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authortv <tv@krebsco.de>2026-11-18 12:38:19 +0100
committertv <tv@krebsco.de>2026-11-18 12:38:19 +0100
commit257ad0391ff8eba437108e1885c45314e9fd5833 (patch)
tree3098609e38125c0afb326efeb41a08d0045da3d4 /docs
parentcfe3dbaff24b5ae433b3203d69c7e9bceb4e1ccc (diff)
parent55f36a960a90aedcb6e899ea963cc642fd630a82 (diff)
Merge branch 'ecdsa'
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
-rw-r--r--docs/configuration.md4
-rw-r--r--docs/federation-tests.md7
-rw-r--r--docs/federation.md47
-rw-r--r--docs/guides/federation/building-on-the-api.md8
-rw-r--r--docs/guides/federation/getting-started.md6
-rw-r--r--docs/guides/federation/keys.md31
-rw-r--r--docs/guides/federation/upgrades.md7
7 files changed, 86 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/docs/configuration.md b/docs/configuration.md
index d246082..989f268 100644
--- a/docs/configuration.md
+++ b/docs/configuration.md
@@ -256,4 +256,8 @@ record = "/home/tv/.config/continuum/tv.record"
continuum-party --config tv.toml write home/tv/motd '"hello"'
```
+`key` is an OpenSSH private key file, or a public key an ssh-agent holds: the key itself
+(`key = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAA…"`), or a file of such lines, whose first signs
+([`guides/federation/keys.md`](guides/federation/keys.md), Keys in an ssh-agent).
+
`node` and `token` are secrets: never logged, however they are given.
diff --git a/docs/federation-tests.md b/docs/federation-tests.md
index d7e4a43..ba182ad 100644
--- a/docs/federation-tests.md
+++ b/docs/federation-tests.md
@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ built to: a stage is done when its tests are.
## The harness
* **Keys.** Ed25519 keys made from seeds, signing as `ssh-keygen -Y sign` does; a vector
- checks one signature against `ssh-keygen` itself.
+ checks one signature against `ssh-keygen` itself. An ECDSA key `ssh-keygen` made, and
+ events it signed with it, are vectors; a test signs through a running `ssh-agent`, and
+ `ssh-keygen -Y verify` checks what it signed: the machine testing needs OpenSSH.
* **Events.** A builder for every kind (writes, key sets, node lists, proposals, votes,
version events, checkpoints, roots and forks), each from a party, a key and its
dependencies, encoded and signed as the design says; and for what is none: bytes that
@@ -115,7 +117,8 @@ Vectors for: an event and its ID; an event whose value holds names JCS sorts by
UTF-16 units otherwise than by their bytes (one from U+E000 to U+FFFF beside one beyond
U+FFFF); events at federation 1's sizes and just past them; a signature, a version and
its hash, a checkpoint and its ID, the genesis change of a federation's root and of a
-fork's, and a snapshot after a checkpoint. A vector that changes is a change of the
+fork's, a snapshot after a checkpoint, and a version naming an ECDSA key, with a write
+and a key set `ssh-keygen` signed with it. A vector that changes is a change of the
federation, which takes its next number ([`federation.md`](federation.md), Changing the
federation).
diff --git a/docs/federation.md b/docs/federation.md
index 7b453af..5faa478 100644
--- a/docs/federation.md
+++ b/docs/federation.md
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ What an adversary can do:
* delay or drop messages between any nodes, short of forever between honest ones;
* steal another party's key.
-What it can't: forge an Ed25519 signature, or find two byte strings with one SHA-256.
+What it can't: forge an Ed25519 or ECDSA signature, or find two byte strings with one
+SHA-256.
Out of scope: keeping anything from being read (every party reads all of it), hiding who
talks to whom, and a party's own machine taken over whole (then the adversary is that
@@ -125,11 +126,12 @@ Spread out:
* **`deps`**: the IDs of its dependencies, as 64 lower-case hex digits, one at least,
ascending, none twice; a client gives the heads it read.
-* **`party`** and **`key`**: the party that signs it, and the key it signs with:
- `ssh-ed25519`, one space, and the key's base64, padded and canonical, with no comment,
- its 32 bytes an Ed25519 public key. Keys in a version and a key set are spelled so
- too, and node IDs as continuum spells them: `continuum:` and the 64 lower-case hex
- digits of the node's Ed25519 public key.
+* **`party`** and **`key`**: the party that signs it, and the key it signs with: its
+ type, one space, and the base64 of its SSH encoding, padded and canonical, with no
+ comment. Two types: `ssh-ed25519`, its 32 bytes an Ed25519 public key, and
+ `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, its point on NIST P-256 uncompressed. Keys in a version and a
+ key set are spelled so too, and node IDs as continuum spells them: `continuum:` and
+ the 64 lower-case hex digits of the node's Ed25519 public key.
* **What it does**, one field of:
* `write`, `{"path": "<path>", "value": <value>}`: a value at a place (The policy);
* `keys`, `["<key>", …]`: the party's key set (Keys);
@@ -141,9 +143,14 @@ Spread out:
* **`sig`**: an SSH signature (`ssh-keygen -Y sign`, namespace `continuum-federation`)
over the event's bytes without `sig`: the SSHSIG blob of version 1, hashed with
`sha512`, its key the event's `key`, its reserved field empty, as `ssh-keygen` writes
- it, in base64, padded and canonical, unarmored. It is checked as continuum checks a
- user's signature, strictly *(checked: `access::sshsig::verify_blob`)*, which takes
- `sha256` too, and any reserved field: the federation asks `sha512` and an empty one.
+ it, in base64, padded and canonical, unarmored. An Ed25519 signature is checked as
+ continuum checks a user's signature, strictly *(checked:
+ `access::sshsig::verify_blob`)*, which takes `sha256` too, and any reserved field: the
+ federation asks `sha512` and an empty one. An ECDSA signature is over the SHA-256 of
+ what it signs, as SSH signs with such a key. Its `s` and the curve's order less `s`
+ both check, so the federation takes the low one alone, at most half the order, and `r`
+ and `s` each as SSH's shortest mpint *(checked: `federation::keys`)*. `ssh-keygen`
+ makes either; a party's client makes `s` low.
Three things no party signs, as their bytes need no signer, each without `party`, `key`
and `sig`: a version event (Changing the policy), and a federation's root and a fork's,
@@ -193,12 +200,13 @@ current at its heads, Forks). Spread out:
* **The federation** it follows, and its **number**, one more than that of the version
it changes.
* **The parties and their keys** (`keys`): one party at least, each by name, as
- continuum's user names, 1 to 64 of `A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ @ -`, with one `ssh-ed25519` key
- or more, none twice in the version. With them the party signs its votes and proposals
- on this version, its key set and its node list (Keys, Nodes). Its `since` is the
- number of the version that named them anew: this one's where it does (a party new in
- it, keys the parties replace, or the same keys named anew), else the `since` the
- version it changes gives the party, whose keys it then names unchanged.
+ continuum's user names, 1 to 64 of `A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ @ -`, with one key or more
+ (`ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, Events), none twice in the version. With them
+ the party signs its votes and proposals on this version, its key set and its node list
+ (Keys, Nodes). Its `since` is the number of the version that named them anew: this
+ one's where it does (a party new in it, keys the parties replace, or the same keys
+ named anew), else the `since` the version it changes gives the party, whose keys it
+ then names unchanged.
* **The node lists** (`nodes`): every party's, a list of node IDs, none twice, with its
`since` as keys have one. The version that lets a party in names its list anew, empty
where it gives it no nodes, so that a list it wrote before it was taken out counts no
@@ -691,7 +699,7 @@ crafted events. *Sim*: a simulation. *Bench*: measured, not judged.
| 59 | Two checkpoints proposed at once, by nodes voting by themselves | The votes split; nays from the nodes backing one make the other dead, and its backers are free | sim |
| 60 | Two nodes of one party, each voting by itself | They can vote twice, answered as any party voting twice: a party has one node vote by itself | — |
| 61 | A key a version names, kept on a node that votes by itself, stolen with it | As 23: it counts while that version is current | unit |
-| 62 | A party's event spelled anew by another: its `sig` or `key` encoded otherwise, its signature's S not canonical, its blob naming another key | None: `key` and `sig` read back to themselves, the signature is checked strictly, and the blob's key is `key` | unit |
+| 62 | A party's event spelled anew by another: its `sig` or `key` encoded otherwise, its signature's S not canonical (of ECDSA, the order less `s`, or `r` or `s` with zeros more in front), its blob naming another key | None: `key` and `sig` read back to themselves, the signature is checked strictly (of ECDSA, `s` low and `r` and `s` each its shortest), and the blob's key is `key` | unit |
| 63 | A node joining from the root is shown a chain old keys grew, beside the one the others took | It takes neither, and reports; once a checkpoint passed, it joins from a pinned one, where that chain is refused | unit |
| 64 | Checkpoint heads before the current checkpoint, or at which it isn't current, or one in another's history | No version: a version event naming it is refused | unit |
| 65 | After a checkpoint, a party that backed a second proposal once its first was dead, the nays that freed it withheld by those who cast them | Not named: its client keeps those nays with its `true` | unit |
@@ -786,6 +794,13 @@ moves to it by a version of its policy that names it (`"federation": 2`), which
parties pass once their nodes run a continuum that knows it. A node that doesn't know
the federation, or a version, its swarm has stops taking events and says so.
+A change that only has the federation take what it refused, and reads nothing it took
+otherwise, keeps the number: the keys of type `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256` taken beside Ed25519
+ones are such a change. It is rolled out first and used after: every node runs a
+continuum that takes it before any party uses it. A node that doesn't refuses what uses
+it, a version naming such a key among them, and reads otherwise than the others until
+it does.
+
## The registry on it
The krebs registry today: users, their hosts, the hosts' names, addresses and keys, as
diff --git a/docs/guides/federation/building-on-the-api.md b/docs/guides/federation/building-on-the-api.md
index 9f144be..4f37b91 100644
--- a/docs/guides/federation/building-on-the-api.md
+++ b/docs/guides/federation/building-on-the-api.md
@@ -41,11 +41,13 @@ sorts them:
* `deps`: the heads it read (`heads` in `GET /events`), each as 64 lower-case hex digits,
ascending, one at least.
-* `key`: the key it signs with, `ssh-ed25519`, a space, the base64 of its blob, no
- comment; one of the party's keys.
+* `key`: the key it signs with, its type (`ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`), a
+ space, the base64 of its blob, no comment; one of the party's keys.
* `sig`: an SSH signature (`ssh-keygen -Y sign`, namespace `continuum-federation`, hashed
with `sha512`) over the JCS bytes of the object without `sig`: the SSHSIG blob, its
- reserved field empty, in base64, unarmored.
+ reserved field empty, in base64, unarmored. Of an ECDSA key, its `s` low, at most half
+ the curve's order: `ssh-keygen` makes a high one half the time, which no node takes;
+ sign again, or put the order less `s` in its place.
* The value is any JSON with integers only, from −2⁵³ to 2⁵³; the event up to 256 KiB.
Put its bytes as they are:
diff --git a/docs/guides/federation/getting-started.md b/docs/guides/federation/getting-started.md
index ce2b614..3570ee3 100644
--- a/docs/guides/federation/getting-started.md
+++ b/docs/guides/federation/getting-started.md
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ That builds the node, `continuum`, and the party's client, `continuum-party`, in
## A key for each party
-The version names each party's keys, and the party signs with them. The client reads an
-OpenSSH Ed25519 key without a passphrase:
+The version names each party's keys, and the party signs with them. A key is
+`ssh-ed25519` or `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`. The client reads an OpenSSH private key file
+without a passphrase, of an Ed25519 key, or signs through an ssh-agent holding the key
+([`keys.md`](keys.md), Keys in an ssh-agent):
```sh
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N '' -f tv.key
diff --git a/docs/guides/federation/keys.md b/docs/guides/federation/keys.md
index 48018a3..3dd2834 100644
--- a/docs/guides/federation/keys.md
+++ b/docs/guides/federation/keys.md
@@ -25,12 +25,41 @@ continuum-party --node http://tv:secret@localhost:3000 --key laptop.key \
Each key goes as one argument, an `authorized_keys` line; its comment is left out. A
set holds up to 16 keys. A node voting by itself keeps a key its version names on that
-node (`--store-vote-key`): one stolen there votes for the party.
+node (`--store-vote-key`), an Ed25519 key in a file: one stolen there votes for the
+party.
A set counts where it is written under a version numbered at least the `since` the
current version gives the party's keys: once a version names a party's keys anew, no set
written before counts, and the party writes its set again.
+## Keys in an ssh-agent
+
+A key no file holds signs through an ssh-agent holding it: a smartcard's or a security
+key's PIV key, which the agent reaches through PKCS#11 (`ssh-add -s`), or a key in a
+Secure Enclave or a phone, held by an agent there. Such a key is `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256` or
+`ssh-ed25519`. A security key's FIDO key (`ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk` or `-t ed25519-sk`,
+its type ending in `@openssh.com`) is neither: it signs otherwise than the federation
+takes, and is no party's key.
+
+Give the client its public key as `--key`, the key itself (an `authorized_keys` line) or
+a file holding it: it asks the agent at `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to sign, and writes the signature
+as `ssh-keygen -Y sign` does through that agent. Of a file holding several keys (all
+`ssh-add -L` lists, say), the first signs, and the client warns: give another itself to
+sign with it. An agent that doesn't hold the key given signs nothing, and the client stops
+before it records or puts what it would have signed.
+
+```sh
+ssh-add -L # ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAA… tv@phone
+ssh-add -L | grep tv@phone | cut -d' ' -f1,2 # the key as a version or a set names it
+continuum-party --node http://tv:secret@localhost:3000 \
+ --key "$(ssh-add -L | grep tv@phone)" --record tv.record \
+ write home/tv/motd '"from the phone"'
+```
+
+Of an ECDSA signature, `s` and the curve's order less `s` both check. The federation
+takes the low one alone, so that nobody makes another event of what the party signed;
+the client makes `s` low, whichever the agent gives.
+
## Changing the keys of a set
A write counts only while the key that signed it is among the party's keys: what a key
diff --git a/docs/guides/federation/upgrades.md b/docs/guides/federation/upgrades.md
index 945088d..95dab12 100644
--- a/docs/guides/federation/upgrades.md
+++ b/docs/guides/federation/upgrades.md
@@ -32,3 +32,10 @@ naming another is taken as a proposal, and a party's client backs none.
A change to any of that is a federation of its own, with the next number, and its own
design. A swarm moves to it by a version naming it, which the parties pass once their
nodes run a continuum that knows it.
+
+A change that only has the federation take what it refused, and reads nothing it took
+otherwise, keeps the number: `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256` keys beside Ed25519 ones. Roll it out
+first, then use it: every party's operators upgrade their nodes, and only then does a
+party name such a key in a version or a key set, or sign with one. A node not upgraded
+refuses what uses it and reads otherwise than the others: a version naming such a key is
+none to it, and it stays on the version before.