record`.
* federation.md, federation-tests.md: the stages end with remakesdesigns/federation-1-stage-5tv3 days2-4/+1
| | | | | | What a federation is used for is read and written through a node's API: kartei's entries are signed in by their parties and read from what counts there, with no stage of their own.
* federation.md: kartei's files, identifiers and rules on a federated swarmtv3 days1-11/+25
| | | | | | | | | The registry holds each kartei namespace in its party's, a place per file. What kartei's consumers read as one for all (host and user names, the names hosts go by, addresses and blocks in every net but `internet`) is shared, at places of its own, given by krebs's rules: a party's by its name, and what kartei gives it beyond them by a rule each in the first version. What kartei's consumers read is written out from what counts, but for what names an identifier the current version doesn't give its party.
* held: the store's worker reads a document only while it is writabletv3 days1-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | A rejoin makes the node's document writable again only as it ends, in the lock of the swap, once the node checked the epoch (`Holding::follows`) and follows it or gives it up. The store's worker reads nothing, and writes nothing, while the document isn't writable, checked in the lock it reads under. Whether a rejoin runs isn't enough: its state is taken up for its last checks, while the epoch's document is still the node's, and a store started from that document would keep the checkpoint it read there, and put again what it took into the document the node goes back to.
* simtest: row 15 with joiners handed an epoch they can't checktv3 days1-40/+57
| | | | | | | | | | A node with an empty document can't tell an epoch made up from another it can't check: either way it takes the snapshot's checkpoint only where its operator named or pinned it. The others move to a checkpoint and compact; f, joining and pinning nothing, doesn't take their epoch, and g, pinning the checkpoint, takes it and reads what they read. A made-up epoch served by d, an honest node besides, is row 31's alone: d follows the others' epoch wherever it reaches them.
* simtest: d, serving a higher made-up epoch, is apart from the otherstv3 days1-2/+9
| | | | | | Reaching the others, d rejoins their epoch, the lower, as any node holding a store does, and e, reaching only d, finds their epoch there, not d's. Cut off from them, d stays on the one it made up.
* simtest: row 15's made-up epoch is of a higher ID than the others'tv3 days1-9/+13
| | | | | | | Of a lower one, the others try to rejoin it every so often, as in row 31, and f, rejoining their epoch, finds them away mid-sync and gives up for that, not for its checkpoint. Of a higher ID, they leave it alone; e, reaching only d, still takes it, as one joining takes the newer generation.
* remake: a failed simulation's dump shows each node's catch-uptv3 days1-5/+15
| | | | | Its target, attempts, whether the node rejoins now, and why the last try failed, before the lines of the remake records.
* simtest: in row 15, the joiner reads as the node serving it doestv3 days1-6/+9
| | | | | | d, serving the epoch it made up, puts again there what its store holds, as every node holding a store does: e, judging every event, reads what d reads, the checkpoint the others moved to among it, not the root alone.
* simtest: row 31's later write builds on what is above the checkpointtv3 days1-2/+2
| | | | | It builds on tv's write, the checkpoint's head: one built on the root isn't above the heads of the checkpoint the nodes moved to, and they refuse it.
* held: nothing of a rejoin's document is read before the node follows ittv3 days1-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | While a node rejoins, its document is that of the epoch it tries, which it follows only once it checks it (`Holding::follows`). The store's worker reads nothing of it, and writes nothing, while the node rejoins: else the store, starting there from the snapshot's checkpoint, would take one the node neither builds nor has pinned, and keep it should the node give up the rejoin.
* docs: the federation's test plan, built to stage 5tv3 days1-5/+5
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* simtest: made-up epochs handed to a node holding a store (rows 15, 31)tv3 days2-1/+177
| | | | | | | | | | d serves an epoch of the next generation it made up, of a lower ID than the others', its snapshot holding the root as the document stood before the checkpoint they moved to. A node joining with nothing that reaches only d takes it, the root being what its operator named, and reads only what it holds (15); one reaching only the others takes not their epoch, whose checkpoint it neither builds nor has pinned (15); the others try d's, find its root before their document's checkpoint, and stay on theirs (31).