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| author | slopulus <slop@lassul.us> | 2026-11-17 20:01:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tv <tv@krebsco.de> | 2026-11-17 21:09:38 +0100 |
| commit | bcda4d67483239691b045c5b978047f017f3b9e3 (patch) | |
| tree | f6a36de02d707969c1c78c03ce589cef171fbad3 /src/simtest/timing.rs | |
| parent | a1e398621eec9472ad67f1eafeba9ff23b012c2f (diff) | |
continuum-party: signing through an ssh-agent
A key held in hardware is never a file: only an ssh-agent signs with it. Given a public
key as `--key` (a `.pub` file, `ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), the client asks
the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign what SSHSIG signs (a sign request with the key's
blob, no flags) and writes the blob around the agent's signature as `ssh-keygen -Y sign`
does. An ECDSA signature the agent gives with a high `s` is made low, the other of its
two spellings, which the federation takes. What it makes is checked before it is used.
A private key file signs as it did.
A test starts `ssh-agent`, adds an ECDSA and an Ed25519 key to it and deletes their
files, signs through it, and has both continuum and `ssh-keygen -Y verify` check each
signature, one of an agent's high-S answers among them. Without OpenSSH it asks nothing.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/simtest/timing.rs')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
