diff options
| author | slopulus <slop@lassul.us> | 2026-11-17 19:57:56 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tv <tv@krebsco.de> | 2026-11-17 21:09:37 +0100 |
| commit | a1e398621eec9472ad67f1eafeba9ff23b012c2f (patch) | |
| tree | adbbf48890e8f1129c8bf40b4145e16fd411b843 /src/access | |
| parent | 393fb4d70fc6bf88debc4ca13d644ea7de9602f5 (diff) | |
keys: a party's key may be ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, its signature low-S only
A party's keys may be held where no file has them, in a Secure Enclave or a phone, and
those are ECDSA keys on NIST P-256. Everywhere a party's key counts (a version's keys, a
key set, the key an event is signed with) such a key is taken beside an Ed25519 one,
spelled as `ssh-keygen` writes it, without a comment: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, a space,
and the base64 of its SSH encoding, its point uncompressed and on the curve.
Its signature is SSHSIG as an Ed25519 one is, hashed with `sha512`, its inner signature
over SHA-256 as SSH signs with such a key. ECDSA signatures are malleable: of `s` and
the curve's order less `s`, both check. So the federation takes one spelling alone: `s`
low, at most half the order, `r` and `s` each SSH's shortest mpint, and the blob reading
back to itself as an Ed25519 one does. What anyone makes of a party's signature is then
none, as before.
The vectors are a key `ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256` made, a first version naming it, and
a write and a key set `ssh-keygen -Y sign` signed with it, each taken; the signature's
high-S twin, which checks as ECDSA, and its `r` spelled longer are none. Ed25519 keys and
signatures are spelled and checked as they were.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/access')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/access/sshsig.rs | 16 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/src/access/sshsig.rs b/src/access/sshsig.rs index e25d8a7..740a727 100644 --- a/src/access/sshsig.rs +++ b/src/access/sshsig.rs @@ -198,7 +198,12 @@ pub(crate) fn sign(key: &SigningKey, namespace: &str, message: &[u8]) -> String } /// What a signature is made over. -fn signed_data(namespace: &[u8], reserved: &[u8], algorithm: &[u8], hash: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> { +pub(crate) fn signed_data( + namespace: &[u8], + reserved: &[u8], + algorithm: &[u8], + hash: &[u8], +) -> Vec<u8> { let mut signed = MAGIC.to_vec(); string(&mut signed, namespace); string(&mut signed, reserved); @@ -207,13 +212,14 @@ fn signed_data(namespace: &[u8], reserved: &[u8], algorithm: &[u8], hash: &[u8]) signed } -fn string(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) { +/// `bytes` as SSH's string: a big-endian `u32` length, then the bytes. +pub(crate) fn string(out: &mut Vec<u8>, bytes: &[u8]) { out.extend_from_slice(&(bytes.len() as u32).to_be_bytes()); out.extend_from_slice(bytes); } /// Reads SSH's encoding. -struct Reader<'a>(&'a [u8]); +pub(crate) struct Reader<'a>(pub(crate) &'a [u8]); impl<'a> Reader<'a> { fn u32(&mut self) -> Result<u32, String> { @@ -222,7 +228,7 @@ impl<'a> Reader<'a> { Ok(u32::from_be_bytes(*bytes)) } - fn string(&mut self) -> Result<&'a [u8], String> { + pub(crate) fn string(&mut self) -> Result<&'a [u8], String> { let length = self.u32()? as usize; if self.0.len() < length { return Err("cut short".to_owned()); @@ -232,7 +238,7 @@ impl<'a> Reader<'a> { Ok(bytes) } - fn end(&self) -> Result<(), String> { + pub(crate) fn end(&self) -> Result<(), String> { if self.0.is_empty() { Ok(()) } else { |
